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WHEN ARE RELEASES OF CLAIMS FOR
ERISA PLAN BENEFITS EFFECTIVE?
ALBERT FEUER*

The Supreme Court made the following statement about the
limits, if any, on the effectiveness of purported releases of
statutory rights:
It has been held in this and other courts that a statutory right
conferred on a private party, but affecting the public interest, may
not be waived or released if such waiver or release contravenes the
statutory policy.'
Congress made the following declaration when it enacted the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"):
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this Act to protect interstate
commerce and the interests of participants in employee benefit
plans and their beneficiaries ....2

I.

INTRODUCTION

ERISA significantly enhanced safeguards for pension and
welfare benefits of employees. ERISA did this by establishing
nationwide standards "with respect to the establishment,
operation and administration of... [employee benefit] plans,"3 and
"standards of conduct, responsibility and obligations for fiduciaries
of employee benefit plans"' which could be enforced with
"appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal
courts."5
This Article proposes that ERISA requires the
application of the following principles to determine if a release
deprives an individual of the right to a court review of the denial of
a claim to a benefit entitlement under an ERISA plan:6
* The Law Offices of Albert Feuer, J.D. Yale Law School, Mathematics

Ph. D. Columbia University. The author wishes to thank Edgar Pauk and
Richard Reilly for repeatedly highlighting ERISA's many cross currents.
1. Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704 (1945) (internal

citations omitted).
2. ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2000).
3. ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a).

4. ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
5. Id.
6. This Article will focus on releases to ERISA plans and their fiduciaries

of claims by individuals for the entitlement of plan benefits. Thus, we will not
focus on releases of such claims to spouses or medical providers or releases of
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1) The ERISA spendthrift prohibition on the assignment or
alienation of pension benefits voids any release of such a plan or its
fiduciaries from a claim that an individual is entitled to accrued
benefits under such plan. This does not preclude settlements of
pension benefit claims disputes. However, only judicially approved
settlements are binding. Settlements of overtime payment disputes
also require such approval to be effective. v
2) The ERISA fiduciary-duty provisions void any release of a welfare
plan or its respective fiduciaries from claims that an individual is
entitled to benefits under such plans unless, when the individual
executed the purported release:
(a) the individual voluntarily agreed to release the plan and
fiduciaries from the claim at issue;
(b) the individual fully understood what a prudent fiduciary would
have known about the released rights; and
(c) the individual received fair and reasonable consideration for such
release.
Thus, a court reviewing the effectiveness of a release must generally
review the individual's underlying benefit claim.
3) The fiduciary-duty provisions void any release of a pension plan,
or its fiduciaries, from a claim that an individual is entitled to
benefits that accrued under such plan on or after the execution of
the "release,"8 unless each of the three conditions set forth in the
second principle is satisfied. Two such major releases are often at
issue. First, the release of a right to participate in an ERISA plan,
such as a 401(k) plan or a medical plan, 9 and second, the release of a
right to have payments that are part of a settlement of a non-ERISA
dispute, such as one pertaining to a purported wrongful layoff,
treated for pension benefit purposes in the same manner as similar
compensation.'0 This does not preclude settlements of non-ERISA

any claims against ERISA fiduciaries other than the failure to pay the plan
benefits to which an individual is entitled. Nor will we consider purported
implicit releases of such claims on the basis that an individual failed to make
timely benefit claim or a timely appeal at the denial of such a claim. We will,
however, consider implicit releases arising from the characterization of an
individual's compensation and service in settlements of non-ERISA disputes,
such as wrongful termination settlements.
7. However, Department of Labor approval also suffices for releases of
rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. 29 U.S.C. § 216(C).
8. Releases are only permitted for pension benefits that have not yet
accrued. A release of accrued pension benefits is void by the first principle.
9. Thus, the fair and reasonable requirement would appear to void an
individual's decision to defer monthly compensation of $1,000 in exchange for
an increase in monthly compensation of $100.
10. These releases may purport to bind the pension plan implicitly on the
basis that the individual has agreed not challenge the characterization of the
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disputes, but prevents them from violating ERISA's fiduciary
provisions.
4) Therefore, a purported release of the benefits described in the
second and third principles is not effective merely because the
agreement with the release includes boilerplate provisions that the
individual: (a) read and understood the agreement, and (b) was
given the opportunity to, and was encouraged to, seek assistance of
legal or other professional counsel. Also adding references to all
claims arising from the participant's employment, to all employee
benefit claims, or even to all claims against the named plan, will not
suffice. These provisions do not show that the individual fully
understood the claim at issue or received fair consideration for such
claim. By contrast, both informed consent and fair consideration
usually accompany an equitable settlement of a bona fide dispute
about an individual's entitlement to benefits from an ERISA plan.
These four principles, which rest upon ERISA's fundamental
purpose and basic provisions, have not been consistently
considered or applied by the courts. The courts have also rarely
considered whether ERISA voids all attempts to release claims to
(1) any ERISA benefit entitlements;" or (2) accrued pension
benefits.
Many courts have instead applied contract principles,
supplemented at times by special scrutiny, rather than ERISA
fiduciary principles.
Fiduciary principles place the burden of
showing that the individual received fair consideration and fully
understood the release on the party wishing to rely on the release.
Thus, individuals are being wrongfully denied pension and welfare
benefits to which they are entitled by releases that wrongfully
deprive them of access to federal courts to challenge improper
claim denials. 3

II. ERISA's PURPOSE, COVERAGE, AND MAJOR PROVISIONS
As ERISA Section 2: Congressional Findings and Declaration
of Policy declares:
The Congress finds that the growth in size, scope, and numbers of
employee benefit plans in recent years has been rapid and
substantial.., that the continued well-being and security of
millions of employees and their dependents are directly affected by
these plans; that they are affected with a national public interest;

payment in the settlement.
11. ERISA § 410, 29 U.S.C. § 1110(a), prohibits any agreement which
purports to relieve fiduciaries of their duties. One of the most basic fiduciary
duties is the obligation to follow plan terms, ERISA § 404(a)(4)(D), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a)(1)(D), and thus pay individuals the plan benefits to which they are
entitled.
12. ERISA § 206(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d).
13. Class actions have also been wrongfully denied certification for similar
reasons.
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that they have become an important factor affecting the stability of
employment and the successful development of industrial
relations... that owing to the lack of employee information and
adequate safeguards concerning their operation, it is desirable in
the interests of employees and their beneficiaries, and to provide for
the general welfare and the free flow of commerce, that disclosure be
made and safeguards be provided with respect to the establishment,
14
operation, and administration of such plans ....

A. ERISA Purpose and Coverage
ERISA was enacted in response to numerous protests by
employees and their beneficiaries who had not received their
anticipated pension and welfare benefits."
Under the pre-ERISA rules, very few employees qualified for
pension benefits and those that qualified would often find, on
retiring, that there were no assets to pay their benefits. Workers
could be required to be employed by the same employer without
any interruption of employment until they attained their "normal
retirement age" to be entitled to any pension benefits.16 Further,
employers did not have to fund pension benefits adequately17 and
no government agency insured pension benefits.18
Under the pre-ERISA rules, many participants who qualified
for pension or welfare benefits were also not paid their promised
benefits because of improper plan operations: 9
" There were no general federal standards requiring persons
operating such plans to pay promised benefits or to avoid
transactions which could dissipate plan assets;
* Participants and beneficiaries were not generally entitled to the
disclosure of plan terms and conditions, their benefits, or the
financial condition of their plans; and
" Participants and beneficiaries had no federal right to appeal benefit
denials either within the plan or to the courts unless they

14. ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
15. See generally JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME
SECURITY ACT OF 1974 A POLITICAL HISTORY (2005).

16. S. REP. NO. 93-383 (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890, 4901.
17. Although, the pre-ERISA tax qualification rules of the Internal Revenue
Code for pension plans contained funding rules, I.R.C. § 404(a)(1), there were
not sufficient advance funding requirements. See e.g., S. REP. NO. 93-383,
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890, 4901, 4940; H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 93-1280
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5064.
18. See e.g., S. REP. NO. 93-383, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890, 4902,
4962 (referencing the 1963 Studebaker shutdown in which participants
received only fifteen percent of their vested benefits). See WOOTEN, supra note
15, at 51-79 for a discussion of the role of Studebaker in creating ERISA.
19. See, e.g., SACHER ET AL., EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW xciv-xcv (2000).
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0
participated in certain collectively bargained plans.

ERISA, which was enacted in 1974, generally applies to both
2
pension plans (which include profit-sharing plans) ' and welfare
plans (which include medical, disability, life insurance, and
severance plans).22 For simplicity, all such covered plans will be
2
ERISA does not require
herein denoted as ERISA plans.
employers to establish any ERISA plans, but it does impose
minimum standards on the establishment and operation of any
4
covered employee benefit plans that employers choose to adopt.
25
Defined contribution pension plans ("DC plans") are pension
20. Benefit denials by collectively bargained plans administered jointly by
representatives of the union and the employer or employers could be
challenged as violations of section 302 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 186. This section permits the establishment and operation of jointly
administered employee benefit plans. Id. Beneficiaries, however, had to show
the determination was arbitrary and capricious. There was also no protection
against employer retaliation. See Firestone Tire & Rubber v. Bruch, 489 U.S.
101, 108-11 (1989) and Kathryn Kennedy, Judicial Standards of Review in
ERISA Benefit Claim Cases, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1083, 1100-04 (2001).
21. Pension plans are generally defined as plans which provide retirement
income to employees or result in the deferral of income by employees for
periods extending to the termination of covered employment; however, under
certain circumstances severance plans arrangements are not treated as
pension plans. ERISA § 3(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2). Employees may but need
not be able to obtain distributions from pension plans before the termination
Profit-sharing plans often permit such in-service
of employment.
distributions, although 401(k) plans may only permit the distribution of
employee contributions.
22. Welfare plans are generally defined as plans which provide participants
or their beneficiaries with medical, surgical, or hospital care, or benefits, or
benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death, or unemployment,
or vacation benefits, apprenticeship, or other training programs, or daycare
centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(1). These plans do not include payroll practices, such as sick pay,
holiday pay, jury pay, or overtime. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-lb(3) (2005). See also
Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 120-21 (1989) (distinguishing between
unfunded vacation benefit plans and ERISA-covered welfare benefit plans).
23. ERISA does not, however, cover employee benefit plans whose only
participants are the owners and the spouses of the owners of the trade or
business sponsoring the plan. It is irrelevant whether the sponsor is a
corporation, a partnership, or an unincorporated entity. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.33(b)-(c). If there are other participants, then the owner and the owner's
spouse are provided with the ERISA protections such as the protection of
pension plan assets of a bankrupt participant. See generally Yates v. Hendon,
541 U.S. 1 (2004).
24. See, e.g., Esden v. Bank of Boston, 229 F.3d 154, 172 (2d Cir. 2000).
25. ERISA § 3(34), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34). A participant's benefits in such
plans are based solely upon the amounts contributed to the participant's
account. Any income, expenses, gains, losses, and any forfeitures from other
participants' accounts, are allocated among the remaining participants'
accounts. All investment risk is placed on the participant, who benefits from
investment gains and suffers from investment losses. Thus a participant's
accrued benefits, namely the participant's account balance, may either
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plans in which each participant has an individual account. Profitsharing plans and 401(k) plans are DC plans.
Defined benefit pension plans ("DB plans")26 are pension plans
in which participants do not have individual accounts.27
A
participant's benefits in DB plans are expressed in the form of a
life annuity, beginning at the participant's normal retirement
age.' The annuity is called the participant's "normal retirement
benefit" and is derived from a formula that usually includes the
participant's compensation and years of service.'
B. Major ERISA Provisions
ERISA protects pension benefits more than welfare benefits,
as is suggested by the inclusion of the term "retirement" in the
name of the statute." Explicit mandates address four distinct
dangers to pension benefits.
First, pension benefits may not be assigned or alienated.3
Thus, the benefits may not be endangered by a participant's
agreement to surrender any of his or her pension benefits.
Second, pension benefits may not be forfeited if the plan
increase or decrease in the course of a year. Benefits may be and usually are
made available on a participant's termination of employment. Distributions
may be also permitted prior to the termination of such employment.
26. ERISA § 3(35), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35).
27. But see Patrick J. Purcell, The Enron Bankruptcy and Employer Stock
in
Retirement
Plans,
available
at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/9102.pdf (Mar. 11, 2002), for a
discussion of hybrid plans in which a participant's benefit in a DB plan is
presented as an individual account.
28. See ERISA § 3(24), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(24), for the definition of a
participant's normal retirement age).
29. Such annuities may be converted into lump sum equivalents as of the
participant's normal retirement age or as of any other time, although the plan
need not permit lump sum payments of such amounts. All investment risk is
placed on the employer, who benefits from investment gains and suffers from
investment losses. Thus, a participant's accrued benefits, namely the annuity
beginning as of the participant's normal retirement age, may not decrease in a
year. For example, a participant who has accrued a $1,000 annual lifetime
annuity beginning as of the participant's normal retirement age may not find
that such benefit will decrease at any later time. Benefits may be, but are
often not, made available when a participant terminates employment for a
reason other than death, although distributions are not generally permitted
prior to such termination.
30. Plans may provide both pension benefits and welfare benefits, such as
.pension plans" which provide disability 'pension" benefits to participants
during the participant's disability rather than for life. Those disability
benefits are thus welfare benefits rather than pension benefits. The pension
plan provisions apply only to the pension benefits but not to the welfare
benefits, whether provided by a pension plan or a welfare plan. See e.g.,
McBarron v. S & T Indus., Inc., 771 F.2d 94, 98 (6th Cir. 1985); Rombach v.
Nestle USA, Inc., 211 F.3d 190, 193-94 (2d Cir. 2000).
31. ERISA § 206(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1).
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sponsor has employed a participant for at least a short statutory
period.32 Thus, the benefits may not be endangered by a sponsor's
plan provision or an administrator's plan practice.
Third, pension assets must be held in trust." Thus, the
benefits may not be endangered by a sponsor's weak financial
position, which could otherwise permit a sponsor's creditor to
obtain plan assets.
Finally, pension plans must meet minimum advance funding
Thus, the benefits may not be endangered by the
requirements.'
employer's failure to put aside sufficient funds to satisfy the plan's
expected obligations.
Congress reinforced these mandates when it adopted ERISA
by also establishing a government agency, the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation (the "PBGC"), to insure benefits from DB
plans.' Thus, the benefits may not be endangered because the
plan lacks sufficient funds to pay its actual obligations.36 Such
shortfalls may result from poor investment performance, changes
in employee populations, inappropriate actuarial projections, or
The PBGC is financed with
inadequate advance funding.
premiums from DB plan sponsors37 and it has the authority to
recover any benefit payments made on behalf of an insufficiently
funded plan from the controlled group, which contains the plan's
32. ERISA § 203, 29 U.S.C. § 1053.

33. ERISA § 403, 29 U.S.C. § 1103, which also permits insurance contracts
and custodial IRA accounts to be used instead of trusts. The section applies to
any funded plan, which may also include welfare plans such as a funded
medical insurance plan.
34. ERISA §§ 301-308, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086.
35. ERISA § 4000 et. seq., 29 U.S.C. § 1301 et. seq., also known as Title IV
of ERISA. No government guarantee applies to benefits provided by DC plans,
such as 401(k) plans.
36. A participant's benefits may, however, exceed the guaranteed benefits,
if the benefits were increased within five years of the termination or if they
are in excess of the statutory guarantees (which are adjusted annually for

inflation). ERISA §§ 4022-4022A, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1322-1322a. See American
Academy of Actuaries, PBGC and United Airlines, How Does United's
termination affect the PBGC deficit? (May 12, 2005) ($3.2 billion of pension
benefits for United Airlines were not funded or guaranteed on May 10, 2005
when a bankruptcy judge permitted United to terminate its pension plans).
The total PBGC premiums may not suffice to pay all guaranteed benefits for
the airline plans, let alone the other insured plans. See generally Protecting
Pensions: HearingBefore the S. Finance Comm., 109th Cong. (June 7, 2005)
(statement of David Walker, Comptroller-General, Government Accountability
TO
ACCOUNTING
OFFICE
REPORT
Office);
U.S.
GOVERNMENT
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES. "RECENT EXPERIENCES OF LARGE DEFINED
BENEFIT PLANS ILLUSTRATE WEAKNESSES IN FUNDING RULES, GAO-05-294
(MAY 2005). Compare PBGC FEBRUARY 7, 2005 PROPOSAL, "STRENGTHEN
FUNDING FOR SINGLE-EMPLOYER PENSION PLANS, with ERISA INDUSTRY
COMMITTEE MAY 2005 PROPOSAL, CONSENSUS PROPOSALS FOR PENSION
FUNDING, PBGC REFORM AND HYBRID PENSION PLANS.

37. ERISA §§ 4005-4006, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1305-1306.
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sponsor."
ERISA protects both pension and welfare benefits with three
basic sets of provisions. First, standards of conduct, responsibility,
and obligations are set forth for ERISA fiduciaries of all employee
benefit plans."9 ERISA established a uniform set of national rules
that enhanced traditional trust protections by imposing duties
upon a broader class of fiduciaries and prohibited agreements or
plan clauses which relieved fiduciaries from those duties."'
Second, all covered plans must meet minimum operating
standards. Each employee benefit plan must be established and
maintained pursuant to a written instrument.4' Moreover, each
plan must have, and distribute to participants and beneficiaries, a
summary plan description designed to be understood by an
average plan participant and which describes participants' rights
and obligations."2 Specific disclosure obligations are imposed on
the plan's administrator,' who is defined" as the person
designated in the plan instruments, or if no one is so designated,

38. ERISA §§ 4061-4071, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1371.
39. Fiduciary rules do not apply to unfunded plans maintained primarily to
defer the compensation for a select group of the highly compensated, which are
often called top-hat plans. ERISA §§ 4(b), 401(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1003(b),
1101(a). Such employees are presumed to have sufficient knowledge and
bargaining power to protect their plan interests without resort to ERISA
fiduciary protections. See Dept. of Labor, Advisory Opinion 90-14A (May 8,
1990). But cf.Demery v. Extebank Deferred Compensation Plan (B), 216 F.3d
283, 289-90 (2d Cir. 2000) (treating bargaining power as a secondary factor in
determining whether a plan was such a top-hat plan).
40. See H.R. REP. No. 93-533 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4648-51. See also John Langbein, What ERISA Means by "Equitable": The
Supreme Court's Trail of Error in Russell Mertens and Great-West, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1317 (2003) 1321-32. However, in order to achieve this
broadening of fiduciary protection ERISA, unlike common law trust laws,
permits fiduciaries to have a conflict with their beneficiaries. ERISA does
require, however, that the fiduciary with two hats wear only one at a time,
and wear the fiduciary hat when making fiduciary decisions. Pegram v.
Hardrich, 530 U.S. 211, 225 (2000).
41. ERISA § 402(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1). Every plan must also have a
procedure for amending such plan. ERISA § 402(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3).
42. ERISA § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 1022.
43. A plan administrator must automatically provide (a) summary plan
descriptions at least once every five years, although interim summaries of
material modifications to the plan must be provided more often, and (b)
summary annual reports describing the financial condition of the plan. ERISA
§ 104(b)(1)-(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(1)-(3).
Administrators must make
available for inspection, the plan documents, the latest summary plan
description, and summary annual report-copies of those items must also be
made available at a reasonable charge. ERISA § 104(b)(2), (4), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1024(b)(2), (4). Participants also have the right to obtain on request annual
benefit statements from the administrator. ERISA § 105, 29 U.S.C. § 1025.
See generally ERISA §§ 101-111, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031.
44. ERISA § 3(16), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16).
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the plan sponsor45 is the administrator.
Third, plan participants and beneficiaries are given tools to
enforce their benefit rights, including federal court access. Claims
for ERISA benefits may be filed in federal court." Successful
claimants may be able to recover costs and attorneys' fees. 7
Finally, there are prohibitions on (a) retaliating against employees
for making benefit claims, b) any actions intended to prevent
employees from qualifying for benefits; and (c) retaliating against
a person who has given information in any inquiry related to
ERISA."
Participants and beneficiaries are, however, not generally
permitted to begin a civil action to claim benefit entitlements until
they have exhausted the plan's claims procedures, 4 9 assuming the
45. The plan sponsor for a plan (a) maintained by a single employer is the
employer, (b) maintained by a employee organization is the organization, and
(c) maintained by more than one employer, or by one or more employers and
one or more employee organizations, the association, committee, joint board of
trustees, or similar group of representatives of the parties who establish or
maintain the plan.
46. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). A claim may be based
either on an explicit plan provision or on the assertion that ERISA overrides a
specific plan provision, such as the ERISA prohibition on the forfeiture of
pension benefits. Benefit claims may also be presented as an equitable relief
claim under ERISA section 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). A claim under
the latter provision often asks for plan reformation to eliminate a provision
violating ERISA and then requests benefits under those reformed terms
pursuant to ERISA section 502(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1). An individual
may also use the latter to claim that a plan fiduciary breached its duty by
failing at some time in the past to pay the entitled the benefits to which the
individual was entitled-such a claim may raise a statute of limitations issue
under ERISA section 413, 29 U.S.C. § 1113.
47. ERISA § 502(g)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). Such recoveries are not
always available. See e.g., Lowe v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 361 F.3d 335 (7th Cir.
2004) (holding that a prevailing participant is only awarded attorneys' fees if
plan's litigating position was not "substantially justified"); Leyda v.
AlliedSignal, 322 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2003) (using a five factor test that includes
whether action conferred a common benefit on a group of plan participants).
But cf. Canseco v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 93 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 1996)
(noting a presumption in favor of awarding attorneys' fees to prevailing
participant or beneficiary); Anderson v. Procter & Gamble Disability Plan, 220
F.3d 449 (6th Cir. 2000) (attorneys' fees are not generally available for
internal appeals of plan denial).
48. ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140. This protection applies to all ERISA
plan benefits, not merely pension benefits. Section 510 "helps make [ERISA
benefit] promises credible." Inter-modal Rail Employees Ass'n v. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 520 U.S. 510, 515 (1997). The inquiry protection
applies to both internal and external inquiries. Nicolaou v. Horizon Media,
Inc. 402 F.2d 325 (2d. Cir. 2005).
49. The exhaustion requirements of the various circuits are discussed in
Fallick v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance, 162 F.3d 410, 418-19 (6th Cir. 1998).
The primary purposes of the exhaustion requirement are to: (1) uphold
Congress' desire that ERISA trustees be responsible for their actions,
not the federal courts; (2) provide a sufficiently clear record of
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procedures comply with ERISA minimum standards for a "full and
The claims regulations impose very specific
fair review."'
disclosure obligations on initial and appellate benefit denials so
that participants and beneficiaries will understand the reasons for
the denial and the additional facts, if any, they may present to
show their entitlement to the benefits at issue." The claims
procedures may not contain any provision or be administered in a
way that unduly inhibits or hampers the initiation or processing of
benefit claims, such as imposing a claim filing fee. 2
C. General FiduciaryProvisions
An ERISA fiduciary is required by ERISA section 404(a)(1),
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1),' to

administrative action if litigation should ensue; and (3) assure that any
judicial review of fiduciary action (or inaction) is made under the
arbitrary and capricious standard, not de novo.
Davenport v. Abrams, 249 F.3d 130, 133 (2d Cir. 2001). However, exhaustion
is deemed to have occurred and court access is permitted if the plan fails to
29 C.F.R.
satisfy the ERISA minimum claims resolution standards.
§ 2560.503-1(b),(l). Exhaustion may not be required if the benefits claim is
based on the interpretation of a ERISA statutory requirement, such as the
interest rates that may be used to compute benefits, rather than on the
interpretation of a plan provision. See, e.g., Costantino v. TRW, 13 F.3d 969,
974-75 (6th Cir. 1994). But compare Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 474
U.S. 1087 (1986) in which the Supreme Court declined to rule whether there is
such a distinction.
50. ERISA § 503, 29 U.S.C. § 1133.
51. Benefit denials must do more than refer to plan documents and the
summary plan description that the plan administrator must make available to
all participants. The denial must set forth in a manner designed to be
understood by the claimant:
(i) the specific reason or reasons for adverse determination; (ii)
references to the specific plan provisions on which the determination is
based; (iii) a description of any material or information necessary for the
claimant to perfect the claim and an explanation of why such material
or information is necessary; (iv) a description of the plan's review
procedures and the time limits applicable to such procedures, including
a statement of the claimant's right to bring a suit under [ERISA section
502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)] following an adverse benefit determination
on review.
29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(g) (emphasis added).
52. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(b)(3).
53. These rules were designed to take into account the special nature and
purpose of employee benefits plans, whose beneficiaries required more
protection than the beneficiaries of other trusts. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 931280, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5083. ERISA's enhancements of
existing trust law include the imposition of duties upon a broader class of
fiduciaries, ERISA § 3(21), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21), the prohibition of exculpatory
clauses, ERISA §§ 404(a)(1)(D), 410(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a)(1)(D), 1110(a),
and extensive specific disclosure and reporting requirements, ERISA § 101111, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031. See also H.R. REP. No. 93-533, reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4649-51.
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discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of
the participants and beneficiaries and(A) for the exclusive purpose of: (i) providing benefits to participants
and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of
administering the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of
an enterprise of a like character and with like aims;
(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the
risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly
prudent not to do so; and
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing
the plan insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent
with the provisions of this title [entitled "Protection of Employee
Benefit Rights"] and title IV [entitled "Plan Termination
Insurance"] .'4
The introductory language imposes together with paragraph
(A) a duty of loyalty ("Duty of Loyalty"),' and with paragraph (B) a
duty of care ("Duty of Prudent Care"). Both these duties are
derived from the common law of trusts."
In Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund
v. Central Transport, Inc., the Supreme Court permitted the
fiduciaries of a multi-employer pension and welfare plan57 to
conduct random audits of the employment records of a plan's
contributing employers to determine if the employers were making
the correct contributions.'
The Supreme Court found that no
specific ERISA provision was needed to permit or require such
employer audits because:
In general, trustees' responsibilities and powers under ERISA
reflect Congress' policy of "assuring the equitable character" of the
plans. Thus, rather than explicitly enumerating all of the powers
54. ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
55. This Duty of Loyalty is reinforced by ERISA section 403(c), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1103(c), which prohibits the inurement of plan assets to the benefit of the
sponsoring employer.
56. Cent. States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Cent.
Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570-71 (1985). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 170, at 364 (1959) (Duty of Loyalty); id. § 174, at 379 (Duty to
Exercise Reasonable Care and Skill).
57. A multi-employer plan is one established for a substantial business
purpose in which more than one employer is required to contribute pursuant
to a collective bargaining agreement between one or more employee
organizations and one or more employers. See ERISA § 3(37), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(37); 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-37(c).
58. 472 U.S. at 569-74.
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and duties of trustees and other fiduciaries, Congress invoked the
common law of trusts to define the general scope of their authority
and responsibility. Under the common law of trusts, as under the
Central States trust agreements, trustees are understood to have all
"such powers as are necessary or appropriate for the carrying out of
59
the purposes of the trust."
The Court also stated that "trust documents cannot excuse
trustees from their duties under ERISA" and thus implied that the
plan trustees would have the responsibility and authority to
perform the audits regardless of the trust terms.r°
The Supreme Court subsequently stated in Massachusetts
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell that ERISA fiduciary
mandates were intended
to incorporate the fiduciary standards of trust law into ERISA, and
it is black-letter trust law that fiduciaries owe strict duties running
directly to beneficiaries in the administrationand payment of trust
benefits. The legislative history also shows that Congress intended
these fiduciary standards to govern the ERISA claims61
administration process.
According to ERISA, a person is a fiduciary for an ERISA
plan to the extent:
(i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control
respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or
control regarding management or disposition of its assets,
(ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation,
direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of
such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or
(iii) he has any discretionary authority or
responsibility in the administration of such plan.62

discretionary

Such term includes any person designated under Section
405(c)(1)(B) [allowing that fiduciary authority to be delegated in the
plan governing instrument].63
Thus, a person may be a fiduciary whether or not he has any

59. Id. at 570 (quoting 3 AUSTIN ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 186 (3d ed.
1967)) (emphasis added). The reference to the Scott treatise was footnoted
with references to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 186 and to the
multi-volume treatise, GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, LAW OF
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 551 (2d ed. 1982).
60. Cent. States, 472 U.S. at 568.
61. 473 U.S. at 152-53 (emphasis added). The Court's black-letter trust law
conclusion was supported by references to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 182 and the one-volume treatise, GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T.
BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS § 109 (1973).
62. ERISA § 3(21), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
63. Id.

2005]

When ERISA Benefit Claim's Releases are Effective

plan title.' On the other hand, persons with plan titles often have
the authority, control or responsibility to be treated as engaged in
fiduciary acts.
ERISA explicitly describes some of the responsibilities
associated with the two titles often held by plan fiduciaries: plan
trustee and plan administrator. Plan assets must generally be
held by one or more trustees, who may not delegate the
responsibilities imposed on them by the plan's trust agreement.65
on
plan
imposed
are
obligations
disclosure
Explicit
administrators." In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Russell, the Supreme Court distinguished the fiduciary duties of
plan administrators from those of trustees:67
[Tihe fiduciary obligations of plan administratorsare to serve the

interest of participants and beneficiaries and, specifically, to provide
them with the benefits authorized by the plan. But the principal

statutory duties imposed on the trustees relate to the proper
management, administration, and investment of fund assets, the
maintenance of proper records, the disclosure of specified
information, and the avoidance of conflicts of interest.6
Congress made a fiduciary's duties under ERISA "the highest
known to the law" 9 by adding three enhancements to the
protections of the common law of trusts when it adopted ERISA. 0
First, fiduciary duties were imposed on a broader set of actors and
actions, namely on any person performing a fiduciary act. Second,
the fiduciary principles embodied in ERISA, including the Duty of
Loyalty and Duty of Prudent Care, may not be overridden by any
plan provisions. 7 Third, ERISA section 410, 29 U.S.C. § 1110,
64. Persons performing ministerial functions within a framework of
policies, interpretations, rules, practices and procedures made by other
persons are not thereby fiduciaries. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, D-2. By contrast,
the persons establishing and maintaining the framework are engaged in
fiduciary acts. Id. § 2509.75-8, D-3. See, e.g., Milofsky v. American Airlines,
404 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 2005) (Third party administrator not treated as
fiduciary with respect to notices it distributed because it lacked authority over
the content of such notices).
65. ERISA §§ 403(a), 405(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1103(a), 1105(c)(1).
66. See supra note 43.
67. An individual who is both a plan trustee and administrator would have
both responsibilities.
68. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 142-43 (1985)
(emphasis added). In that case, the Supreme Court concluded that the
"panoply of remedial devices" ERISA places at the disposal of a participant
who did not receive her promised benefits did not include a cause of action for
extra-contractual damages caused by improper or untimely processing of
benefit claims. Id. at 146-48.
69. Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 272 n.8 (2d Cir. 1982).
70. See supra note 53.
71. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(D), 29 § 1104(a)(1)(D). See also H.R. CONF. REP. No.
93-1280, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5083, 5101; S. REP. NO. 93-127
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4865-66, 4869-70.
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voids any agreement or instrument, not merely plan provisions,
purporting to relieve fiduciaries from liability or responsibility for
a breach of fiduciary duty.
III. DETERMINING AN INDIVIDUAL'S PLAN BENEFIT
ENTITLEMENTS IS A FIDUCIARY ACT AND FIDUCIARIES
HAVE A DUTY TO WARN INDIVIDUALS IF THEIR FIDUCIARY
ACT MAY PLACE AN INDIVIDUAL'S PLAN INTEREST AT
MATERIAL RISK

In Pegram v. Herdrich, the Court noted that:
At common law, fiduciary duties characteristically attach to
decisions about managing assets and distributing property to
beneficiaries. Trustees buy, sell, and lease investment property,
lend and borrow, and do other things to conserve and nurture
assets. They pay out income, choose beneficiaries, and distribute
remainders at termination. Thus, the common law trustee's most
defining concern historically has been the payment of money in the
interest of the beneficiary.2
Similarly, in Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Electric Co., the
New York Court of Appeals noted:
A beneficiary, about to plunge into a ruinous course of dealing, may
be betrayed by silence as well as by the spoken word. The trustee is
free to stand aloof, while others act, if all is equitable and fair. He
cannot rid himself of the duty to warn and to denounce, if there is
improvidence or oppression, either apparent on the surface, or
lurking beneath the surface, but visible to his practicedeye. 73
ERISA fiduciaries have two distinct obligations pertaining to
the determination and the payment of plan benefits to which an
individual is entitled. First, the Duty of Prudent Care requires
plan fiduciaries to know, understand, follow the plan terms,
determine the correct benefit entitlements and pay such
entitlements. 4 In some cases individuals may have to resort to
both judicial and internal plan reviews of a benefit denial to
reverse an incorrect benefit claims denial. Second, the Duties of
Care and of Loyalty require plan fiduciaries to warn individuals if
the individual's entitlement to plan benefits may be placed at
material risk by an action of the fiduciary when the fiduciary
knows or should know of such risk. Such fiduciary actions include
encouraging individuals to withdraw from, to refrain from plan
participation or to release the rights to benefit entitlements.75

72. 530 U.S. 211, 231 (2000) (emphasis added and internal citations to
Bogert & Bogert and Scott omitted).
73. 121 N.E. 378, 380 (1918) (emphasis added).
74. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A)-(B), (D); 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)-(B), (D).
75. Id.
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A. Seeking a Release of a Claim ofEntitlement to
ERISA Plan Benefits Is a FiduciaryAct
ERISA treats a person who controls the benefit amount to be
distributed to a plan participant or beneficiary as thereby engaged
in a fiduciary act." Fiduciary duties characteristically attach to
decisions about distributing property to beneficiaries.77 The initial
determination of an individual's entitlement to plan benefits in
response to a benefit claim may be characterized as a fiduciary
action because it is part of the key plan administration
responsibility of providing such benefits. 8 The Supreme Court
recently reemphasized this conclusion in Egelhoff v. Egelhoff,
when it stated that the "the payment of benefits [is] a central
matter of plan administration."" Similarly, the determination of a
participant's benefit entitlement in response to an appeal of a
denial of a participant's claim for plan benefits is also treated as a
fiduciary act.'
Persons making benefit determination are thus acting as
fiduciaries because they are exercising control over the disposition
of plan assets and they have discretionary authority or
responsibility in plan administration."1 There appears to be no
reason to distinguish whether the determination is (a) explicitly

76. ERISA § 3(21)(A)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(1).
77. 530 U.S. at 231. The Court cited BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 59,
§§ 551, 741-47, 751-75, 781-99; 2 A. SCOTT, supra note 59, §§ 176, 181; 3 A.
SCOTT, supra note 59, §§ 188-193, 232.
78. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. at 142-43.
79. 532 U.S. 141, 148 (2001). The Court therein decided that ERISA
preempted local law which purportedly provided that a participant's divorce
overrode a participant's explicit designation of the beneficiary of his benefits
ERISA § 206(d)(3), 29
under an ERISA life insurance plan. Id. at 147-48.
U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3), describes the conditions under which court orders may
override a pension plan participant's beneficiary designations. These orders
are known as "qualified domestic relations orders" ("QDROs"). Id. QDROs may
not, however, be needed to supersede a beneficiary designation for a pension
plan's death benefits. See Silber v. Silber, 786 NE2d 1203 (2003) and Mooore
v. Moore, 2005 Mich App. LEXIS 1055. See also Guardian Life v.Finch, 395
F.3d 238, 242-43 (5th Cir. 2004) and Manning v. Hayes, 212 F.3d 866, 871-72
(5th Cir. 2000), which discuss whether there is a federal common law which
permits spouses to waive their interests in non-pension plan benefits.
80. Varity, 516 U.S. at 514-15 (citing Firestone,489 U.S. at 111).
81. ERISA § 3(21), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21). A person need not have any plan
title to engage in a fiduciary act, although ERISA plans are required to name
the fiduciaries that are authorized to manage and control the operation and
administration of the plan. See ERISA § 402(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1). A
person with such authority, regardless of the person's title, is treated as an
ERISA fiduciary. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, D-3. Fiduciary actions do not include
the performance of merely ministerial tasks, such as persons preparing benefit
computations pursuant to plan terms for the administrator, who would
authorize the actual payment. Such authorizations are treated as fiduciary
acts. Id.
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made in response to a claim for plan benefits or to a formal denial
of a participant's claim for plan benefits as in the Supreme Court
cases described above; or (b) implicitly made by persuading a
participant or beneficiary to release rights to claim an entitlement
to plan benefits.82 The authority and control exercised to obtain a
release and thereby reduce or eliminate a participant's benefit far
exceeds that exercised by (1) the employer the Second Circuit
found to have engaged in a fiduciary act when it delayed the
payment of plan benefits to a former employee by delaying its
submission of the requisite distribution application;' (2) the thirdparty administrator the Ninth Circuit found to have engaged in a
fiduciary act when it decided to pay those health benefit claims
which it deemed so clear that no review was required by the plan
sponsor;' or (3) the employer the Supreme Court found to have
engaged in a fiduciary act when it persuaded employees to cease
participating in its welfare plans.85
The fiduciary act characterization of the process of seeking
and obtaining such a release is unaffected by whether the person
who controlled the process of obtaining the release, often the
participant's employer, has any plan title, such as plan
administrator.
Such person may thus be called a Releasing
Fiduciary. ERISA requires the Releasing Fiduciary, like all
fiduciaries to fulfill the Duty of Loyalty, i.e., to act "solely in the
interests of the participants and beneficiaries" for the "exclusive
purpose of' providing benefits for those persons and defraying the
plan's reasonable administrative expenses."
B. ERISA FiduciariesHave a Duty to Warn If Their FiduciaryAct
May Place an Individual'sPlan Interest at MaterialRisk
The Supreme Court referred to a fiduciary's duty to disclose
facts which it knows or should know could materially affect the
participant's benefits when the Court suggested that the plaintiff
in Pegram v. Herdrich, may have been able to seek relief under a
claim that the plan officers had breached their fiduciary duty to
82. By contrast if the release assigns the participant's plan benefits to
another party, such as a transfer of medical benefits to pay the fees of a
medical practitioner, the act of requesting and obtaining the release is not a
fiduciary act. This is so because the individual's entitlement to the benefits is
not at issue. For pension plans, such assignments are generally prohibited by
ERISA section 206, and some non-pension plans also prohibit the assignment
or alienation of benefits.
83. Blatt v. Marshall & Lassman, 812 F.2d 810 (2d Cir. 1987).
84. See IT Corp. v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 107 F.3d 1415 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding that ERISA section 410, 29 U.S.C. § 1110, voided a contract

exonerating the third party administrator from any fiduciary liability).
85. Varity, 516 U.S. at 500-501.
86. ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
87. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A).
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disclose the incentives for non-treatment by its physicians, which
was information that "affects [the] beneficiaries' material
interests.""8 The Supreme Court's suggestion was accompanied by
a brief description of two earlier decisions addressing the extent of
a fiduciary's duty to disclose, including the duty to warn that his
or her actions may place an individual's interest at material risk.
The Court described its earlier decision, Varity Corp. v. Howe
as "holding that ERISA fiduciaries may have duties to disclose
information about plan prospects that they have no duty, or even
power, to change." In that case, the employer was a fiduciary who
had determined the prospects of the company's medical and
severance plans. The Supreme Court held therein that fiduciary
disclosure duties are not limited to the specific statutory and
regulatory requirements applicable to plan administrators and
claims administrators.
In particular, an employer who was also the administrator of
its medical benefits plan and its severance benefits plan was found
to have exercised discretionary authority over the management or
administration of the plans when it provided information to
employees to help them decide whether to withdraw from those
plans by joining a new subsidiary and participate in the
subsidiary's identical plans. Thus, the employer was performing a
fiduciary act and violated its Duty of Loyalty when it
misrepresented the plans' future prospects to persuade the plan
participants to withdraw from those plans and join the subsidiary.
Consequently, when the subsidiary went into receivership, the
participants were entitled, under ERISA section 502(a)(3), 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), to recover from their prior employer the
welfare benefits they would have had if they had not transferred to
the subsidiary. The Court's holding rested on two crucial points:
First, the Duty of Loyalty requiring that fiduciaries act "solely
in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries" applies not
only to the management of plan assets but to activities associated
with the "provision of benefits" to individual participants, such as
benefit determinations under the claims procedures. 0 The Court
rejected the defendants' argument that permitting the participants
to obtain relief for such "fiduciary breaches" would threaten the
viability of employee benefit plans by making them too costly.9
The Court found such relief to be consistent with the ERISA
fundamental purpose of assuring that employers incur the costs
88. 530 U.S. at 228 n.8. In that case, the ERISA fiduciary breach rules
were held not to apply to decisions by physicians employed by an ERISA
welfare plan about either the medical care to which a participant was entitled
under the plan or the care which was medically appropriate. Id. at 231-36.

89. Id. at 504.
90. Id. at 513-15.
91. Id. at 504-05.
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necessary so that individuals will obtain their employee benefit
entitlements.9" The Court also stated that characterizing an
unwarranted benefit denial as a fiduciary breach does not change
the review standards applicable to a reviewer's denial of an appeal
of a benefit denial.'
In fact, the Court observed that it had
previously used traditional fiduciary conduct rules to determine
those standards.'
Thus, the fiduciary characterization of these
acts did not expand the plan's definition of promised employee
benefits or increase the costs the employer should incur.
Second, as the Court observed, it had previously held in
Central States Pension Fund v. Central Transport,Inc.:
There is more to plan (or trust) administration than simply
complying with the specific duties imposed by the plan documents or
statutory regime; it also includes the activities that are "ordinary
and natural means" of achieving the "objective" of the plan. Indeed,
the primaryfunction of the fiduciary duty is to constrainthe exercise

of discretionarypowers which are controlled by no other specific duty
imposed by the trust instrument or the legal regime. If the fiduciary
duty applied to nothing more than activities already controlled by
other specific legal duties, it would serve no purpose.95
The Supreme Court's analysis focused on the company's
encouragement of its employee-participants in its company plans
to join a subsidiary and the subsidiary's corresponding plans, even
though it knew (and had helped arrange) that the subsidiary
would be unlikely to survive or to maintain those plans. The
Court did not rely on the fact that the employer was named as the
92. Id. at 513.
93. Id. at 514-15.
94. Id. A challenge to an ERISA plan's denial of a benefit claim under
ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), is subject to de novo
rather than arbitrary and capricious review standards unless the decision of
the reviewer of the initial benefits denial was an exercise of "a discretion
vested in them by the instrument under which they act." Firestone,489 U.S. at
111-12. See generally Kennedy, supra note 20. If the plan's benefit denial
does not result from the fiduciary's exercise of its discretion under the plan
terms, as described in Firestone, but rather is deemed denied because of a
substantial violation of the claims rules by the reviewer, such as the failure to
issue a decision, some federal circuit courts have found the arbitrary and
capricious standards inapplicable. See Gilbertson v. Allied Signal Inc., 328
F.3d 625, 631 (10th Cir. 2003); Jebian v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 310 F.3d 1173,
1180 (9th Cir. 2002), substituted opinion at 349 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir.
2003); Gritzer v. CBS, Inc., 275 F.3d 291, 296 (3d Cir. 2002); Seman v. FMC
Corp. Ret. Plan, 334 F.3d 728, 733 (8th Cir. 2003). But compare Southern
Farm Bureau Life Insurance Co. v. Moore, 993 F.2d 98, 101 (5th Cir. 1993),
which gives no explanation for the failure to distinguish a deemed denial from
an actual denial, with McGarrah v. Hartford Life, 234 F.3d 1026, 1030-31 (8th
Cir. 2000), and Daniel v. Eaton, 839 F.2d 263, 268 (6th Cir. 1988), in which the
initial denial was fully responsive to the appeal.
95. 516 U.S. at 504 (second emphasis added and internal citations to Bogert
& Bogert omitted).
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administrator of the original plan. After mentioning the common
law fiduciary duty to deal fairly and honestly with beneficiaries,
the Court explicitly declined to discuss whether fiduciaries have
affirmative disclosure obligations, i.e., an obligation to warn.9
The Supreme Court described the second case, Glaziers &
Glassworkers Union Local No. 252 Annuity Fund v. Newbridge
Securities, Inc. ," as one which "discussed the disclosure obligations
of an ERISA fiduciary.""8 The lower court therein described "an
affirmative duty to inform when the trustee knows that silence
might be harmful."' In particular, the court held that a resigning
ERISA fiduciary may have had a duty to warn a replacement
fiduciary about the risk of retaining an investment manager.1
The reference in Glaziers to the duty to warn if a transaction
places a beneficiary's entitlement at material risk was derived
from Judge Cardozo's holding in Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas &
Electric Co."°' Under Judge Cardozo's analysis; the fiduciary must
act so that the beneficiary will fully understand the material facts
of the risk. Otherwise, the warning would be pointless."6
Several circuits have similarly recognized the affirmative
duty of ERISA to warn participants about plan transactions and
policies that place the participant's interest at material risk.'
In
Shea v. Esenstein, the Eighth Circuit reversed a Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal' (unless otherwise designated, "dismissals" shall refer
to such dismissals) of a claim against a medical benefits plan by
the widow of a participant who died of heart failure because the
lower court should have found the plan had a fiduciary obligation
to disclose the incentives that its physicians had not to treat
participants.9
The court quoted the D.C. Circuit when it
declared: "The duty to disclose material information is the core of a
fiduciary's responsibility, animating the common law of trusts long

96. Id. at 506.
97. 93 F.3d 1171 (3d Cir. 1996).
98. 530 U.S. at 228 n.8.
99. 93 F.3d at 1180.
100. Id. at 1184.
101. 121 N.E. at 379-80.
102. See generally id.
103. For a more general discussion of ERISA fiduciary disclosure obligations
see Susan Stabile, I Believed My Employer and Didn't Sell My Company Stock:
Is There an ERISA (or '34Act) remedy for Me, 36 Conn. L. Rev. 385, 398-404
(2004).
104. Under the notice pleading rules that underlie the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: "The accepted rule [is] that a complaint should not be dismissed for
failure to state a claim [under Rule 12(b)(6)] unless it appears beyond doubt

that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002).
105. Shea v. Esenstein, 107 F.3d 625, 627 (8th Cir. 1997).
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before the enactment of ERISA."1°
The Second and Third Circuits found that multi-employer
pension plan fiduciaries had an affirmative obligation to inform a
participant that his benefits were being jeopardized by his
employer's failure to make required plan contributions. 7 As the
Third Circuit declared: "Continued eligibility is the core of the
trustee beneficiary relationship and those responsible for the
administration of the fund are required to notify pensioners when
their employer jeopardizes their eligibility."1 0 8 In Ream v. Frey, the
Third Circuit upheld a breach of fiduciary judgment in favor of
participants who had not been warned by a departing trustee of
the risks associated with a replacement trustee.'9
IV. WHEN ARE RELEASES OF EMPLOYEES' NON-ERISA
FEDERAL COMPENSATION RIGHTS EFFECTIVE?
Where a private right is granted in the public interest to effectuate
a legislative policy, waiver of a right so charged or colored with the
public interest will not be allowed where it would thwart the
legislative policy which it was designed to effectuate. With respect
to private rights created by a federal statute, such as § 16(b) [of the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938], the question of whether the
statutory right may be waived depends upon the intention of
Congress as manifested in the particular statute.110
The principles applicable to determining the conditions under
which individuals may release their claims to benefit entitlements
from ERISA plans may be illuminated by the rules the courts have
applied to other compensation rights established by federal law.
Federal law sets minimum standards for both major
components of employee compensation: wages and employee
benefits.
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA")
regulates the wages and hours of those employees who are not
highly paid and whose work duties are not treated as executive,
administrative, or professional under the applicable regulations."
ERISA regulates employee benefit plans that provide benefits such
as pension, severance, medical, disability, or life insurance
benefits. Unlike the FLSA, ERISA protects all employees. Both
these statutes rest on the presumption that without such
106. Id. at 628 (quoting Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of Am., 919 F.2d 747,
750 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
107. See Rosen v. Hotel & Rest. Employees & Bartenders Int'l Union, 637
F.2d 592, 600 (3d Cir. 1981); Dellacava v. Painters Pension Fund, 851 F.2d 22,
27 (2d Cir. 1988).
108. Rosen, 637 F.2d at 600 (emphasis added).
109. 107 F.3d 147, 156 (3d Cir. 1997).
110. Brooklyn Sav. Bank, 324 U.S. at 704-05.
111. There was considerable controversy about the revised final regulation
which took effect on August 23, 2004. 29 C.F.R. § 541.700.
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mandates many employment contracts would not satisfy the
minimum statutory standards. Thus, the requirements for an
effective release must exceed those for an effective employment
contract. The Supreme Court found that the congressional policies
that FLSA was designed to effectuate would be rendered a nullity
if employees could without judicial approval release claims of
entitlement to the compensation that the FLSA protected.
Common-law fiduciary principles are used to determine the
effectiveness of releases made by seamen regarding their rights to
recover damages for work-related injuries under the Merchant
Marine Act of 1920 (the "Jones Act").1 ' Unlike ERISA, the Jones
Act lacks the full panoply of ERISA fiduciary safeguards and it is
far more difficult to determine the precise damages to which an
injured seaman is entitled to than the ERISA plan benefits to
which an individual is entitled. Nevertheless, decisions about
Jones Act releases illustrate how the courts substantially limit the
ability of fiduciaries to use releases to avoid fulfilling their
statutory fiduciary obligations.
A. FairLabor StandardsAct of 1938
The FLSA requires employers to pay covered employees a
minimum hourly wage and overtime hourly pay at least equal to
one and a half times their regular pay if they work beyond the
statutory maximum of hours."' The FLSA also provides that
liquidated damages and reasonable attorneys' fees are awarded if
the required wages are not paid.'
The principal congressional purpose in enacting the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 was to protect all covered workers from
substandard wages and oppressive working hours, "labor conditions
[that are] detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard
of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of
workers." 5
The Supreme Court declared that the FLSA rules were
designed to achieve
the Congressional policy of uniformity in the application of the
provisions of the Act to all employers subject thereto ....
No
employee in any part of the United States in any industry affecting
112. See generally 46 U.S.C. § 688. This Act provided seamen with rights to
damages for work-related injuries similar to those provided to railroad
workers under the Federal Employers' Liability Act of 1905. However, the
Jones Act did not change the fiduciary principles governing contracts between
seamen and their employers-those principles do not govern contracts
between railway workers and their employers.
113. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).
114. Id. § 216(b).

115. Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys. Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739 (1981)
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 202(a)).
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interstate commerce need fear that the fair labor standards
maintained by his employer will be jeopardized by oppressive labor
116
standards maintained by those with whom his employer competes.
Moreover, the Court found these rules were premised on "the
fact that due to the unequal bargaining power as between
employer and employee, certain segments of the population
required federal compulsory legislation to prevent private contracts
on theirpart which endangered national health and efficiency and
as a result the free movement of goods in interstate commerce." 17
Even though the FLSA did not explicitly prohibit releases, the
Court found releases of the FLSA required wage payments were
implicitly prohibited because, "[n]o one can doubt but that to allow
waiver of statutory wages by agreement would nullify the
purposes of the Act."' Furthermore, unequal bargaining power of
the parties similarly prevented an effective waiver of statutory
liquidated damages by bank night watchmen who had not been
initially paid their required wages."'
The Supreme Court later rejected the argument that a
prohibition on releases of FLSA claims would preclude amicable
settlements of disputes about such claims in D.A. Schulte, Inc. v.
Gangi."O The Court observed that a stipulated settlement of a
bona fide dispute that was submitted to a court with pleadings by
both sides could be converted into a binding judgment after
judicial scrutiny of the settlement terms."'
B. The Jones Act
The Jones Act had overturned the Supreme Court's ruling in
Warner v. Goltra, which limited the ability of seamen to recover
damage from their employers for work-related injuries."' The
Jones Act was designed to enlarge the traditional broad protection
which admiralty law offered to seamen."
116. Brooklyn Sav. Bank, 324 U.S. at 710.
117. Id. at 706-07 (emphasis added).
118. Id. at 707.
119. Id. at 708.
120. 328 U.S. 108, 114 (1946). The Supreme Court concluded that the FLSA
liquidated damages may not be waived in a non-judicial compromise of a
dispute over FLSA coverage of building service and maintenance workers.
However, before repeating the Brooklyn Sav. Bank unequal bargaining power
argument in favor of such prohibition, the Court stated that it did not need to
"consider the possibility of compromises in other situations which may arise,
such as a dispute over the number of hours worked or the regular rate of
employment." Id. at 114-15.
121. Id. at 113. However, in 1949, the FLSA was amended to provide that
the Department of Labor was authorized to approve settlements. 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(c).
122. 239 U.S. 155, 159-62 (1934). See, e.g., T.J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY
AND MARITIME LAW 249-50 (2d ed. 1994).
123. 239 U.S. at 156, 162. Justice Cardozo concluded, in the Court's opinion,
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In Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., the Court "liberally
construed [section 33 of the Jones Act] to carry out its full purpose"
when it set forth the requirements for an effective release of Jones
Act rights.'24 In Garrett, a jury verdict of $4,000 for damages to
compensate the seaman for his injuries was overturned by the
Pennsylvania courts because the seaman had executed a written
release.'
The seaman had received $100 in exchange for the
release.'26 The Pennsylvania courts found that the seaman's
allegations about the release's invalidity did not satisfy the local
burden 7that such allegations must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. 12
The Supreme Court rejected this application of Pennsylvania
law because the Jones Act was intended to "have a uniform
application throughout the country, unaffected by 'local views of
common law rules'.... This uniformity requirement extends to
the type of proof necessary for judgment."2 '
The Court decided that the guiding principle in considering
the effectiveness of any Jones Act release is the "solicitude" with
which admiralty traditionally views seamen's contracts as
discussed in an 1823 circuit decision by Justice Story:
They [the seamen] are emphatically the wards of the admiralty; and
though not technically incapable of entering into a valid contract,
they are treated in the same manner as courts of equity are
accustomed to treat young heirs, dealing with their expectancies,
wards with their guardians, and cestuis que trustent with their
trustees .... If there is any undue inequality in the terms, any

disproportion in the bargain, any sacrifice of rights on one side,
which are not compensated by extraordinary benefits on the other,
the judicial interpretationof the transaction is that the bargain is
unjust and unreasonable, that advantage has been taken of the

situation of the weaker party, and that pro tanto the bargain ought
to be set aside as inequitable."2

The Court then remanded the case to the Pennsylvania court
with instructions to apply a fiduciary-like analysis to the release:
We hold, therefore, that the burden is upon one who sets up a
seaman's release to show that it was executed freely, without
that a ship's master was entitled to the statutory damages for bodily injuries
because the statute's coverage of "seaman" "must be read in the light of the
mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained." Id. at 158.
124. 317 U.S. 239, 247-48 (1942).
125. Id. at 240-41.
126. Id. at 242.
127. The seaman had alleged that at the time he executed the release (a) he
was under the influence of painkillers; (b) his employer had threatened him;

and (c) he thought the release applied only to disputed wage payments. Id. at
241.
128. Id. at 244 (citations omitted).
129. Id. at 246 (emphasis added).
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deception or coercion, and that it was made by the seaman with full
understanding of his rights. The adequacy of the consideration and
the nature of the medical and legal advice available to the seaman
at the time of signing
the release are relevant to an appraisal of this
13
understanding. 0
This fiduciary-like analysis was subsequently used by a New
York federal district court to reject a claim that a release by a
seaman of his Jones Act rights be set aside because he asserted
that his injuries were more serious than he had contemplated
when he executed the release.'
In McBrien v. United States
Petroleum Carriers,the court first found that the waiver applied to
the damage claims.'
The release explicitly (a) identified the
particular claims; (b) made the seaman aware that he was
releasing those claims; and (c) warned him that by executing the
release he would thereby assume the risk that his injuries may
turn out to be more serious than they appeared at the time of the
execution.133 Second, the settlement was found to be fair.'
The
payment for the release, more than forty percent of the actual
damages, was found not to be unreasonable in view of the
uncertainty of the damages at the time of the execution."' Third,
the seaman was found to have fully appreciated what he was
releasing. 6
The seaman was actively represented by an
experienced admiralty attorney who had complete access to all
medical reports and had advised the seaman to postpone settling
until the extent of his injury became clearer.
Finally, the
voluntary nature of the contract was not contradicted by any
showing that the seaman was under economic distress when he
executed the contract.
V. ERISA MAY VOID ALL BENEFIT RELEASES; IF BENEFIT
RELEASES ARE PERMITTED, THEN EFFECTIVE RELEASES MUST
COVER THE BENEFIT CLAIMS AGAINST A PLAN AND ITS FIDUCIARIES;
THE TERMS OF THE RELEASE MUST BE FAIR AND THE INDIVIDUAL
MUST HAVE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
RELEASE WHEN EXECUTING THE RELEASE
ERISA section
Insurance" provides:

410,

entitled

"Exculpatory

Provisions;

(a) Except as provided in section 405(b)(1) and 405(d) [which refer to
liability for breaches by other fiduciaries) any provision in an
130. Id. at 248.
131. McBrien v. U.S. Petroleum Carriers, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 627 (S.D.N.Y.
1959).
132. Id. at 635.
133. Id. at 633-34.
134. Id. at 635.
135. Id. at 634.
136. Id.
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agreement or instrument which purports to relieve a fiduciary from
responsibility or liability for any responsibility under this Part [the
ERISA part entitled "Fiduciary Responsibility"] shall be void as
against public policy.
The Supreme Court made the following statement, in Black &
Decker DisabilityPlan v. Nord, about ERISA's statutory purpose:
"ERISA was enacted to promote the interests of employees and their
beneficiaries in employee benefit plans, and to protect contractually
defined benefits."3 7
ERISA Section 2, entitled
Declaration of Policy," provides:

"Congressional Findings

and

(b) It is hereby declared to be the policy of this Act to protect... the
interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their
beneficiaries...
by
establishing
standards
of
conduct,
responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit
plans, and by providing for appropriate
remedies, sanctions and
138
ready access to the Federal courts.
ERISA may void all releases by individuals of claims against
an ERISA plan or its fiduciaries to a benefit entitlement under
such plan.
If, however, such releases are permitted,'39 then
ERISA's fiduciary provisions impose substantial limits on the
conduct of the Releasing Fiduciary if the fiduciary wishes to obtain
an effective release. Thus, I propose that such releases are void
unless:
*

The plan, its fiduciaries, and the benefit issue are covered by a
contract voluntarily entered into by the individual;

*

The individual received fair and reasonable consideration for the
release; and

*

The individual fully understood his legal rights and the material
facts pertaining to the release which the Releasing Fiduciary knew
or should have known when the release was executed.
A.

General ERISA Release Considerationsand the
Prohibitionof FiduciaryReleases

The effectiveness of releases of claims for ERISA benefit
entitlements" ° is determined by ERISA sections 404(a)(1)(D) and
410, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a)(1)(D) and 1110, ERISA's other fiduciary

137. 538 U.S. 822, 830 (2003) (quoting Firestone, 489 U.S. at 113, which
quoted Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983), and Mass. Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. at 148).
138. ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
139. In this Section we disregard the prohibition of release of entitlements to
accrued pension benefits that I discuss extensively in Section VII.
140. Id.
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sections, and the developing federal common law of rights and
obligations under ERISA-related plans, which, as described in
numerous Supreme Court cases, rests on general trust principles.
ERISA preempts any local law relating to employee benefit
plans. 4" This is particularly true for the provisions for the
enforcement of benefit entitlements.4
Thus, like the FLSA and
the Jones Act, which also mandate the uniform application of their
minimum standards, the effectiveness of these ERISA benefit
releases is determined by federal rather than local law. The
Supreme Court has, however, not discussed the conditions under
which releases of ERISA benefit claims are permitted or are
effective."
Releases from employee benefit claims are generally sought
by three distinct parties, each of whom seeks to avoid direct and
indirect liability for such claims. First, and most obvious, are the
plans, which must generally act through fiduciaries. Second, are
the plan fiduciaries, such as a trustee or the administrator. They
usually seek releases in both their plan and individual capacity.
The latter are designed to avoid any liability for a fiduciary breach
claim associated with the benefit claim.
Finally, are the
employers, who are usually ultimately responsible for funding the
plan. An employer wishes to avoid any liability for additional plan
contributions as well as breach of fiduciary claims against it, its
officers, agents, representatives, and owners, so that it may
instead fund non-plan obligations.
ERISA section 410, 29 U.S.C. § 1110, prohibits agreements
relieving fiduciaries from responsibility or liability for a breach of
fiduciary duty.'" As discussed, supra, this section in concert with
ERISA section 404(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) significantly
enhances the protections of common law trusts. There is no
exception, equitable or otherwise, for fiduciaries who breach their
141. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). See, e.g., Alessi v. RaybestosManhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523-24 (1981) (describing an instance in which
a state law prohibiting pension offsets for workers compensation benefits was
preempted).
142. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144. See generally Aetna Health, Inc. v.
Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004) (detailing how ERISA preempted state law claims

by ERISA medical plan participants regarding their eligibility for certain
benefits).
143. Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882 (1996) held that an employer did
not commit a breach of fiduciary duty by amending a pension plan to provide

additional benefits to those employees who executed releases of Title VII
discrimination claims against their employer. The Court also unsurprisingly

held that the plan fiduciaries did not violate ERISA by paying these additional
benefits even though the employer benefited by obtaining an effective release
in exchange for those additional payments. Id. at 892-94.
144. The only "exception" to this provision, which allows indemnification
agreements, ERISA § 410(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1110(b), enhances the protections for
individuals seeking to collect their benefit entitlements from a plan.
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explicit duty to make the benefit payments to which a participant
or beneficiary is entitled. " 5 The Supreme Court has stated that
"as a general matter, courts should be loath to announce
equitable
exceptions to legislative requirements or prohibitions that are
unqualified by the statutory text."146 Thus, whether an individual
has received any consideration or acknowledged receiving full
payment of the plan benefits to which he or she is entitled the
release is void. " 7 The individual retains the right to bring a civil
action to obtain any promised benefits that he or she was not paid,
although as discussed, supra, the individual may be required to
first exhaust the plan's internal review processes. "
Some may argue that ERISA's exculpatory prohibition applies
only to plan fiduciaries and thus ERISA plans may be released
from an individual's claims to entitlements to plan benefits.
Therefore, plan fiduciaries would be required to enforce the release
on behalf of the plan. This argument has a fundamental flaw.
Fiduciaries have a duty to pay individuals their benefit
entitlements pursuant to the terms of the plan. 149 Those terms
may only be changed by plan amendments, but the releases do not
constitute such amendments."
Thus if ERISA section 410
prevents plan fiduciaries from being relieved of their responsibility
to follow plan terms, which it does, the plan also may not be
relieved of such responsibility.
B. ProposedFiduciaryRules for Effective Releases of a Claim of
Entitlement to ERISA Plan Benefits
If the explicit prohibition on releases of ERISA section 410, 29

145. See ERISA § 404(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D).

146. See Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers National Pension Fund, in which the
Court found that there is no equitable exception to the ERISA prohibition on
the assignment of pension plan benefits. 493

U.S. 365, 376 (1990). Similarly,

there is no limit on ERISA's explicit ban on all releases of fiduciary
responsibilities. See ERISA § 410, 29 U.S.C. § 1110. Prohibiting releases of
claims for the entitlement to ERISA plan benefits is also consistent with the
Supreme Court's repeated characterization of ERISA as a "comprehensive and
reticulated statute" to protect the interests of employees and their
beneficiaries in promised employee benefits. The Supreme Court first used

this language when it held that ERISA protected benefits accrued prior the
effective date of ERISA. See Nachman v. PBGC, 446 U.S. 359 (1980). See also
Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. at 146 and Harris Trust v.
Salamon Smith, 530 U.S. 238, 247 (2000).
147. Of course, if the individual received full payment of his benefit
entitlements he will not be entitled to any additional benefit payment if the
release is void.
148. See supra note 49.
149. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)l)(D).

150. See ERISA § 402(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3) and Curtis-Wright v.
Schoonnejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 83 (1995) (plans must be maintained pursuant
to written instruments with a procedure for sponsor amendments).
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U.S.C. § 1110, is disregarded, then guidance on the effectiveness of
releases may be found in ERISA's other fiduciary provisions. In
particular, I propose that a plan or plan fiduciary claiming it has
been effectively released from an individual's claim to an
entitlement to ERISA benefits has the burden of showing that the
Releasing Fiduciary, i.e., the person who sought the release,
satisfied each of the following Proposed Fiduciary Release Rules:
(a) the individual agreed to a voluntary contract releasing the plan
or its fiduciaries from the claim in question;
(b) the individual received fair and reasonable consideration for the
release;
(c) the individual fully understood his legal rights and the material
facts pertaining to the release which the Releasing Fiduciary knew
or should have known when the release was executed.
The latter two fiduciary conditions, however, need not be
considered unless there is a binding contract. The requirement
that the plan and its fiduciaries be covered has, however,
sometimes been disregarded. There are decisions discussed, infra,
in which the plan was an entity distinct from the employer, such
as a plan funded with a trust or insurance contracts, but the
release was held to preclude a benefit claim against the plan even
though neither the plan nor any of its fiduciaries in its fiduciary
capacity was designated as a released party or even mentioned in
the contract. Similarly, there are decisions discussed, infra, in
which the claim was not covered.
Releasing Fiduciaries are obligated to know the plan terms
This is a
determining the plan benefits of the individual.'
consequence of the requirement that fiduciaries must perform
their duties with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct
of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims in
accordance with the terms of the plan documents. 5' In general, "a
pure heart and an empty head are not enough" to meet fiduciary
responsibilities."'
Releasing Fiduciaries also have the duty to assure that the
individual fully understands the material aspects of the release, so
that he or she can give informed consent to the release. Under the
Proposed Fiduciary Release Rules, a Releasing Fiduciary must
assure that the individual receives a fair and reasonable amount
151. By contrast, an individual is responsible for the facts under his control,

such as his medical treatment and expenses if the plan has clarified what he
needs to show to be entitled to reimbursement under a medical benefits plan.
152. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
153. Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455 (5th Cir. 1983).
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in exchange for releasing his or her claim to the entitlement to
plan benefits. These are both a consequence of the requirement
that fiduciaries shall act solely in the interests of plan participants
for the exclusive purpose of providing them with plan benefits.'
Under the Proposed Fiduciary Release Rules a release is
treated as ineffective if the individual did not fully understand the
benefit claim being released; a fortiori such treatment is required
if the Releasing Fiduciary also lacked the same understanding.
Mutual ignorance should not cause an individual to be wrongfully
deprived of the plan benefits to which she is entitled. On the other
hand, a similar deprivation will often occur without a release if the
fiduciaries never bring a benefit violation to the attention of an
individual. In such case, the individual and perhaps the plan
fiduciaries may not even know that he or she has a claim to
pursue. ERISA imposes stringent requirements on fiduciaries to
know, follow, and disclose plan terms so that individuals will not
be deprived of their benefit entitlements.
Under the Proposed Fiduciary Release Rules a court
considering the effectiveness of a release of rights to benefit
entitlements thus must review the strength of the underlying
benefit claim to determine
(1) if the individual fully understood his legal rights and the
material facts pertaining to the release which the Releasing
Fiduciary knew or should have known when the release was
executed; and
(2) if the participant received fair and reasonable consideration for
the release under the first assumption.
The benefit entitlements of the individual would be
determined under the Firestonede novo standards of review unless
the claims reviewer had the requisite discretion and exercised
such discretion in reviewing the benefit claim and the appeal of
the denial of the claim.'55 The considerations that the Supreme
Court applied in Firestone to determine the appropriate standard
of review appear to apply whether such review occurred before or
after the execution of the agreement containing the release. Thus,
if the plan's position has no merit, the individual would be
required to receive at least the benefits set forth in the plan for the
consideration to be fair. If the individual's position has no merit,
then any consideration would be fair. If, as often occurs in a bona
fide dispute, the opposing positions each have some basis, then the
fairness would depend upon the court's assessment of the relative
154. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A). See also Central States,
472 U.S. at 570-71 and Varity, 516 U.S. at 506 which discuss the fiduciary

duty to deal fairly and honestly with ERISA participants and beneficiaries.
155. See supra note 94 for a discussion of the applicability of de novo reviews
if the claims reviewers had but failed to exercise the requisite discretion.
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strengths and values of the opposing positions.

VI. IMPLICATIONS OF PROPOSED FIDUCIARY RELEASE RULES FOR
'ERISA PLANS AND THEIR FIDUCIARIES; CONSISTENCY OF RULES
WITH ERISA BASIC PURPOSES AND TRADITIONAL FIDUCIARY
PRINCIPLES; AND EXAMPLES OF APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED

FIDUCIARY RELEASE RULES
There was, then, a relation of trust reposed, of influence exerted, of
superior knowledge on the one side and legitimate dependence on
the other. At least, a finding that there was this relation has
evidence to sustain it. A trustee may not cling to contracts thus
won, unless their terms are fair and just .... His dealings with his
beneficiary are "viewed with jealousy by the courts, and may be set
aside on slight grounds." He takes the risk of an enforced surrender
of his bargain if it turns out to be improvident. There must be
candor and equity in the transaction, and some reasonable
proportion between benefits and burdens.'5
Releases deprive individuals of the opportunity to show that
they are entitled to ERISA plan benefits in both internal plan
reviews and in federal courts unless the Releasing Fiduciary
fulfilled its fair disclosure duties and fair dealing duties under
ERISA to the individual. These rules pose no undue obstacles to
the settlement of bona fide benefit disputes. The Proposed
Fiduciary Release Rules are thus consistent with ERISA's
statutory policies which determine the extent to which ERISA
rights may be effectively waived. Thus, they meet the criteria set
57
forth by the Supreme Court in Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil.
A. Implicationsof Proposed FiduciaryRelease Rules for ERISA
Plans and Their Fiduciariesand the Consistency of the Rules with
ERISA Basic Purposes and TraditionalFiduciaryPrinciples
Under the Proposed Fiduciary Release Rules a Releasing
Fiduciary has three affirmative fiduciary duties if it or any other
person wishes to rely on a release it obtains of an individual's
claim to the entitlement of ERISA plan benefits:
*

First, the Releasing Fiduciary must fully understand the plan
terms and the relevant facts pertaining to the benefit claim or
claims for which it seeks the release.

156. Globe Woolen, 121 N.E. at 380 (emphasis added and internal citations
omitted).
157. 324 U.S. at 704-05. See also the Jones Act, which has no explicit
release standards, but for which the Supreme Court applied fiduciary
principles to determine the effectiveness of releases of its protected benefits.
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"

Second, the Releasing Fiduciary must act so that the individual
filly understands the legal rights and relevant facts pertaining to
the benefit claim purportedly being released. It may not suffice for
the Releasing
Fiduciary
to refrain from making
any
misrepresentations about the plan terms, the relevant facts, or the
rights of the individual, particularly if there is no bona fide dispute
about the benefit claim or claims at issue.

"

Third, the Releasing Fiduciary must assure that the consideration
received by the individual in exchange for the release is fair and
reasonable. 5s

The release is void ab initio if the Releasing Fiduciary
violates any of these duties. Thus, it does not suffice to show there
was a fair and reasonable payment for the claim. The individual
must have also fully understood who and what was released.
The Releasing Fiduciary's fair disclosure duties and fair
dealing duties become more extensive as the number and
complexity of the discrete issues covered by the release become
more extensive. For example, the following are discrete issues: (a)
the individual's eligibility for any benefits; (b) the plan's annual
benefit accruals; (c) the equivalence of different forms of benefit
payments; (d) the plan's definition of covered compensation and
the participant's covered compensation history; (e) the plan's
definition of covered employment and the individual's periods of
employment; and (f) the plan's compliance with ERISA's pension
accrual rules. Each of those issues may contain discrete subissues if plan amendments caused different terms to apply at
different times of the participant's employment.
Finally, the
Releasing Fiduciary's disclosure duties become particularly
pronounced if there is no bona fide dispute about a claim for
benefit entitlements from the plan when the release is requested.
The Proposed Fiduciary Release Rules pose no undue obstacle
to reasonable settlements of bona fide disputes with respect to an
individual's ERISA benefit rights. In such cases, the fair dealing
and fair disclosure prerequisites of an effective release will be
readily available. 9
The rules, however, prevent an individual
158. The fairness assessment may be non-trivial if the agreement is not
limited to a settlement of the specific claim for benefits because there may be
considerable uncertainty about the portion of the consideration, if any,
allocated to such claim. The Plan and its fiduciaries have the burden of
showing compliance with all these duties, thus they bear the risk of being
unable to show the fairness of the consideration.
159. The paucity of litigation regarding releases obtained by plans suggests
that such plan releases are generally considered valid. This presumption is
probably the result of those releases having often been obtained in settlements
of bona fide disputes of the claim at issue for which there is little question that
(1) the settlement payment was reasonable; and (2) the participant or
beneficiary fully understood the significance of the release. By contrast, in
most litigated release cases the Releasing Fiduciary was the employer funding
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from being deprived of his promised ERISA plan benefits by an
agreement that was not fair or was obtained without the
individual's full understanding of what or who he was releasing.
In such cases, the individual will appropriately retain access to the
court and internal review process to obtain the benefits to which
enforcement
he was entitled under the comprehensive
mechanisms of ERISA. 61
The Proposed Fiduciary Release Rules are consistent with
Congress' desire to offer employees enhanced protection for their
benefits without creating a system so complex that administrative
costs, or litigation expenses, unduly discourage employers from
The Court in Varity used the
offering welfare benefit plans.'
fiduciary Duty of Loyalty to find that participants could remain
entitled to benefits from their original employer's plan when their
employer's misrepresentations had caused them to transfer to a
subsidiary and thereby cease participating in the plans in
question.' 2
In Firestone, the Supreme Court also emphasized the
importance of protecting promised plan benefits and found that a
default presumption in favor of de novo review of a plan's denial of
a benefit claim." The Court, however, observed that traditional
trust principles permit a plan to be drafted to provide for arbitrary
and capricious review of benefit determinations under certain
circumstances."
Releases raise an issue different than the appropriate claims
review criteria. Instead, the issue is the conditions under which
individuals may be deprived of even such minimal judicial review
of a plan's denial of a participant's claim for entitlement to ERISA
benefits. The traditional fiduciary Duty of Loyalty which may not
be eroded under ERISA would appear to assure that purported
releases of entitlements to ERISA benefits are void ab initio,
unless, as set forth in the Proposed Fiduciary Release Rules, the
"release" had been fully understood by the individual and had been
the ERISA plan, who thus had a financial incentive to obtain the release in

exchange for less than fair consideration.
160. Courts often justify preempting state regulation of employee benefit
plans, with statements such as: "[Tihe detailed provisions of § 502(a) [which
provides federal court access] set forth a comprehensive civil enforcement
scheme that represents a careful balancing of the need for prompt and fair
claims settlement procedures against the public interest in encouraging the
formation of employee benefit plans." See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542

U.S. at 200 (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987))
(emphasis added). Thus, ready court access is a critical part of ERISA.
161. Varity, 516 U.S. at 497.
162. The Supreme Court upheld such a remedy which had been provided by
the court below. See Howe v. Varity, 36 F.3d 746 (8th Cir. 1994), affd, 516
U.S. 489 (1996).

163. 489 U.S. at 101.
164. Id. at 109. See generally Kennedy, supra note 20.
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obtained in exchange for fair and reasonable consideration.
The three basic sources that the Supreme Court regularly
consults when establishing a federal common law of ERISA rights
and obligations '65appear to agree that a release of a plan or plan
fiduciaries from an individual's claim of entitlement to plan
benefits is void ab initio unless the Proposed Fiduciary Release
Rules are satisfied. 1" Furthermore, Bogert specifies that the
fiduciary has the burden of proof,'67 whereas the other two sources
are silent. The Bogert position is consistent with the standards
applied to determine if the fiduciary-like releases of Jones Act
claims are void."
The Restatement describes the significance
of the
requirement that the beneficiary fully understand what is being
released as follows:
Since the trustee is in a fiduciary relation to the beneficiary, he
should inform the beneficiary of his rights and of the materialfacts
affecting a transaction which is a deviation from the terms of the
trust, in so far as the trustee knows or should know these facts. The
consent of the beneficiary does not preclude him from holding the
trustee liable for a deviation from the terms of the trust, unless the
beneficiary understandsthat the transaction is a deviation from the
terms of the trust and that he is entitled to require the trustee to
administer the trust accordingto its terms. It is not necessary that
the trustee should inform the beneficiary of all the details of which
the trustee knows, but he should see that the beneficiary is
sufficiently informed so that he understands the character of the
transaction and is in a position to form an opinion as to its
advisability. Thus, if the trustee proposes to invest in speculative
securities in which he is not permitted to invest by the terms of the
trust, the trustee should inform the beneficiary not only that the

165. Those sources are: the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS; BOGERT &
BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, supra note 59; and 3 AUSTIN
SCOTT & WILLIAM FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS (4th ed. 1988).
166. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 217(2) (Discharge of Liability
by Release or Contract); BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 59, § 943 (Releases); 3

SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 165, § 217 (Discharge of Liability by Release
or Contract). The cited sections all apply to post-breach releases. The
following sections all apply to consents to fiduciary breaches at or before the
time of the breach, such as releases before a claim has been made.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 216 (Consent of Beneficiary); 3 SCOTT &
FRATCHER, supra note 165, § 216 (Consent of Beneficiary); BOGERT & BOGERT,
supra note 59, § 941 (Consent). However, the requirement for reasonable
consideration in those releases is included only if the fiduciary has an interest
adverse to the beneficiary, such as a purchase by the trustee of a part of the
beneficiary's interest. A plan sponsor or its representatives seeking a prebreach release, which will thereby decrease its plan contribution obligation,
would appear to have a similar conflict of interest with the individual from
whom the benefits release is being sought.
167. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 59, § 941, at 520, 542.
168. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. at 248.
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securities are not a proper trust investment but should tell him of
the nature of the risk involved. If, however, the trustee is led by the
beneficiary to believe that the beneficiary is fully informed, the
trustee cannot be held liable
169 even though the beneficiary did not in
fact have full information.
Thus, under the Proposed Fiduciary Release Rules, the
release of a claim for entitlement to plan benefits is void ab initio
unless the participant fully understood the significance of the
release, including the fact that he will not be paid all the plan
benefits to which he is entitled.
The exception from the requirement that the beneficiary fully
understood the transaction for those cases in which the beneficiary
leads the trustee to believe the beneficiary is fully informed would
appear to be limited to cases in which the beneficiary has taken
the initiative in presenting the specific claim. A beneficiary would
not appear to have taken the initiative merely because the consent
includes a boilerplate acknowledgment that the beneficiary
understood the agreement and the beneficiary was advised to, and
given the opportunity to, consult professional counsel, including
legal counsel, before executing the consent. A lack of initiative is
particularly apparent if the consent does not explicitly describe the
specific claim. By contrast, a beneficiary will have taken the
initiative if her professional counsel initiated a complaint about
the specific claim and the consent follows extensive discussions by
the professional counsel with the trustee about the complaint.
of the
The
Restatement
describes
the
significance
requirement that the transaction be fair and reasonable as follows:
If the beneficiary consents to a transaction in which the individual
interest of the trustee is adverse to that of the beneficiary, the
beneficiary is not precluded from setting the transaction aside, or
otherwise holding the trustee liable for breach of trust, where the
transaction involves a bargain between them which was not fair and
reasonable. See § 170(2). This requirement is in addition to the
requirementsstated in Clauses (a), (b) and (c).
Illustration:

14. A is trustee of Blackacre for B. By the terms of the trust A is
directed to sell Blackacre. With B's consent A sells Blackacre to
himself individually for $10,000. At the time of the sale, Blackacre
is worth considerably more than $10,000. B can hold A liable for

breach of trust. 170
Thus, under the Proposed Fiduciary Release. Rules, the

169. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 216 cmt. k (emphasis added).
170. Id. § 216 cmt. n (emphasis added).
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beneficiary's understanding of the release need not be considered
if he did not receive fair and reasonable
consideration, which in of
71
itself makes the release void ab initio.

1

B. General Releases Are Generally Not Effective Releases of
Entitlements to ERISA Plan Benefits
The Proposed Fiduciary Release Rules and the common law of
trusts allow general releases to be effective only under very
limited circumstances. Individuals may pursue unknown claims
for entitlements to ERISA benefits, even if such claims are
included within the coverage of a general release, i.e., those which
don't identify both the specific claim and the released parties. 72
Unknown claims can not be fully understood. Such understanding
is not shown by the inclusion of boilerplate that the individual (a)
read and understood the agreement, and (b) was given the
opportunity to, and was encouraged to seek assistance of legal or
other professional counsel.
General releases of asserted claims of entitlements to ERISA
plan benefits are effective if the circumstances surrounding the
execution of the release show that the individual fully understood
who and what was being released and the other Proposed
Fiduciary Release Rules are satisfied. For example, a bona fide
settlement of a dispute about specific pension benefit issue need
not set forth the issue but may include a release of all pension
benefit claims. If, arguendo, the pension issues may be released,
the specific issue would be effectively released by such a general
release.
By contrast, individuals may pursue unasserted, whether
known or unknown, claims for entitlements to ERISA benefits,
whether they are included within the coverage of a general
release. Unasserted claims by definition are those for which no
claim has been made and thus have not been considered by a
claims fiduciary. The release would then be void as a prohibited
attempt to exculpate plan fiduciaries from the responsibility to

171. If a party not representing the employer obtains the pre-breach release,
the result would appear to the unchanged. The Duty of Loyalty would appear
to preclude any plan fiduciary from relying on a release in which the
individual did not receive a fair and reasonable portion of the individual's plan
benefits. See id. § 170 (Duty of Loyalty). See also Central States, 472 U.S. at
570-71 and Varity, 516 U.S. at 506 which discuss the fiduciary duty to deal
fairly and honestly with ERISA participants and beneficiaries.

172. This is consistent with the claims regulations which do not permit
general denials of claims for entitlements to benefits under ERISA plans but
instead require references to specific plan provisions. The consequence of such
deficiency is identical to the ineffectiveness of a release-the participant is
given judicial access.
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73
follow the plan terms when the claim is finally asserted.'
Thus, under the Proposed Fiduciary Release Rules, the plan
and its fiduciaries retain the risk that all the issues pertaining to
the benefit rights of an ERISA plan participant have not been
identified in the release agreement and understood when a release
is executed. 174 The Releasing Fiduciary, like all fiduciaries, is
responsible for knowing and following the plan terms (consistent
with ERISA) which determine the participant's benefit
entitlements. Judge Cardozo reached a similar conclusion when
he held that a fiduciary could not rely on a contract with a
beneficiary. This holding was based in part on the lack of fair
disclosure by the fiduciary prevented the beneficiary from fully
understanding the transaction.'75

C. Examples of the Application of the ProposedFiduciaryRelease
Rules for Valid Releases of a Claim of Entitlement to
ERISA Plan Benefits
Under the Proposed Fiduciary Release Rules several common
but inequitable releases of claims for entitlements to ERISA plan
benefits may not be the basis for granting Rule 12(b)(6) motions to
dismiss the benefit claim.'76
Ex. (1) Employers often provide terminated employees who release
fair employment practices claims with additional pension plan
benefits, such as treating the employee as five years older with five
additional years of service. 11 7 Such an agreement may have a
general release provision in which the participant gives up the right
to make any claims arising from his employment and another
provision promising to pay the employee the benefits according to
the terms of the specified plan.
Without any additional information, this release under the
Proposed Fiduciary Release Rules does not apply to a claim by the
participant with respect to a pension plan benefit issue other than
the additional five years of age or service, such as his actual
service or his compensation history. The participant did not agree
to accept any particular interpretation of the plan. Moreover, the
173. ERISA § 410, 29 U.S.C. § 1110.
174. The participant, however, remains responsible for the facts under his
sole control that he knows may be relevant to his benefit claim, such as the
seaman in McBrien who assumed the risk that his injury was more serious
than he thought when signed his Jones Act release and had fully understood
the relevance of such assumption when he executed the release.
175. Globe Woolen, 121 N.E. at 380-81 (annulling a contract between a
manufacturer and electric utility because the common director of both
companies, but principal shareholder of the manufacturer, who declined to

participate in negotiation of contract did not speak up about unfairness of
contract and thus breached his fiduciary duty to the utility).

176. The standards are set forth supra note 104.
177. See, e.g., Lockheed Corp., 517 U.S. at 882.
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outcome would not change if the plan and the summary plan
description were part of the agreement. Nor would it change if the
agreement had been reviewed by the participant's counsel because
the participant never agreed to waive his rights to make some
benefits claim based on an interpretation of the plan document
that differed from his employer.
Ex. (2) An employer and an employee agree that he is entitled to
severance benefits of $10,000 based on $1,000 per year that he and
his employer believed he was entitled to for each of his ten years of
pre-termination service. This agreement contains a release of an
employee's severance benefit claims. The employee subsequently
learns that he was entitled to $2,000 per year of service because he
was entitled to be classified in a different group than he and his
employer thought at the time of the execution of the release.
Without additional information, under the Proposed
Fiduciary Release Rules, the employer may not show the release is
effective even though it does appear to be a voluntary waiver of
the claim in question. The employee did not receive a fair
payment for his agreement. Although there is no question about
his entitlement to $20,000, he received only half. Moreover, the
participant may not be shown to have fully understood his legal
rights and the relevant facts about the $10,000 deficiency that the
employer should have known when he executed the release.
Regardless of whether or not he was advised by counsel, this
would not change the inequity of the agreement or his apparent
lack of understanding of his rights and the relevant facts. Thus,
the release would remain ineffective. The employer's ignorance,
which was in good faith, does not excuse its failure to adhere to the
plan terms when it learned of its mistake and certainly offers no
basis for treating the release as effective and thereby depriving the
employee of his promised benefits.
Ex. (3) An employer agrees to provide a terminated employee with a
$5,000 payment in exchange for a release of the employee's fair
employment practices claims. The agreement contains a general
release by the employee of all claims arising from her employment
that the employee may have against the employer, its officers and its
representatives of all claims under a boiler plate list of statutes
including ERISA. There is no mention of any pension plan in the
agreement.
However, one year prior to her termination the
employer's pension plan trust paid her what she and the plan
administrator, her employer, believed to be her entire benefit both
at that time and at the time of the execution of the termination
agreement. In fact, under the terms of the plan, she was entitled to
$10,000 more, which she did not receive.
Without any additional information, under the Proposed
Fiduciary Release Rules the employer may not show the release is
effective, even if, arguendo, the agreement is treated as a waiver of
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the employee's benefit rights against the plan that is never
mentioned as a released party or otherwise in the agreement. The
employee did not receive a fair payment for her release. Although
there is no question about her entitlement to $10,000, she received
substantially less than half that amount under the agreement. It
is the employer's burden to show whether any portion of that
payment was even allocable to the pension plan waiver. Moreover,
the participant may not be shown to have fully understood her
legal rights and the relevant facts about her $10,000 pension plan
deficiency that the employer knew or should have known when she
executed the release.
The outcome would not change if the deficiency in the pension
plan payment occurred a year after the execution of the
termination agreement rather than a year before. Nor would the
results change if she had been advised by counsel or had the
released parties included a reference to the employer's employee
benefit plans or even the specific plan (so there would be less
question about the wavier applying to the plan) because the
employer would still be unable to show that the agreement was
fair and reasonable.
Ex. (4) An individual agrees to work for an employer without
receiving any pension and medical benefits even though she will
perform the same services in the same manner as other employees
who are eligible for those benefits. At the time she is hired, she is
not told the value of either the pension or the medical benefits or
offered the opportunity to obtain the benefits in exchange for the
waiver. But she is told she will have no job if she does not sign the
waiver. The exclusion has nothing to do with the employee's age.
The employer just wishes to save money by treating her for payroll
purposes as an independent contractor even though she is an
employee. In fact, the pension benefits are worth $5,000-$15,000 a
year and her total compensation is comparable to the wage
compensation of other employees doing work similar to her during
her ten years with the company. When she leaves, she is entitled to
$100,000 (including earnings on the contributions she was entitled
to) under the terms of the pension benefit plan, which she then
requests.
Without additional information, under the Proposed
Fiduciary Release Rules, the employer may not show the release is
effective even though it appears to be a voluntary waiver of the
claim in question. The employee did not receive fair payment for
her release. Although there is no question about her entitlement
under the plan to $100,000, she received nothing. Moreover, the
participant could not have fully understood her legal rights, and
the relevant facts about the annual or expected total deficiency
that the employer knew or should have known when she executed
the release. Whether or not she was advised by counsel at the
time of the execution of the employment agreement would not
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change the inequity of the agreement or her lack of understanding
of her rights and the relevant facts. Thus, the release would
remain ineffective.
In many cases, the employer could have
achieved the desired pension savings without a release by
amending the pension plan to exclude the particular employee
without violating any of the non-discrimination rules applicable to
pension plans.178 Moreover, the employer may have been able to
achieve the same monetary result by offering to provide the
employee benefits in exchange for much lower wages. Similar
questions about her eligibility for medical coverage could arise
with respect to her entitlement to medical benefits if she had an
accident or serious illness during her employment.
VII.PENSION BENEFIT RELEASES OTHER THAN PRE-ACCRUAL
PARTICIPATION WAIVERS ARE GENERALLY VOID AB INITIO

The [ERISA pension] anti-alienation provision can "be seen to
bespeak a pension law protective policy of special 1intensity:
79
Retirement funds shall remain inviolate until retirement."
I propose that ERISA generally voids releases of claims for
entitlements to accrued pension benefits. Such releases usually
violate the ERISA spendthrift mandate that pension benefits may
not be assigned or alienated. °
This mandate prevents an
individual from endangering his pension benefits by agreeing to
relinquish any part of his or her accrued pension benefits to
another party, whether it is the plan or another person. On the
other hand, the mandate does not prohibit pre-accrual pension
benefit waivers, such as annual elections not to participate in a
401(k) plan. Moreover, the mandate prohibiting the forfeiture of
the vested pension benefits of individuals who have fulfilled
certain statutory service periods may also independently void
those releases.'
A. Releases of Entitlements to Accrued Pension Benefits Are Void
ab Initio
ERISA's statutory language, regulations, and purpose, and
the Supreme Court decisions, the treatment of spendthrift trust

178. ERISA prevents discrimination in coverage by reason of age. ERISA
§ 202(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(2). Pension plans that qualify for favorable

tax treatment may also not discriminate in favor of the highly compensated in
participation or benefit accrual rules. I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(4), 410(b).

179. Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 851 (1997) (citations omitted).
180. ERISA § 206(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1). These anti-assignment and
anti-alienation rules apply to all pension plans, whether the assets are held in

a trust or in an insurance contract pursuant to ERISA section 403(a)-(b), 29
U.S.C. § 1103(a)-(b).
181. ERISA § 203(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a).
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interests by the three basic trust sources, and Griswold's
traditional Spendthrift Trusts treatise imply that ERISA's antiassignment mandate prohibits relinquishment by an individual of
his or her pension plan rights to any party, including the pension
plan.'
This interpretation is consistent with the general
definitions found in Black's Law Dictionary." Thus, releases of
claims to accrued pension plan benefits are void ab initio.
Moreover, such a release does not become effective even if the
participant received fair and reasonable consideration and was
aware of all the relevant facts and law when he or she executed
the release." On the other hand, a court may be expected to
approve a stipulated settlement a claim to an entitlement to
ERISA plan benefits under the same circumstances.
The statutes and regulations set forth only two circumstances
under which a pension plan may pay a participant's benefits to a
party other than the plan, the participant, or the participant's
beneficiaries. A pension plan may make benefit payments to an
"alternate payee" under a qualified domestic relations order
pursuant to ERISA section 206(d)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(4)
("QDROs"). A pension plan may also make benefit payments to
the federal government in order to satisfy the tax obligations of a
participant or a beneficiary.'85 These exceptions do not reduce an
individual's entitlements to accrued pension benefits, but merely
182. The anti-assignmentprohibitions in spendthrift trusts, such as ERISA
pension plans, are designed to protect a beneficiary from giving up his trust
interest and thus apply to dispositions to any party including the trust, which
is obligated to make the trust payments. These provisions thus prevent any
change in the party who will receive the required payments. The parties may
not agree to remove this prohibition except under very limited and specified
circumstances. By contrast, anti-assignmentprohibitions in debt obligations
are not spendthrift features. The provisions are designed to protect a creditor
from having its obligation impaired by a change in the party required to pay
the obligation rather than the party who will receive the payment. As a
consequence, such prohibitions prevent any change in the party who is
obligated to make the payments, i.e., the debtor. Moreover, the two parties
may and often do agree to remove such prohibitions on assignments.
183. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 108 (5th ed. 1979) defines "assign" as "to
transfer, make over, or set over to another." "Alienate" is defined as "to
convey, to transfer the title to property." Id. at 66.
184. Of course, if under such agreement the individual received the plan
benefits to which he was entitled, the individual may not obtain any additional
plan benefit payments. As discussed supra, fair and reasonable consideration
may be less than the plan benefits to which an individual is entitled if there is
any uncertainty about the claim.
185. Under Reorganization Plan Number 4 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,713
(1978) and 29 C.F.R. § 2570.200a-2, the IRS has the responsibility for
establishing the regulations with respect to the prohibition on the assignment
or alienation of pension benefits. ERISA § 206(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d). Those
regulations are associated with the similar prohibition in I.R.C.
§ 401(a)(13)(B). See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(b)(2), (c)(2)(ii) (as amended in
1988).
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permit those entitlements to be used to satisfy the individual's
obligations to another person.
The statutes and regulations similarly only permit a pension
plan to offset a portion of a participant's plan benefits against
specified plan obligations of the individual."
ERISA permits
arrangements to secure loans from the plan 8 ' and offsets for
amounts that a participant is ordered to pay the plan as a result of
a crime or an ERISA violation pertaining to such plan under a
variety of arrangements including settlements between a
participant and the Department of Labor or a participant and the
PBGC." There is also a regulatory exception for arrangements to
recover overpayments of plan benefits. 9
No statutory or regulatory exception permits any reduction of
the benefit entitlements of participants or beneficiaries. Thus,
ERISA section 206(d), 29 U. S.C. § 1056(d), prohibits a release of
an individual's claim of entitlement to pension benefits, which
would cause such a reduction.
The Supreme Court in Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers
National Pension Fund held that the statutory exceptions to the
prohibition against the assignment or alienation of pension
benefits are not subject to any generalized equitable expansion.19'
In particular, the Court found that the pension benefit interest of
a union officer did not become subject to a constructive trust on
behalf of the union from whom he had embezzled more than
$377,000 in violation of section 501(c) of the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 501(c). 9 ' The court
below found that such a trust had been established because (a) the
embezzlement of the union funds injured the union members, who
were also the plan participants, and thus the plan was injured;
and (b) the "other appropriate relief" authorized for violations of
the LMRDA overrode the ERISA prohibition on the assignment or
alienation of pension benefits."2 The Court held that the plan was
distinct from the union and an injury to the union was not
equivalent to an injury to the plan, which would not be the

186. In addition, there is also an exception for voluntary revocable
assignments. They may not exceed ten percent of the payments to the
individual. ERISA § 206(d)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(2). Such assignments are

not at issue in this Article and thus not discussed further.
187. ERISA § 206(d)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(2).
188. ERISA § 206(d)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(4).
189. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(c)(2)(i), (iii).
There are also additional
exceptions for administrative convenience, such as deposits to the joint bank

account of the participant and the participant's spouse, which will not be
discussed further.
190. 493 U.S. at 376.
191. Id. at 367-69.
192. Id. at 369-70.
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beneficiary of the constructive
unequivocally declared:

trust.1 93

The

Court

then

Nor do we think it appropriate to approve any generalized equitable
exception-either for employee malfeasance or for criminal
misconduct-to ERISA's prohibition on the assignment or alienation
of pension benefits.
Section 206(d) reflects a considered
congressional policy choice, a decision to safeguard a stream of
income for pensioners (and their dependents, who may be, and
perhaps usually are, blameless), even if that decision
prevents
94
others from securing relief for the wrongs done them.

The Supreme Court reinforced its Guidry holding in Boggs v.
Boggs by deciding that the statutory exceptions to the prohibition
against the assignment or alienation of pension benefits are not
subject to any judicial expansion. 9 The Court found that ERISA
section 206, 29 U.S.C. § 1056 preempted the community property
rights of the children of a deceased participant's first wife to the

193. Id. at 373. There is a division among the circuits about the ability of a
pension plan to use an involuntary offset against a participant's benefits to
recover damages caused to the plan by such participant's fiduciary breach
when the offset does not meet the conditions described in ERISA section
206(d)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(4). Section 1502(a) of Pub. L. No. 105-3 added
this exception with an effective date of August 5, 1997. Compare Brovarski v.
Local 1205 Intl Bhd. of Teamsters Union Pension Fund, No. 97-CV-489, 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23039, at *29 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 1998), and Coar v. Kazmir,
990 F.2d 1413, 1420 (3d Cir. 1993) (permitting such an offset), with Herberger
v. Shanbaum, 897 F.2d 801, 804 (5th Cir. 1990) (prohibiting such an offset).
See also Martorana v. Trustees of Steam-fitters Local Health Fund, 404 F.3d
797 (3"d Cir. 2005) (no anti-assignment exception for offsets to cover attorney
fees charged against participant for bringing frivolous benefit claim). See
generally Sharon Reece, The Gilded Gates of Pension Protection:Amending the
Anti-Alienation Provision of ERISA Section 206(d), 80 OR. L. REV. 379 (2001).
Three arguments are generally offered in favor of permitting such an offset,
which will improve the ability of the plan to recover such funds for the benefit
of all its beneficiaries and participants. First, ERISA section 409, which
imposes personal liability on a person who commits a fiduciary breach,
overrides the prohibition of ERISA section 206, 29 U.S.C. § 1056. Second, the
legislative history shows that Congress focused on preventing garnishments
when it considered ERISA section 206, 29 U.S.C. § 1056, which can only be
done by third parties. Third, the Treasury Regulations recognized that offsets
are not subject to the section 206 ban. However, ERISA section 206, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1056, prohibits the assignment or alienation of pension benefits. Prohibited
assignments are not limited to garnishments. See generally Treas. Reg.
§ 1.401(a)-13(b)(1). Moreover, if Congress and the Treasury, respectively,
wished to exclude all offsets from the anti-assignment and anti-alienation ban,
the statutory exception would not have referred only to offsets arising from
loans and the regulatory exception would not have been restricted to benefit
overpayments. See Coar, 990 F.2d at 1422 n.8. A fortiori, if Congress or the
Treasury had wished to exclude any benefit reductions from the ban, such as
those resulting from any kind of release, they would have explicitly done so.
194. Guidry, 493 U.S. at 376.
195. 520 U.S. at 851.
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participant's pension plan benefits."0 Thus, the children had no
right to any of the pension plan distributions, or the income on
such distributions, that their father received after their mother's
death because:
ERISA's pension plan anti-alienation provision is mandatory and
contains only two explicit exceptions, see §§ 1056(d)(2) [voluntary
revocable assignments], (d)(3)(A) [QDROs], which are not subject to
judicial expansion. The anti-alienation provision can "be seen to
bespeak a pension law protective policy of special 97
intensity:
Retirement funds shall remain inviolate until retirement."
The strength of this protective policy is shown by the fact that
the Court prevented the participant's children from obtaining any
of the pension funds that had been paid out to the participant or
any of the undistributed pension funds that had been rolled over
into an IRA."
The three basic trust sources that the Supreme Court
regularly consults to establish a federal common law of rights and
obligations under ERISA-related plans all appear to agree that if
an individual's benefits may not be alienated or assigned, as
occurs with a spendthrift trust, then the individual may not make
an effective transfer of his or her interest to the trustee, or the
other beneficiaries of the trust, by releasing his or her interest in
the trust.10

If ERISA permits releases of claims for accrued pension
benefits then the Proposed Fiduciary Release Rules would be
applicable to such releases. This change would not significantly
decrease the amount of attention that courts would devote to such
releases. Under the Proposed Fiduciary Release Rules, the courts
are required to look at the underlying dispute about the employee
benefits to determine if the individual received fair and reasonable
consideration and fully understood what and who was being
released. 20 On the other hand if the courts permit releases of

196. Id. at 853.
197. Id. at 851 (internal citations omitted).
198. Moreover, this protection continued even after the participant's death

and included the income on the distributed and rolled over funds.
199. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 59, § 226 (Attempted Transfer by
Beneficiary-Destructibility of Spendthrift Trust); 3 SCOTT & FRATCHER,
supra note 59, § 343 (Conveyance by Beneficiary to Trustee); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 343 (Conveyance by Beneficiary to Trustee). There
have also been decisions that neither estoppel nor consent overrides a

spendthrift provision which, like the anti-assignment mandate of ERISA, had
been created by statute. See, e.g., In re Wentworth, 129 N.E. 646, 648 (1920),
where the issue was the effect of a testamentary spendthrift clause created by

statute.
200. Disallowing waivers of accrued pension benefits would mean the courts
would have the more difficult task of determining the precise pension benefit
entitlement of the plaintiff. However, a court asked to approve a stipulated
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accrued pension benefits and do not apply the Proposed Fiduciary
Release Rules, many claims will be dismissed without any
consideration of the underlying claims. There may be a dramatic
drop in class litigation, which is often the only effective way of
obtaining promised employee benefits, if the courts deny class
certifications on the basis that individual review is needed of the
circumstances in which form releases were executed by numerous
dismissed employees." 1
B. Releases of Entitlements to Accrue Future PensionPlan
Benefits Are Permitted
The prohibition against the assignment or alienation of
pension plan benefits does not affect releases of the right to accrue
future pension benefits, i.e., pre-accrual releases. For example,
401(k) plans permit individuals to decide, before earning
compensation, whether to have such compensation contributed in
a tax-free fashion, to a pension plan under the conditions set forth
in I.R.C. § 401(k). The Treasury Regulations also describe the
income tax effects of elections that are not pursuant to 401(k)
arrangements, such as a one-time election not to participate in a
pension plan on or before the date the individual becomes eligible
to participate in the plan, or temporary elections not to participate
in a pension plan. °2
On the other hand, ERISA voids pre-accrual releases of
service credits for periods of employment that may be required for
an employee to be eligible to (a) participate in the plan, or (b)
qualify for vesting of benefits that may accrue when the
participation release is inapplicable.0 3 The releases may, however,
affect the benefits that may accrue during an individual's postrelease employment. 4
As with any employee benefits for which releases are not
prohibited, the Prohibited Fiduciary Release Rules govern the
effectiveness of such releases. The seeking of such pre-accrual

settlement of a bona fide dispute between the parties would only have to
conduct the more limited review of the reasonableness of the proposed
settlement as is the case with settlements about the entitlement to ERISA
non-pension plan benefits.
201. This may be the case even if the releases have no explicit reference to
the plan (which for a pension plan must be distinct from the employer) or the

claim at issue.
202. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(k)-1(a)(2)-(3), (5) (as amended in 2004).
203. Service credits are generated by the periods of employment or presumed

employment that ERISA requires pension plans to use for vesting and
participation purposes pursuant to the rules set forth in ERISA sections
202(b) and 203(b), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1052(b), 1053(b). See e.g., Holt v. Winpisinger,
811 F.2d 1532, 1542 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding a release of the right to those
credits was void).

204. See, e.g., Minadeo v. ICI Paints, 398 F.3d 751 (6th Cir. 2005).
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releases are fiduciary acts because it is part of the traditional
administration activity of enrolling eligible employees in an
ERISA plan. In particular, there must be a showing that the
employee fully understood the released participation rights and
was fairly compensated for the release, such as the payment to the
employee of the compensation that would otherwise be contributed
to a 401(k) plan.
The common law of trusts also distinguishes between preaccrual releases of spendthrift interests, which are allowed, and
post-accrual releases, which are not allowed. In particular, a
person named as a spendthrift trust beneficiary may disclaim his
or her interest and thereby avoid becoming a beneficiary, but once
he or she becomes a beneficiary, no benefit waivers are
permitted."5 There is a fundamental distinction between common
law disclaimers of spendthrift interests and releases of claims to
the entitlement of accrued pension benefits. In the former, there
is often no question as to the entitlements of the beneficiary, who
wishes to be treated as if he or she predeceased the time at which
the transfer of the interest was to take place. In the latter, there
is often a question as to the individual's entitlements, and the
individual has no intention to be treated as if he or she
predeceased the date when he or she wished to obtain the plan
benefits to which he or she had been entitled to plan benefits.2°

205. See, e.g., BOGERT & BOGERT, supra, note 61, § 194.
206. It is thus irrelevant that comment (c) of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 58 (Spendthrift Trusts: Validity and General Effect) (2003) permits
beneficiaries to reject spendthrift interests by either disclaimer or releases
because such rejections are not at issue in this paper. The reporter after
conceding that allowing such releases is contrary to the weight of authority
argues in his report for such comment that "an assignment or other
relinquishment of a portion of a beneficiary's interest in a spendthrift trust
should be permissible in connection with the settlement of a genuine will
contest or other bona fide proceeding challenging the validity of the trust."
The reporter recognized that his proposed changes in state spendthrift
statutes would not affect the stricter anti-assignment prohibition for ERISA
trusts, which contains no exception for such assignments. Moreover, the
exception is explicitly derived from Section 377.1 of the pre-ERISA text,
GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS (2d ed. 1947), which is entitled "Assignment
in Connection with Will Contests." The principal cited case is In re O'Keefe,
167 Misc. 148 (1938), which presents the unremarkable principle that the
anti-alienation provision does not take affect until after the probate of the will
and thus the provision is not violated by pre-probate settlements. By contrast
after the probate of a estate, those provisions prevent an income beneficiary
from making a binding consent to the termination of such spendthrift interest,
In re Fiscus, 45 A.D.2d 235 (1974) and the beneficiary of spendthrift trust was
prevented from using his trust interest to make a binding settlement with the
trustee. In re Margolis, 187 Misc. 2d 600 (2001). Moreover, this narrow
exception is limited to situations where the creation of the spendthrift trust is
at issue in a bona fide dispute rather than a participant's entitlement to a
precise amount of benefits under an existing ERISA pension plan.
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Releases of pension benefits associated with payments of
settlements for non-ERISA disputes may be either pre-accrual or
To the extent the dispute pertains to
post-accrual releases.
deprivations of back pay or service credits the associated pension
benefits would appear to be accrued benefits and thus may not be
released under the anti-assignment prohibition of ERISA section
206(d). On the other hand, to the extent the dispute pertains to
other matters, such as front pay, the pension benefits have not
accrued, or factors that do not affect pension accruals, no benefits
accrue. Thus, in any case, releases of claims to pension benefit
entitlements associated with these agreements are certainly not
effective if they were not obtained in compliance with the Proposed
Fiduciary Release Rules. Those rules require a showing of the
receipt of fair consideration for the foregone pension benefits and
full understanding of the benefits being benefits. It should be
noted that these releases often do not explicitly refer to pension
plan claims but rather have implicit effects. For example, an
individual may release the right to challenge the characterization
of a payment under the settlement agreement, as a wage payment
a bonus payment or a payment for emotional damages.0 7
C. ERISA May ProhibitReleases of Entitlements to Vested
Accrued Pension Benefits
Finally, a release of a claim for vested accrued pension benefit
entitlements by an individual to the plan or its fiduciaries may
violate the non-forfeiture rules of ERISA section 203(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1053(a). The Supreme Court stated:
Section 203(a) is a central provision in ERISA. It requires generally
that a plan treat an employee's benefits, to the extent that they have
vested by virtue of his having fulfilled age and length of service
requirements no greater than those specified in § 203(a)(2), as not
subject to forfeiture. A provision in a plan which purports to
sanction forfeiture of vested benefits for any reason, other than one
listed in subsection (a)(3) [none pertain to releases of any kind],
would violate this section.2
In Nachman, the Supreme Court held that a pension plan
could not avoid the non-forfeiture rules by defining a pension plan
participant's benefit as non-forfeitable only to the extent the
benefit had been funded."° The Court voided such definition even
for those benefits accrued before the effective dates of the ERISA
207. Similarly the agreement may determine the extent to which an
individual is entitled to service credits. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 2530.200b2(a)(3), which defines an "hour of service" in relevant part to include: "each
hour for which back pay, irrespective of mitigation of damages, is either
awarded or agreed to by the employer."
208. Nachman, 446 U.S. at 367.

209. Id.
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vesting rules.
The prohibition of forfeitures by ERISA section 203(a), 29
U.S.C. § 1053(a),21° does not apply to all pension benefits. The
forfeiture rules apply only to those benefits that are required to
vest under the minimum vesting rules (which require benefits to
become non-forfeitable after a participant has satisfied certain
statutory service requirements) or the rules prohibiting
discrimination in favor of the highly compensated. 1' Accrued
benefits which have not yet become vested are not covered by the
prohibition on forfeitures. By contrast, the prohibition of
assignment or alienation of pension benefits by ERISA section
206(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d), applies to all accrued pension benefits,
regardless of the participant's service.
The statute, regulations, and Supreme Court cases do not
discuss the precise extent to which the forfeiture prohibitions
apply to forfeitures caused not by plan provisions, but by plan
practices. 12 These prohibitions do, however, prevent plans from
making it a practice to require participants or their beneficiaries
to agree to waive a portion of the value of their benefits in order to
obtain a specific form of benefit payment.2 "2 It may be similarly
argued that the prohibition applies to any individual agreement in
which an individual purportedly gives up all or part of the
individual's non-forfeitable accrued pension benefits, such as a
release acknowledging the receipt of complete payment of the
benefits to which the individual was entitled.
VIII. THE

APPLICATION OF ERISA FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLES BY
COURTS TO RELEASES OF CLAIMS OF ENTITLEMENT TO

ERISA BENEFITS
Except as provided in section 405(b)(1) and 405(d) [which refer to
liability for breaches by other fiduciaries] any provision in an
agreement or instrument which purports to relieve a fiduciary from
responsibility or liability for any responsibility under this Part [the
ERISA part entitled "Fiduciary Responsibility"] shall be void as

210. Under Reorganization Plan Number 4 of 1978, 43 Fed Reg. 47,713
(1978), and 29 C.F.R. § 2570.200a-2, the IRS has the responsibility for
establishing the regulations with respect to the prohibition on the forfeiture of
pension benefits. See ERISA § 203, 29 U.S.C. § 1053. Those regulations are
associated with the similar prohibition in I.R.C. § 411. See Treas. Reg.
§§ 1.401(a)-4, 4T (as amended in 1993).
211. Treas. Reg. § 1.411(a)-4(a) (as amended in 2004).

212. This prohibition does not prevent plans from complying with the
requirement that spousal waivers must be obtained before the plan may make
certain forms of benefit payments to a participant. See ERISA § 205(c)(2)(A),
29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(2)(A).
213. See Treas. Reg. § 1.411(a)-4(a).
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A fiduciary and a beneficiary can settle a disputed claim that the
fiduciary breached its fiduciary responsibilities under ERISA if the
claim is knowingly and voluntarily released. To determine whether
a release is knowing and voluntary, we apply general principles of
contract construction. Because we are guided by principles of trust
law, however, we must examine the totality of the circumstances in
which the release was signed to ensure the fiduciary 21did
not obtain
5
the release in violation of its duties to the beneficiary.
Rosenbaum v. Davis Iron Works, 2"6 an unpublished decision of
the Sixth Circuit, found that ERISA prohibited fiduciaries from
being released of a future unspecified obligation to pay the ERISA
Leavitt v.
benefits to which an individual is entitled. 17
Northwestern Bell Co. held that ERISA permits a release of a
claim for ERISA plan benefits directed at a specific issue in a
settlement of such specific claim.2 1 A district court in the Third
Circuit concurred with the Eighth Circuit's reasoning.19
The Eighth Circuit has applied fiduciary principles to
determine the effectiveness of releases of entitlements to ERISA
The
benefits using a totality-of-circumstances analysis.2
applicability of fiduciary principles was obvious because most of
the plaintiffs filed fiduciary breach claims under ERISA section
502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), rather than the more customary
benefit claims under ERISA section 501(a)(1)(b), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1131(a)(1)(B). Almost all the releases pertained to the same
Releases associated
underlying issue: the eligibility for benefits.'
with settlements of bona fide disputes about the specific claim at
issue were upheld.
The courts found ineffective all the releases

214. ERISA § 410, 29 U.S.C. § 1110.
215. Leavitt v. Northwestern Bell Co., 921 F.2d 160, 162 (8th Cir. 1990)
(internal citations omitted).
216. No. 88-1245, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 5223, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 19, 1989).
217. The Court distinguished its earlier unpublished decision at *13, Miller
v. GM Corp., 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 5601 (6th Cir. 1988), as pertaining to
benefits arising from an employment contract rather than from an ERISA
plan.
218. Leavitt, 921 F.2d at 161.
219. Blessing v. Struther, Dunn, Inc., 1985 U.S. Dist LEXIS 17311 (E.D. Pa.)
(a release of all pension plan claims as consideration for the payment of an
individual's pension benefits as a lump sum rather than an annuity was found
to foreclose a claim about the computation of the lump sum). It was not clear
whether this computation was in dispute when the release was executed. Id.
220. Leavitt, 921 F.2d at 162.
221. The Blessing plaintiff, however, claimed the lump sum value of pension
benefits was computed incorrectly and the release was executed to obtain a
lump sum payment.
222. Mange v. Petrolite Corp., 960 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Mo. 1997), af'd, 135
F.3d 570 (8th Cir. 1998); Martino-Catt v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 317
F. Supp. 2d 914, 917 (S.D. Iowa 2004).
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not associated with such settlements. 2 ' The Eighth Circuit's
approach places lesser burdens on Releasing Fiduciaries than the
Proposed Fiduciary Release Rules, 2 ' which require fair
consideration and fair disclosure (so that the individual fully
understands the release).

A. The Sixth and Eighth Circuits'Considerationof Whether
ERISA Benefit Releases for Plan FiduciariesMay Ever Be Effective
In Rosenbaum v. Davis Iron Works, the court concluded that a
release in an agreement settling a dispute with respect to the
computation of a participant's pension benefit entitlement on the
basis of the participant's employment history could not preclude
the distinct claim that the participant's benefit includes a portion
of the plan's surplus.225 The plan had been terminated and the
parties knew the plan had a surplus, but the amount of the
surplus had not been computed when the release was executed. 6
The court held that ERISA section 410, 29 U.S.C. § 1110 voids
any release of future unspecified claims against the plan."? The
court distinguished an earlier Sixth Circuit unpublished decision,
Miller v. GM Corp.,28 that found severance plans were not
precluded from obtaining releases from participants by such
section:
Miller concerned the waiver of rights under an employment
contract, not the waiver of claims that the administrators of a plan
violated their fiduciary duty to the plan. The present case, on the
other hand, involves exactly the type of case § 1110 was meant to
apply to, a waiver of claims
of breach of fiduciary duty. The
229
prohibition should apply.
Moreover, the court found that there could not have been an
effective release because it was not clear at the time of the
223. Barbera v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Long-Term Disability Plan, No. 041598 (DWF/SRN), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21862, at *1 (D. Minn. Oct. 26,
2004); Seman v. FMC Corp. Ret. Plan, 334 F.3d 728, 733 (8th Cir. 2003).
224. Less lenient local fiduciary rules were applied by a district court in the
Third Circuit. Auslander v. Abraham Helfand, 988 F. Supp. 576 (D. Md. 1997)
225. 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 5223, at *11.
226. Id. at *15.
227. Id. at *14.
228. No. 87-1493, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 5601, at *13 (6th Cir. Apr. 27,

1988).

The court held therein that GM employees had effectively released

their GM severance plan rights when they executed releases in exchange for

stock in a GM affiliate, EDS, on being transferred to EDS. Id. at *11. The
court's decision, that ERISA section 410, 29 U.S.C. § 1110, was inapplicable,
was, however, based on its assertion that the section was enacted "to preclude
a fiduciary from being reimbursed from the employee benefit trust funds for a
personal loss incurred by the trustee or administrator as a result of a breach of
fiduciary duty." Id. However, the statute contains no such limitation. See
generally ERISA § 410, 29 U.S.C. § 1110.
229. Rosenbaum, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 5223, at *13.
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agreement whether any plan surplus would be available for the
plan participants." ° In addition, no claim could accrue until the
Plan paid the surplus to the employer rather than to the
participants.
The Eighth Circuit in Leavitt found that ERISA section
410(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1110(a), did not prohibit releases by
participants of benefit claims against plan fiduciaries."' The
court's decision rested on three assertions and a presumption that
releases are limited to the specific issues that were the subject of
bona fide disputes about the entitlement to benefits, such as the
executive's entitlement to severance benefits in this case.n
First, is the assertion that "[a] release, however, does not
relieve a fiduciary of any responsibility, obligation, or duty
imposed by ERISA; instead, it merely settles a dispute that the
not fulfill its responsibility or duty on a given
fiduciary " did
3

occasion.

1

However, the issue is not the fiduciary's obligation when the
release was executed but whether at the time the claim is
subsequently filed the fiduciary may use the release to avoid
The fiduciary is
paying the individual's benefit entitlement.
thereby breaching its fiduciary duty to pay the participant those
benefits at such later time. The fiduciary is using the release to
relieve itself of "responsibility or liability" for that later alleged
breach. Thus, the statutory prohibition voids the release ."
Second, the Leavitt court asserted that Congress could not
have meant to require the "terminal [sic] litigation" that would
result from a prohibition on releases. 35 But, the Supreme Court
rejected this argument in D.A. Schulte when it upheld the implicit
prohibition on FLSA releases2 3 because litigating parties may
always ask a court to approve a stipulated settlement and thereby
230. The ability of plan participants to a portion of such surplus was

established by a post-settlement case. Bryant v. Int'l Fruit Prods. Co., 793
F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1986).
231. 921 F.2d at 161-62. The applicability of ERISA section 410, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1110, was also rejected in Hogan v. Eastern Enterprises, 165 F. Supp. 2d 55,
65-66 (D. Mass. 2001), and Spann v. AOL Time Warner, 219 F.RD. 307, 319
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). Both rejections cite decisions that did not consider the

applicability of the prohibition.
232.
5223,
233.
234.
1997)

Leavitt, 921 F.2d at 162. But see Rosenbaum, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS
at *14.
Leavitt, 921 F.2d at 161-62.
See IT Corp. v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 107 F.3d 1415, 1418-19 (9th Cir.
(concluding that ERISA section 410, 29 U.S.C. § 1110, voided a

contractual provision purporting to deny fiduciary status by plan
administrator, who was subject to fiduciary claim by plan participants).
235. This argument about "terminal litigation," which was explicitly taken
from Stobnicki v. Textron, 868 F.2d 1460, 1463 (5th Cir. 1989), is discussed
more fully, infra.
236. D.A. Schulte, 328 U.S. at 114.
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avoid interminable litigation.
Third, the Leavitt court asserted that the explicit prohibition
could be disregarded because the group of employees protected by
ERISA, "many of whom are well educated, well compensated,
experienced in business, and aware of their legal rights," require
much less protection than the "lowest paid workers" protected by
the FLSA.2 37 However, ERISA protects all employees, whether
highly paid or lowly paid, who participate in covered employee
benefit plans.'
Furthermore, ERISA's primary focus is not on
severance plans for executives239 but on pension and welfare plans
that often cover many very unsophisticated workers who are not
highly paid and often are also protected by the FLSA.
Courts are obligated to adhere to the laws Congress enacted
to protect all participants in covered employee benefit plans, such
as the very strong fiduciary ERISA requirements.
Congress
unambiguously declared that those requirements could not be
undermined by exculpatory agreements within or without the plan
documents."
The one exception to those rules, permitting
insurance to cover fiduciary breaches, enhances protection for plan
beneficiaries by providing that an insurer may be liable for the
breaches committed by a fiduciary.2"1 There is no justification for
presuming there is any implicit exception, particularly one that
would undermine the very statutory policy of ERISA, namely the
protection of the employee benefits to which individuals are
entitled.242
A Fourth Circuit district court in Pennsylvania, Blessing,
supplemented the Leavitt arguments by comparing the ERISA
prohibition to "sufficiently similar" securities statutes, such as:
Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive
compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or
regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required
thereby shall be void.2
The Court referred to a Fifth Circuit holding that such
provision did not void as a matter of law settlements of securities
violations disputes.2" This comparison has three flaws. First, the
Fifth Circuit quote in Blessing only permitted certain "settlement
agreements [which] do not themselves continue the precise

237. Leavitt, 921 F.2d at 162.

238. Id.
239. This was the issue in Leavitt.
240. ERISA §§ 401(a)(1)(D), 410(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a)(1)(D), 1110(a).
241. ERISA § 410(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1110(b).
242. See Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neill, 324 U.S. 697, 704 (1945) (Releases of

statutory rights are not permitted which contravene the statutory policy).
243. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc
244. Murtagh v. Univ. Computing Co., 490 F.2d 810, 816 (5th Cir. 1974).
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conduct which violates the laws."245 However, as discussed with
Leavitt's first assertion, the ERISA releases at issue would permit
the plan fiduciaries to violate ERISA after the release is executed
by not paying plan benefit entitlements to an individual when he
subsequently files a claim. Second, the statute differs significantly
from the narrower ERISA section 410. Section 410 prevents a
fiduciary from breaching its current plan obligations and thus
requires that the fiduciary pay individual's their plan entitlements
pursuant to ERISA section 404(a)(1)(D). By contrast, the broad
securities law breach prohibition does not correlate with a similar
specific remedy for any kind of securities breach. Third, the
ERISA purposes of assuring that individuals receive their benefit
entitlements differs significantly from the securities law purpose
of preventing securities fraud-thus, different considerations
determine whether releases are available under the two different
statutory schemes.
B. The Eighth Circuit'sApplication of General ERISA Principles
to Releases of Claims of Entitlement to ERISA Benefits
The Eighth Circuit, the only circuit to have considered the
applicability of ERISA fiduciary principles to employee benefit
releases in a published decision,24 found in Leavitt that they
apply.247 The court referred to the same three basic trust sources
that the Supreme Court regularly consults to establish a federal

245. Blessing, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17311, at*15; Murtagh, 490 F.2d at
816.
246. But see Nichol v. Pullman Standard, 889 F.2d 115, 118-19 (7th Cir.
1989). The Seventh Circuit found that a release of non-pension benefit claims

was effective after the plaintiff withdrew its claim that fiduciary principles
prohibit such waivers. Id. at 121. However, the court, sub silento, applied a
fiduciary-like

analysis and considered the fairness of the consideration

received by the participant, the knowledge of the participant, and his
understanding of the rights he released. Id. at 118-19. On the other hand, the
Seventh Circuit subsequently applied a more traditional contract analysis to

releases that determined entitlements to ERISA plan benefits. For example,
there was no focus on the fairness of the consideration in Fair v. International
Flavors & Fragrances,905 F.2d 1114 (7th Cir. 1990); Licciardi v. Kropp Forge
Division Employees Retirement Plan, 990 F.2d 979 (7th Cir. 1993); and Lynn v.
CSX Transportation,Inc., 84 F.3d 970 (7th Cir. 1996). Moreover, instead of

requiring that the individual fully understand the claim for an effective
release the Court found that it sufficed if the individual had "constructive
knowledge" of a claim arising under a settlement agreement. Id. at 975. A
panel of judges from the Second Circuit, including one of members of the panel

that decided Leavitt, considered but declined to decide in an unpublished
decision whether ERISA fiduciary rules determine the effectiveness of
purported releases of claims to benefit entitlements against an employee
benefit plan and its fiduciaries. See Yablon v. Stroock Stroock & Lavan Ret.
Plan, 93 Fed. Appx. 55, 57 n.1 (2d Cir. 2004) (en banc hearing denied 2005).
247. 921 F.2d at 160.
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It then presented
common law of ERISA rights and obligations.
a totality-of-circumstances test with nine factors. 29 Three focus on
whether there was fair dealing, the hallmark of fiduciary
transactions, and appear to be fiduciary factors: (1) did the
participant know his rights and the relevant facts when he
executed the release; (2) did the participant receive adequate
consideration for the release; and (3) did improper conduct by the
employer induce the participant's release. 50 The other six factors
focus on whether there was a knowing and voluntary contract: (4)
the participant's education and business experience; (5) the
participant's input in negotiating the terms of the settlement; (6)
the clarity of the release language; (7) the amount of time the
participant had for deliberation before signing the release; (8)
whether the participant read the release and considered its terms
before signing it; and (9) whether the participant had an
opportunity to consult with an attorney before signing the
release." None of the nine criteria ask for the most fundamental
contract criteria, did the agreement actually released the plan and
its fiduciaries from the claim to an entitlement to a benefit. The
language criterion addresses the agreement's clarity rather than
its coverage.
The court found effective a release which was part of a
settlement of a bona fide dispute about the participant's eligibility
The
for benefits under a severance plan for senior managers.2
company, when it wished to eliminate an executive position, would
offer separation benefits from the plan to executives in descending
order of seniority until the company obtained an acceptance.
The plaintiff declined severance plan benefits when, contrary to
normal procedure, he was asked to make an immediate decision
because a less senior executive wished to obtain the benefits.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id. at 162.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. But cf Mange v. Petrolite Corp., 960 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Mo. 1997),

affd, 135 F.3d 570 (8th Cir. 1998), and sub nom. Mead v. Intermec Tech.
Corp., 271 F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir. 2001). Both cases used the Leavitt
contractual criteria to show that severance agreements had been entered into

in a knowing and voluntary manner. In the former case, the release was
irrelevant because the issue was the treatment of unused vacation time
provided by the severance agreement that contained the release. Mange, 960
F. Supp. at 210. In the latter, the release precludes a claim of entitlement to
short-term disability benefits, which the court found in any case to have no
merit. Mead, 271 F.3d at 716.
253. Leavitt, 921 F.2d at 162-63. The plan was not funded by insurance or a

trust fund. Id. at 163. Thus there were no plan trustees and the employer
was directly liable for the plan benefits at issue. Id.

254. Id. at 161.
255. Id.
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However, he then sought the benefits when he gave notice that he
intended to resign.' Shortly after leaving the company to become
president of another company, he concluded extensive negotiations
regarding his entitlement to plan benefits and accepted $15,000 in
exchange for an "unambiguous release" of his disputed plan claim
for a much larger amount. 7 The court found that the plaintiff
understood his rights, had access to an attorney, and had entered
into a voluntary and knowing agreement.'
There was no
discussion of the strength of the plaintiffs claim, the amount he
was seeking, or an explanation of why $15,000 was adequate
consideration. 9
Similarly, in Martino-Cattv. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,
an Iowa district court found effective a waiver of severance
benefits in exchange for 29,100 DuPont stock options pursuant to
a settlement of a bona fide dispute about the participant's
eligibility for benefits under a severance plan for executives.'
The underlying issue was whether the plaintiff resigned for a
"stated good reason." The court rejected the participant's claim
that the release, which referred to the claims with respect to the
named severance plan, lacked clarity because the word "ERISA"
was not used to describe those claims.26 '
Finally, the court found that the consideration the plaintiff
received was adequate, but again there was no explicit discussion
of the strength of the plaintiffs case or the amount being sought."
However, the court went further than in Leavitt.' It described
the consideration as "substantial," and may have made an implicit
determination of adequacy of the consideration.2 In Bublitz v.
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., the same court approved a
settlement offer containing a release that was issued to all
participants in a severance plan who were members of a class
seeking a declaratory judgment with respect to several issues,
including the significance of the phrase "Stated Good Reason" in
the severance plan."
By contrast, in Seman v. FMC Corp. Retirement Plan, the
court reaffirmed that a release of an ERISA benefit claim was
256. Id.
257. Id. at 162-63.
258. Id. at 163.
259. See generally id.
260. 317 F. Supp. 2d 914, 917 (S.D. Iowa 2004). This also appears to have

involved a plan that was funded with neither a trust nor insurance, so that the
company would have been directly liable for the benefits at issue. Id. at 919.

261. Id. at 922.
262. Id. at 923-24.
263. Leavitt, 921 F.2d at 162-63.
264. Martino-Catt,317 F. Supp. 2d at 923-24.
265. 149 F. Supp. 2d, 816, 819 (S.D. Iowa 2001) (discussing the phrase

"Stated Good Reason").
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effective only "if the fiduciary did not obtain the release in
violation of its duties to the beneficiary," 2 even though in that
case it appeared that there was no need to review those duties.
The court concluded that a participant had not released his rights
to a disability pension as part of a settlement of his age and
disability discrimination claim against his firm when he released
"'any and all claims... in any way incurred or arising out of any
matter or thing whatsoever prior' to September 18, 1997."" The
parties had acknowledged their "intent to make this release as
broad and as general as the law permits with respect to Seman's
The
employment relationship and/or termination from FMC."'
court correctly concluded that the general release language was
superseded by a provision in which the parties agreed that the
plaintiff would be paid benefits in accord with the specified
pension plan's provisions. 9 However, rather than simply finding
that the release didn't cover any claims for pension plan benefits,
the court referred to the agreement's lack of clarity.270
In Barbera v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. LongTerm DisabilityPlan"1 a district court denied a motion to dismiss
a claim that a plaintiff was eligible for benefits from a long-term
disability plan. 7 ' Again a court found that the plan could not rely
on a general release in a severance agreement of "all federal, state
or local charges, claims, demands, actions or liabilities I now have
or might have in the future based on events through the date I
sign this Agreement (even if I don't know of them when I sign this
Agreement) against 3M of whatever kind."27
The nine Leavitt criteria were applied and the motion to
dismiss was rejected because the plaintiff alleged he had not even
been informed of the availability of the long-term disability
benefits so there could not have been a knowing and voluntary
release."4 Unlike Seman, the coverage of the release was not in
question, but rather knowledge of the coverage.275
266. 334 F.3d at 732.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 731.

269. Id. at 732.
270. Id.
271. No. 04-1598, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21862, at *1 (D. Minn. Oct. 26,

2004).
272. See id. at *14-15. The court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss
under the standards set forth supra.
273. Id. at *3.
274. Id. at *9-10 (citing Leavitt, 921 F.2d at 162).

275. Traditional contract law allows releases of claims not known when a
release is executed if such coverage is clearly understood.
WILLISTON,

A TREATISE

ON THE

LAW OF

CONTRACTS,

§ 73.4

See, e.g.,
(General

Releases), 73.11 (Claims not Known at the time of release) (4th ed. 2003). By

contrast, fiduciaries are required to convey full understanding of the claim for
an effective release, supra.
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In Auslander v. Abraham Helfand,"' a defendant was denied

summary judgment on a claim that a plaintiff was eligible for
benefits from a profit-sharing plan.277 The court, which is in the
Fourth Circuit, found that the employer could not rely on a release
of all claims arising before the date of a settlement of a law suit
arising from the plaintiffs alleged embezzlement because the
defendants had not satisfied "the [fiduciary] burden of proving
that the release at issue was not obtained by fraud, undue
influence or overreaching."278 This standard was derived from the
Maryland rules for fiduciary releases. 9 It was thus unnecessary
for the court to consider whether the plaintiff fully understood that
he was purportedly releasing his claim for entitlement to profitsharing benefits.28 °
IX. THE COURTS CONSIDER WHETHER ERISA VOIDS RELEASES
OF CLAIMS OF ENTITLEMENT TO ACCRUED PENSION BENEFITS

Pension entitlements are, without
exception, subject to the anti281
alienationprovision of ERISA.
A participant may not elect a forfeiture [of vested pension
benefits] .28
We decline to ascribe to ERISA's anti-alienation provision an
unreasonable interpretation which would frustrate knowing and

voluntary settlements, such as the one entered into by Casey [the
employer's CEO to waive his undisputed retirement plan benefits in

settlement of allegations that he had committed fiduciary breaches
while serving as the plan's trustee].28
Courts in three circuits have explicitly considered whether
ERISA prohibits releases of a claim of entitlement to accrued
pension benefits. Lynn v. CSX Transportation,Inc. held that the

ERISA prohibition on the alienation or assignment of pension
benefits voids releases by individuals of their claims for
entitlements to accrued pension benefits. 2' Esden v. Bank of
Boston held that a "participant may not elect a forfeiture" of vested
accrued pension benefits." However, Esden did not mention Finz
276.
277.
278.
279.

988 F. Supp. 576 (D. Md. 1997).
Id. at 582.
Id. at 581.
Id. at 579.

280. Id. at 580.
281. Lynn v. CSX Transp., Inc., 84 F.3d 970, 975 (7th Cir. 1996) (emphasis
added).
282. Esden v. Bank of Boston, 229 F.3d 154, 173 (2d Cir. 2000) (emphasis
added).
283. Rhoades v. Casey, 196 F.3d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added).
284. 84 F.3d at 975 (citing Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 760 (1992)).

285. 229 F.3d at 173.
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v. Schlesinger,M which is often quoted for the proposition that
releases of claims for entitlements to accrued pension benefits are
permitted, even though Finz didn't discuss the anti-alienation or
non-forfeiture prohibitions. Finally, the Fifth Circuit, which had
been overruled in Boggs v. Boggs," held that claims of entitlement
to accrued pension benefits may be released as part of a settlement
of a bona fide dispute about an individual's plan obligations, even
if the obligations are not included among the statutory exceptions
to the anti-assignment prohibition."
A. The Seventh Circuit Uses the ERISA's Anti-Assignment
Prohibitionto Void Releases of Claims of Entitlement to Accrued
PensionBenefits
In Lynn, the Seventh Circuit held that the ERISA prohibition
on the assignment or alienation of pension benefits voids any
release of a claim for the entitlement of accrued pension benefits. 9
The court also clarified that such releases were not permitted
under its earlier decisions in Fair v. International Flavors &
Fragrances," Lumpkin v. Envirodyne Industries, Inc.,291 and
Licciardi v. Kropp Forge Division Employees Retirement Plan. 2
Nevertheless, despite the court's unequivocal voiding of such
releases, Fair,Lumpkin, and Liccardi have been cited repeatedly
to uphold such releases.'S
In Fair, the court held that a release precluded a former
executive from claiming that her pension benefits should take into
account a lump sum payment of $8 5 ,000."2
This payment was
part of the consideration5 for the termination of her sex
discrimination litigation and her agreement not to institute any
claim against her employer for any matter arising out of her
employment.'
The plaintiffs agreement not to institute any
claims related to her employment was held to have released her
pension benefits claim. 7 The court decided that ERISA did not
286. 957 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1992).
287. 520 U.S. 833 (1997).

288. Rhoades, 196 F.3d 592 at 599.
289. 84 F.3d at 975.
290. 905 F.2d 1114 (7th Cir. 1990).
291. 933 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1991).

292. 990 F.2d 979 (7th Cir. 1993).
293. See, e.g., Wilson v. Nabisco, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12265 (E.D. Pa)
(citing Fair and Licciardi but not Lynn), rev'd other grounds, No. 02-2148,
2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 24673, at *5 (3d Cir. Dec. 8, 2003).

294. 905 F.2d at 1116.
295. She also received an enhanced salary for eighteen months during which

she was required to provide no additional services.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 1117. There was no discussion why a release of claims against
the plaintiffs employer also released the pension plan, which was a distinct
entity. The plaintiff, however, did not appear to have made a claim against
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prohibit a release of such pension benefit claim. There was no
discussion beyond a statement that the plaintiff had not8 presented
any reason why ERISA prohibited such an agreement.2
The pension plan's summary plan description clearly and
accurately provided that salary payments, but not lump sum
payments, were to be included in pension computations.2
Moreover, the settlement agreement was silent about the
plaintiffs pension rights, so the plaintiff appeared to have no basis
to claim that the lump sum payment was included in the pension
plan computation.'
The Fair release did not pertain to the focus of the antiassignment prohibition, i.e., the individual's undisputed claim to
entitlement to accrued pension benefits."
Instead, the release
indirectly determined the treatment by the pension plan of
payments provided by and characterized by the settlement
agreement. 2 The court found that the plaintiff understood that
the pension plan included the agreement's regular payments but
not the lump sum payment in her pension benefits computation;
thus she could not complain about the allocation between such
payments within the agreement.'
It should be noted that if the
settlement payments were in part attributable to back pay, then
there would be an issue whether the pension benefits associated
with such back pay were accrued pension benefits and thus
protected by the ERISA anti-assignment provision.
In Lumpkin v. Envirodyne Industries, Inc., the court reversed
the lower court's dismissal of ERISA benefit claims by former
employees who sought to recover sufficient funds from their former
employer's grandparent so that their bankrupt employer's
inadequately-funded pension fund could pay their accrued pension
benefits."°' The grandparent would have been liable for this
deficiency if it had not been released from such obligation."O The
court, however, held that the anti-assignment ban did not void the
release the plaintiffs had executed in favor of their former
the plan but only against the employer in its individual status. Id. at 1114.
298. Id. at 1117.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. See discussion of the anti-assignment prohibition, supra.

302. On the other hand under certain circumstances the pension plan
fiduciaries may have the ability the characterize payments differently than
the settlement agreement. For example, if the settlement agreement were

obtained in a manner that violated the Proposed Fiduciary Releases Rules the
agreement's characterization could be voided on the same basis as a release

obtained in such manner.
303. Id. at 1116.
304. Lumpkin, 933 F.2d at 466. There was a substantial benefit deficiency
because the PBGC insurance did not cover all of the former employer's
promised benefits. Id. at 451-52. See supra note 36.
305. Id. at 454.
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employer and "related parties"3 ' as follows:
The anti-alienationprovision, while clearly manifesting Congress's
intent to protect workers from unknowingly signing away their
vested pension benefits, does not impose a bar on settlement
agreements wherein pension claims are knowingly and intentionally
resolved by employees. Fair v. InternationalFlavors & Fragrances,
Inc., 905 F.2d 1114, 1115-1116 (7th Cir. 1990); Nichol v. Pullman
Standard,Inc., 889 F.2d 115, 121 (7th Cir. 1989). To apply the antialienation provision in this case would establish the untenable rule
that ERISA prevents plaintiffs from ever entering into a settlement
in a dispute over lost pension benefits. °7
Although the emphasized language is often quoted, in Fair,
the court did not mention the anti-alienation provision."
In
Nichol, the court held that the anti-alienation prohibition
pertained to claims to entitlement of benefits from pension plans
but not to benefits from welfare plans.0 ' Thus, the prohibition
could not preclude settlements of welfare benefit claims. The
Nichol court did not even suggest therein that the provisions
permitted pension plan benefit settlements.310
The Lumpkin release did not pertain to the focus of the antiassignment prohibition, an individual's undisputed claim to an
entitlement to accrued pension benefits.311 Instead the release
pertained to a "dispute over lost pension benefits." 2 The claim at
issue was whether the defendant, the grandparent of the plan
sponsor, was liable to fund those uncontested "benefits" that the
sponsor had not funded.313 The plaintiffs were in effect bringing a
derivative suit on behalf of the plan. 14 If they were successful, the
plan would have had sufficient assets to meet its undisputed
benefit obligations to the plaintiffs."' Thus, the case had nothing
to do with an assignment or alienation of a participant's pension
benefits because the agreement did not change any participant's
entitlement to those benefits. Therefore, the court correctly found
irrelevant the Supreme Court's holding in Guidry that there are
no equitable exceptions to the prohibition on the assignment or

306. Id. at 455. This ruling did not resolve the case. The lower court was
directed to determine which "related parties" were released from their liability
to fund the plan benefits to which the plaintiffs were entitled but were not
being paid. Id.
307. Id. (emphasis added).
308. 905 F.2d at 1114.
309. 889 F.2d at 119.
310. Id.
311. 933 F.2d at 455.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 453-54.
314. Id. at 453.
315. Id. at 453-54.
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alienation of pension benefits."'
In Licciardi v. Kropp Forge Division Employees Retirement
Plan, the court upheld the dismissal of a participant's claim that
his pension benefits should take into account a lump sum payment
of $650,000 that he received in exchange for resigning as company
president and releasing all claims he might have had against the
company."' The participant, who was the plan administrator,
could have been expected to be aware that this payment would be
so excluded.318 The participant brought suit against the pension
plan and his former employer several years later, when the
company wished to terminate the plan, and offered him benefits
which did not take the lump sum payment into account."' The
termination agreement and an associated omnibus agreement,
which had been executed when he terminated his employment, did
not mention the plaintiffs pension rights.2 ° The court's holding
was based on its characterization of the claim as one based on
ambiguous terms in a settlement agreement, which it called
"contestable benefits," rather than on the plaintiffs "incontestable
"
' Moreover, it
benefits" under the terms of the pension plan.32
stated that any entitlement to benefits under the terms of the
pension plan was not affected by the lack of such statement in the
settlement agreement. 2' The court then considered the actual
plan terms and stated that its best interpretation was that the
lump sum was not to be taken into account to compute pension
Consequently, as in Fair, even if the suit were not
benefits.2
barred, the plaintiffs claim would have been disallowed.
The Licciardi release did not pertain to the focus of the antiassignment prohibition, i.e., an individual's undisputed claim to
entitlement to accrued pension benefits. 24 Instead, the release
indirectly determined the treatment by the pension plan of
payments provided by and characterized by the settlement
agreement. 2' The court also found that the plaintiff understood
316.
317.
318.
319.

Id. at 455-56. See Guidry, 493 U.S. at 376-77.
990 F.2d at 982, 984.
Id. at 982.
Id. at 981-82.

320. The court observed that the agreements could have, but did not,
describe the lump sum payment in a manner that would have been taken into
account under the pension plan. Id. at 982.
321. Id. at 983. This distinction created ambiguity because all pension
benefits are based on plan terms. The real issue is the extent to which a
settlement agreement may reduce, if at all, an individual's claim to an
entitlement to benefits under a pension plan. The court in Lynn clarified

which benefits were incontestable and thus not subject to change by a
settlement agreement, whether or not such agreement contained a release.

322.
323.
324.
325.

Id. at 982.
Id. at 982-83.
Id.
On the other hand under certain circumstances the pension plan
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that the pension plan did not include the agreement's lump sum
payment in his pension benefits computation; thus he could not
complain about such characterization.32
In Lynn v. CSX Transportation,Inc., the court reversed and
remanded a lower court decision that a release precluded an
individual from pursuing a claim that a pension plan's terms
entitled him to credits for the time he was in the military."7 The
individual was an ordinary worker who, with many of his
colleagues, accepted an early retirement package that enhanced
his retirement plan benefits by treating his age and service as
each being increased by five years.328 This package was given in
exchange for a resignation agreement not to assert any claims
against his employer that resulted from his employment
relation.329
The Lynn case differed significantly from Fair,Licciardi, and
Lumpkin. The focus in Lynn was a discussion of the plaintiffs
entitlement to accrued pension benefits, the very focus of the antiassignment prohibition. This time the issue was not the treatment
of settlement payments but rather whether the agreement could
adversely affect those accrued pension benefits." °
The court stated unequivocally that the prohibition of the
assignment or alienation of pension benefits precludes any release
of a participant's or a beneficiary's claim to entitlement to accrued
benefits under the terms of an ERISA pension plan. 1
Pension entitlements are, without exception, subject to the antialienation provision of ERISA. Contested pension claims, on the
other hand, are "simply outside the realm of the provision." The
distinction between these two categories is a critical one, and, if the
decision of the district court is any indication, one that has not yet
been drawn with sufficient clarity. A pension entitlement arises
under the terms of the pension plan itself. A contested pension
claim, by contrast, arises under a settlement agreement. A release
may prevent a plan participant from asserting claims based on a
settlement agreement, but may not bar claims based on pension
fiduciaries may characterize payments differently than the settlement
agreement. For example, if the settlement agreement were obtained in a
manner that violated the Proposed Fiduciary Releases Rules the agreement's

characterization could be voided on the same basis as a release obtained in
such manner.
326. Id. at 984.
327. 84 F.3d at 977.
328. Id. at 972.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 976-77.
331. Id. at 975. The Lynn court also noted that the plaintiff had far less
knowledge than the plaintiff-executives in Fair and Liccardi when they
executed their respective releases. Id. The Lynn plaintiff also played no role
in negotiating the agreement and received no advice from an attorney
regarding the agreement. Id. at 976.
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entitlements.32
Fair, Licciardi, and Lynn illustrate the critical distinction.
Pension entitlements that accrued before the execution of the
release, such as the military service credits of the Lynn plaintiff,333
are incontestable. Thus, they may not be released and are not
affected by settlement agreements. 33 By contrast, pension benefits
associated with settlement payments are contestable and thus
releasable.33 The pension benefits associated with different kinds
of settlement payments may differ significantly, such as lump sum
payments or salary payments for future service, without any
explicit reference to the pension plan.336
The Court may have created confusion by the manner in
which it introduced the term "contested claims." Rather than
simply stating that contested claims are those contestable claims,
whose releases are effective it declared:
Our earlier cases have referred to claims arising under settlement
agreements as "contestable." We think "contested claim" may be a
more accuratephrase, as the claims falling in this category are ones
that have been contested, either actually or constructively. Where a
claim was not previously contested, it has been considered a
"contestable claim" if the claimant had actual or constructive
knowledge of the claim at the time of signing the release. While this
latter type of claim may also be described as "previously
contestable," in that it could have been contested and resolved at the
time the release was entered into (but was not), such a claim has
been constructively contested. A claim may be considered contested
where a claimant knew of the claim at the time a dispute was
settled. Whether the parties actually wrangled over a particular
claim is not determinative. What matters is whether the claimant
knew of the claim and knowingly relinquished it (relinquishmentof
course includingfailure to act or to raise the issue at all). While this
difference in phrasing may seem minor, a review of the record in
this case shows that our previous choice of words has led to
confusion. "Contested claim" strikes us as the clearer, and therefore
preferable, choice. 7

332. Id. at 975 (emphasis added and internal citations omitted).
333. Id. at 977.
334. Liccardi, thus correctly stated the proposition that no explicit provision
is needed in the agreement to assure that a participant's benefits are paid
pursuant to the terms of the pension plan. Licciardi, 990 F.2d at 982.
335. This raises the question of whether the pension treatment of settlement
payments for back pay are accrued benefits and thus incontestable.
336. Faircorrectly observed that the plaintiffs pension benefits incorporated
the enhanced salary obtained by the plaintiff under the settlement agreement
even though the agreement had no such explicit provision. The Court in Lynn
similarly did not rely on the fact that the plaintiffs resignation agreement had
a clause stating he was entitled to retirement payments pursuant to a specific
pension plan provision to decide upon the effectiveness of the releases.
337. Id. at 975 (emphasis added).
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In the discussion immediately following this quote the Court
clarifies that a contested claim is a contestable claim whose
release is effective and the limited circumstances in which an
individual is treated as having constructive knowledge of such
claim. In particular, the Court distinguished the Lynn plaintiff
from those in Fair and Licciardi. First and most "central," the
Lynn plaintiffs claim was based solely on the pension plan and
was thus incontestable and thus could not be released.
By
contrast, the claims of the Fairand Licciardi plaintiffs pertained
to settlement payments and thus were based on the settlement
and were releasable.'
Second, even if the Lynn plaintiffs claim
had been based on the settlement agreement and thus could be
released, i.e., contestable, it was not contested because the Lynn
plaintiff could not have been "reasonably" expected to have
understood the specific pension claim being released under the
form agreement with which he was presented. By contrast, the
Fair and Licciardi plaintiffs, who had negotiated individualized
settlements with the assistance of counsel, could have been
"reasonably" expected to have understood the specific pension
claims being released." 9 Under this reasoning if the plaintiff could
not have been reasonably expected to understand the pension
implications
of
the
settlement
agreement's
apparent
characterization of its payments, such pension claim may not be
contested. Thus, the release of the pension plan is void and the
pension plan may determine the correct characterization of the
payments.'4
Under this analysis, if the claim is based solely on the
settlement agreement, such as for additional pension benefits not
set forth in the pension agreement, then the release does not affect
the plaintiffs plan benefit entitlement. An example of this would
be a former employer who agreed to enhance an employee's
benefits by adding five years of service and age for purposes of the
participant's retirement benefits, as in Lynn, but who had failed to

338. Id. at 976-77.
339. As discussed, supra, this is contract analysis rather than fiduciary
analysis. Contract analysis focuses on whether the individual could have been
expected to understand the released rights. By contrast, fiduciary analysis

focuses on whether an individual fully understood the released rights
340. For example, if the plaintiff receives $30,000 under a settlement
agreement that generated no pension benefits because it was not explicitly
characterized as back pay; but if characterized as back pay would have
generated $400,000 in pension benefits, it would appear that the plaintiff did
not fully understand the release, which would be voided under this analysis.
The Proposed Fiduciary Release Rules would give the same result. The plan

could then decide how to characterize the payment. But see Anderson v. W.
Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, No. CIV. S-92-1482 WBS, 1993
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12437, at *1 (E.D. Cal. June 23, 1993); Wilson v. Nabisco, 82
Fed. Appx. 282 (3d Cir. 2003).
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so amend the plan. Consequently, the plaintiff could not look to
the plan for the promised benefits, but could look to the employer
for those benefits."'
Lumpkin is not an example of this fact pattern because the
participants had an undisputed entitlement to pension plan
benefits." The issue was whether the corporate grandparent had
been relieved of its obligation to fund the pension plan's
obligations.3" If so, the plan lacked the assets to pay those
undisputed benefits.
After Lynn, The Seventh Circuit district courts have
consistently voided releases of entitlement claims for accrued
pension benefits. 3" Voiding a release does not mean that the
In Malloy v.
plaintiff is entitled to the claimed benefit.345
Ameritech Pension Plan, a court found that a release of "all claims
arising out of their employment," including "ERISA claims"
executed by employees in exchange for severance plan benefits, did
not prevent the employees from claiming that the lump sum forms
of their pension benefits were not computed using the correct
In Berger v. Nazametz,"7 a court found that a
actuarial factors.'
form release of "any and all claims or causes of action of any kind,
known or unknown, arising out of his employment" executed by
employees in exchange for additional benefits under a reduction in
force program did not preclude a claim that the employees' lump
sum benefits from the pension plan were not computed in accord
No review of the individual
with the ERISA requirements.'

341. The plaintiff may, however, seek reformation of the plan to include such
additional benefits. See ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). The

plaintiff may prefer to receive payment from the plan because he could avoid
tax on such payments by rolling over the payment to another qualified plan or
IRA. See I.R.C. § 402(f)(2)(A).
342. Lumpkin, 933 F.2d at 452.

343. Id. at 452-53.
344. But see Matthews v. Sears Pension Plan, No. 95 C 1988, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5357, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 1996) (decided before Lynn). In that case,
a plaintiff was found to lack the typicality required for a class action claim
because of what appeared to be a general release executed by the plaintiff. Id.

at *12. Although the claim pertained to the entitlement of an individual's
accrued pension benefits rather than the pension implications of a settlement

payment, namely that the plan used an impermissible interest rate to compute
the lump sum value of the individual's pension benefits, the court cited Fair

for the proposition that such a release may have been effective. Id. at *13.
345. See e.g., Lynn, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7342, at *1 (approving the
rejection by the pension plan of the plaintiffs claim for service credits for his

time in the military on remand).
346. No. 98-488-GPM, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20490, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 7,
2000).
July
347. No. 00-CV-0584-DRH, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11638, at *1 (S.D. Ill.
5, 2001).
348. The court, however, did not focus on the inability to release a pension
plan entitlement but focused on the fact that, as in Lynn, the release was part
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circumstances was needed to make this determination. Thus,
class certification could be granted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed
the subsequent judgment of the district court that the class of
plaintiffs was owed in excess of $300 million by the plan, which
was a cash balance plan. 49
B. The Second CircuitIssues Mixed Decisions on the Effectiveness
of Releases of Claims of Entitlement to Accrued Pension Benefits

In its first decision, Finz v. Schlesinger, the court upheld a
release by a retired judge of his claim that he was entitled to
benefits under a pension plan operated by a law firm of which he
was a name partner."n The release was part of a separation
agreement between the plaintiff and his former law firm in which
partnership assets and liabilities were allocated between the
plaintiff, Finz, and the remaining partners."1 The court based its
conclusion that pension benefits could be effectively released352 on
Leavitt,3" which as discussed, pertained to the eligibility for
severance benefits rather than to pension benefits, and Laniok v.
Advisory Committee of Brainerd Manufacturing Co. Pension

Plan,3" which did not consider the release of accrued pension
benefits. The Finz court did not consider the ERISA prohibition on
the assignment of pension benefits.
The Second Circuit ruled in Laniok that a release of the right
to participate in a pension plan could be permissible because
ERISA did not require universal participation in pension plans."u
The court, however, held that the release at issue had not been

of a form settlement in which the employee's lawyer played no role in drafting
or negotiating. The Lynn court noted that the plaintiff had not been advised
by counsel and had far less knowledge than the plaintiff-executives in Fair
and Liccardiwhen the respective releases were executed.
349. See generally Barry Kozak, The Cash Balance Plan, an Integral
Component of the Defined Benefit Plan Renaissance, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
753 (2004); Edward A. Zelinsky, The Cash Balance Controversy Revisited: Age
Discriminationand Fidelity to Statutory Text, 20 VA. TAX REV. 557 (2001).

350. 957 F.2d at 84.
351. Id. at 80. The plaintiff claimed the release was invalid because he had
not been given any plan documents and did not know the plan terms when he

signed the release. Id. at 81. The court did not discuss ERISA's fiduciary
principles or the prohibition on assignments of pension benefits. Id. It held
the release effective relying on (a) the general principle that a party settling a

fraud claim may not subsequently assert that the settlement was invalid
because he did not understand the fraud; (b) the sophistication of the plaintiff;
(c) the plaintiffs access to legal counsel; (d) the plaintiffs failure to show he

was eligible for pension plan benefits and thus entitled to any plan
information; and (e) the substantial consideration of $75,000 he received
under his separation agreement. Id. at 82.

352. Id. at 81-82.
353. 921 F.2d at 162.
354. 935 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir. 1991).

355. Id. at 1364.
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shown to be effective.356 The court also stated therein that "[o]ur
decision should by no means be interpreted as approving the
individual waiver of [unspecified] pension plan standards that
ERISA does mandate. 57
The Second Circuit identified one of the pension standards
which could not be waived when, without mentioning Laniok, it
declared in the course of reviewing a cash balance plan358 that "[a]
participant may not elect a forfeiture [of vested pension
benefits]."3 9 The court rejected the plan's claim that it was
entitled to pay a participant a lump sum smaller than the
actuarial equivalent of the participant's normal retirement benefit
of a lifetime annuity beginning at their normal retirement age"
because the participant had consented to such reduction. 31 Thus,
releases of vested pension benefits are always void.
The Esden court also discussed the limits on the ability of
employers and employees to contract with respect to ERISA plan
benefits:
ERISA was enacted to restrict employers' and employees' freedom of
contract when bargainingover pensions. Employers do not have to

provide pension plans, but when they do, those plans must comply
with Title I of ERISA [entitled "Protection of Employee Rights"] ....
The Plan is correct that a pension benefit is defined according to the
terms of the plan; but ERISA is quite explicit that those terms are
and restrictions. The Plan
circumscribed by statutory requirements
6 2
cannot contract around the statute.

356. Id.
357. Id. at 1366.
358. Id.
359. Esden, 229 F.3d at 173. Compare Holt v. Winpisinger, in which the
D.C. Circuit held that rights arising under ERISA may not be released, such
as the requirement that all service with an employer be considered to
determine the portion of a participant's pension benefit which was vested and
thus not forfeitable. 811 F.2d at 1542. By contrast, those derived from a
specific plan's terms could be released prior to the accrual of benefits. Id. at
1536. Thus, an officer manager was entitled to service credits for her first ten
years of employment even though she was called and compensated as an
independent contractor in the first year. Id. at 1519-42. ERISA would have
permitted the plan to provide her with no pension if she had not been entitled
to ten years of service. Id. at 1537 n.35.
360. Esden, 229 F.3d at 157. See ERISA § 204(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(c)(3)
(prohibiting a pension plan from paying a lump sum with a value smaller than
the participant's normal retirement benefit, i.e., the life annuity benefit
beginning at the participant's normal retirement age).
361. See Esden, 229 F.3d at 163-64 (holding that a participant's lump sum
benefit under a cash balance plan must be the actuarial equivalent of the
participant's normal retirement benefit of a lifetime annuity beginning at the
participant's normal retirement age). The court concurred with a similar
holding of the Seventh Circuit in Berger v. Xerox Corp. Ret. Income Guarantee
Plan, 338 F.3d 755 (7th Cir. 2003).
362. Esden, 229 F.3d at 172-73 (emphasis added).
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None of the post-Esden district courts in the Second Circuit,"
however, automatically rejected releases of claims for accrued
pension plan benefits or even mentioned Esden.3 "
In Spann v. AOL Time Warner, the court denied class
certification for a claim that the plan had made a systematic error
in annualizing the computation of compensation for partial years
of service, which amount was used to compute pension benefits,
because the court held that the precise circumstances of two
pension plan waivers needed to be considered individually to
determine their validity. 66 Some class members had signed none
of the waivers, some only one waiver, and some both waivers."
Participants agreed in the first waiver not to make any claims
against the pension plan or its fiduciaries in exchange for being
able to receive a lump sum payment.36 There was no discussion of
why such a waiver did not violate the non-forfeiture regulations," 8
which do not permit "a plan to offer an employee the voluntary
choice of 3a 69partial forfeiture in exchange for a particular form of
payment."
The second waiver released the employer, its officers, and
representatives from all claims arising from the participant's
employment in exchange for a severance payment. ° As with
Laniok,"7l which this case cites, there is no discussion of why, even
if this release applied to the pension plan, an entity distinct from
the employer, its officers, and representatives, the release did not
violate the prohibition on the assignment of pension benefits."'
There was a similar denial of class certification when questions
were raised about the benefits provided by a cash balance plan to a
large number of terminated workers.373
363. The Second Circuit in a later unpublished decision, Yablon, 98 Fed.
Appx. at 55, upheld a release of pension benefits. Neither the district nor the
appellate court mentioned the prohibition on pension forfeitures or the
prohibition on the assignment of pension benefits, although references were
made to Finz, 957 F.2d at 78 and Laniok, 935 F.2d at 1360.
364. However, an earlier case, Coviello v. Retirement Plan for National
CleaningContractors,No. 92 Civ. 7139, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6483 (S.D.N.Y.
May 17, 1993), had also used the prohibition on forfeitures to hold that a
release of claims to an entitlement to pension benefits could not diminish and

individual's vested benefits. Id. at *1.
365. 219 F.R.D. at 317-18.
366. Id. at 314.
367. Id. at 312.
368. Id. at 307. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.411(a)-4.
369. Esden, 229 F.3d at 173.
370. Spann, 219 F.R.D. at 312.

371. 935 F.2d at 1360.
372. Spann, 219 F.R.D. at 307. See also Laniok, 935 F.2d at 1360.
373. Walker v. Asea Brown Boveri, Inc., Cash Balance Pension Plan, No.
3:02-CV-550, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3454, at *1 (D. Conn. Feb. 25, 2003). In

that case, the court found that the precise circumstances of the execution of
form waivers, which were part of severance agreements given to more than
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As a result of the two courts' improper denial of class
certification, the participants may have been wrongfully deprived
of promised pension benefits because the small individual losses
will not justify individual actions requiring substantial attorney
fees that might not be reimbursed even if the participant
prevails.374
C. The Fifth Circuit Holds that Offsets Against Accrued Pension
Entitlements in Settlements of Bona Fide Disputes with Pension
Plans Do Not Violate the Anti-Assignment Prohibition
The Fifth Circuit in Rhoades v. Casey,375 held that even after
Boggs v. Boggs,76 releases of claims for accrued pension benefits as
part of settlements of bona fide disputes with pension plans
pertaining to allegations of a fiduciary-participant's misbehavior
do not violate the anti-assignment prohibition.377 In Rhoades, the
individual was credited with his entire benefit entitlement, but the
sum was applied to satisfy an obligation of the participant to the
plan. 8 In particular, the court decided that a former CEO of a
bank, and sole trustee of its retirement plan, could be required to
release his rights to his retirement plan pursuant to a settlement
he concluded with the banking authorities with respect to his
alleged misbehavior as both a bank officer and plan trustee.7 9
The court asserted that three circuits permitted knowing and
voluntary releases of claims for pension benefits as parts of
settlements. 380 However, all the cases are distinguishable from
Rhoades. The first was Finz v. Schlesinger,"' which did not
consider the applicability of the prohibition against the
assignment or alienation of pension benefits and did not involve a
dispute about the individual's obligation to the plan. The second
was Lumpkin,382 which did not involve any dispute about a
participant's benefit entitlement, but rather a dispute about the
8,000 former employees, needed to be considered individually to determine
their validity. Id. The waivers at issue released the employer, its officers and
representatives, and [unnamed] employee benefit plans from all claims arising

out of the participant's employment. Id.
374. ERISA section 502(g)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1), gives courts the

discretion to allow a reasonable attorneys' fee and costs for either party. This
means the courts may decide to give the counsel fees which the counsel
considers far from adequate. Id.
375. 196 F.3d 592 (5th Cir. 1999).

376. 520 U.S. 833 (1997) (the offset was not included in the statutory
exceptions from the anti-assignment prohibition).
377. Rhoades, 196 F.3d at 598-99.
378. Id. at 600-01.
379. Id. at 594-95.
380. Id. at 598-99.
381. 957 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1992).

382. 933 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1991).
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funding obligation of a party related to the plan sponsor. The
pension plan could have paid its benefit obligations if it could have
The Rhoades
obtained sufficient funds from the related party.'
court did not mention Lynn,' which explained the significance of
Lumpkin and held that releases of claims to the entitlement of
accrued pension benefits are void, such as the one in question in
Rhoades. 5 The third was Stobnicki v. Textron,' which also did
not involve an offsetting individual obligation to the plan. In
Stobnicki, the court upheld a settlement of a dispute between two
good faith claimants of pension benefits, the beneficiary named
under the plan, and a common-law wife because as the Court
stated in Rhoades:
We held that courts "will not ascribe to Congress the intent of
making unreasonable law--one requiring terminal[sic] litigation
rather than settlements as does the general law," and therefore the
apparent statutory bar against alienation of pension benefits should
yield to reason and allow benefits to be voluntarily waived for
settlement purposes. 387
The Stobnickni argument, which was mentioned in Leavitt,"
has three flaws in addition to being mooted by Boggs.38 9
First, a ban on releases of accrued pension benefits will not
result in "terminal" or interminable litigation to resolve all
pension disputes. Settlements are not banned, but are binding
only if judicially approved. Courts may be expected to approve
stipulated settlements that are result from the fair dealing
required by the ERISA fiduciary provisions, just as they approve
similar settlements of bona fide disputes about FLSA claims." °
The ban on non-judicially approved releases is not likely to lead to
any flood of inappropriate litigation. Most bona fide disputes will
continue to conclude neither with litigation nor any formal
383. Id.
384. 84 F.3d 970 (7th Cir. 1996).
385. Rhoades, 196 F.3d at 600.
386. 868 F.2d 1460 (5th Cir. 1989).
387. Rhoades, 196 F.3d at 599 (internal citations omitted).

388. 921 F.2d at 162.
389. In overruling a Fifth Circuit decision, Boggs held that ERISA
preempted community property rules on the disposition of a deceased
participant's pension benefits. 520 U.S. at 852-53. Thus, the common law

wife would clearly not have been entitled to any of the participant's benefits
and there would have been no dispute that needed to be settled.
390. D.A. Schulte, 328 U.S. at 113 n.8. See, e.g., EEOC v. Local 28 of the
Sheet Metal Workers Int'l, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24448 (S.D.N.Y.) in which
court required discrimination settlement explicitly address plaintiffs accrued
pension rights. The U.S. Department of Labor was, however, in 1949, also

authorized to approve FLSA settlements. 29 U.S.C. § 216(c). A similar ban on
releases is contained in regulations of the Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993 (the "FMLA"). See Preamble to the Final Regulations Implementing the
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 60 FR 2180,2218 (Jan. 16, 1995).
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settlement, but rather by the decision of a participant or
beneficiary not to even challenge the benefit denial. Litigation
costs are so significant that few fair settlements will be
challenged.39
Second, respected commentators disagree with the concept
that settlements, even judicially approved ones, are the preferred
way of resolving legal disputes.'
Moreover one of the major
Congressional purposes for ERISA was to provide ready access to
the courts, 393 rather than to deprive them of such access. Thus,
"[tihe civil enforcement scheme of § 502(a) [which provides court
access to those who claim ERISA violations] is one of the essential
tools for accomplishing the stated purposes of ERISA."
Third, and most important, the anti-assignment statute3 9
prohibits the Fifth Circuit from compelling the plaintiff to transfer
to the plan the benefits to which he is entitled under the terms of
the plan. The Supreme Court has made it quite clear that there
are no implicit or equitable exceptions to the statutory
prohibition." The phrase "may not be alienated or assigned" has
an unambiguous meaning under the statute, the regulations
thereunder, and the Supreme Court cases interpreting those
sections. All agree that benefit releases by a participant to the
pension plan by which the participant relinquishes his or her
interest in plan benefits to the plan, are assignments of the
participant's interest. This determination is not affected by
whether the participant voluntarily agrees to such relinquishment
or is forced to make the relinquishment by a local domestic
relations statute. In particular, the plaintiff in Rhoades agreed to
give up his claim to benefits under the terms of the pension plan."7
391. Moreover, courts will retain the power to assess attorneys' fees against
any plaintiff who behaves improperly.
ERISA § 502(g)(1), 29 U.S.C.

§ 1132(g)(1).
392. See, e.g., Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075
(1984). It is not clear that plaintiffs, defendants or society as whole is better
served with settlements rather than the determinations of the parties'
respective rights.

393. ERISA § 2(b).
394. Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52 (1987). The
Supreme Court went on to describe the "detailed provisions of § 502(a) as
set[ting] forth a comprehensive civil enforcement scheme that represents a
careful balancing of the need for prompt and fair claims settlement procedures
against the public interest in encouraging the formation of employee benefit
plans." Id. at 54.
395. ERISA § 206(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d).
396. This is why the same Fifth Circuit refused to permit pension plans to
set off damages caused by a misbehaving fiduciary participant against the

participant's plan benefits. See Herberger v. Shanbaum, 897 F.2d 801, 804
(5th Cir. 1990). In Rhoades, the issue is not an involuntary offset but the
validity of a voluntary agreement to execute documents to achieve such offset,
which violates the same anti-assignment prohibition. 196 F.3d at 594-95.
397. 196 F.3d at 599.
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Thus, he agreed to alienate or assign his interest. None of the
exceptions applies,"a so the prohibition on the alienation or
assignment of pension interests would prevent the release from
being effective even if the plaintiff had executed the release as
required under the settlement agreement.
X. THE NON-FIDUCIARY ANALYSIS COURTS HAVE APPLIED TO
RELEASES OF CLAIMS FOR ENTITLEMENT TO ERISA BENEFITS
ERISA does not prohibit knowing and voluntary relinquishment of
employee benefits. Dist. 29, United Mine Workers v. New River Co.,

842 F.2d 734, 737 (4th Cir. 1988). Further, the heightened scrutiny
applied to waiver of rights accrued in ERISA pension plans does not
apply in this case where the plans involved were both welfare
benefit plans. See, e.g., Finz v. Schlesinger, 957 F.2d 78, 82 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 72 (1992). Issues of relinquishment of rights
and waiver are governed by federal common law developed in
ERISA cases rather than by particular state law although state law
may inform the development of the federal common law. Matter of
Heci Exploration Co., Inc., 862 F.2d 513, 523 (5th Cir. 1988). To be

valid, a waiver of ERISA benefits must be an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.39
Although we believe that ERISA permits individuals, including
older individuals like Laniok, to waive their opportunity to
participate in pension plans even if the employer could not exclude
them, such individuals are relinquishing a right that ERISA
indicates a strong congressional purpose of preserving. In order to
ensure that an individual decision characterized as a waiver is not,
in fact, an impermissible exclusion, it is appropriate that an
individual's waiver of his right to participate in a pension plan be
carefully examined to ensure that it is knowingly and voluntarily
made.
In the analogous ADEA [Age Discrimination Employment Act]
waiver situation, we have similarly required that a waiver be
strictly scrutinized. Bormann v. AT&T Communications, Inc., 875

F.2d at 403. In Bormann, we adopted the "totality of the
circumstances" standard applied by the Third Circuit, id. (citing
Coventry v.

United States Steel Corp., 856 F.2d at 524), and

Congress has explicitly indicated approval of this approach to
determining whether ADEA waivers are knowing and voluntary.4

398. There was no loan being repaid, so ERISA section 206(d)(2), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1056(d)(2), is inapplicable. The exception in ERISA section 206(d)(4), 29
U.S.C. § 1056(d)(4), is not applicable because it was not enacted until 1996,
whereas the agreement in question, requiring the plaintiff to execute the
release, was executed in 1993. Rhoades, 196 F.3d at 594.
399. Rodriguez-Abreu v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 986 F.2d 580, 587 (1st Cir.
1993).
400. Laniok, 935 F.2d at 1367.
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The Fourth Circuit, several Third Circuit district courts, and
a Ninth Circuit district court have applied general contract
principles to determine the effectiveness of releases. The First and
Second Circuits have added the totality-of-circumstances overlay
that is applicable to Title VII waivers. The presence of any
consideration exchanged for the release is a factor favoring the
effectiveness of the release in the Second Circuit and certain
district court decisions in the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth and
Ninth Circuits. The First and Fifth Circuits, by contrast, focuses
on the "nature" and adequacy of the consideration. Finally, some
courts have merely asked whether a release of a claim to
entitlement to ERISA benefits under the terms of a plan is
voidable on the basis of duress or lack of mental capacity and
found that such releases may be subsequently ratified.
By
contrast, the Proposed Fiduciary Release Rules require the
Releasing Fiduciary to show the release was obtained by fair
dealing, i.e., the individual received fair consideration and fully
understood the release."
A. The Third and Fourth Circuits' ContractAnalysis of Releases
of Claims of Entitlement to ERISA Benefits
In District29, United Mine Workers of America v. New River
Co., the Fourth Circuit held that an individual settling a wrongful
termination grievance against a company (the "Initial Employer")
may have thereby unknowingly given up his entitlement to
lifetime medical benefits. °2 This holding illustrates why the
Proposed Fiduciary Release Rules are required by ERISA to apply
fiduciary principles rather than contract principles to assure that
participants receive their earned employee benefits.
The plaintiff was receiving lifetime medical benefits from the
United Mine Workers of America 1974 Benefit Plan (the "UMW
Plan"), which had become secondarily liable for such lifetime
benefits when the company from which the plaintiff retired (the
"Final Employer") went out of business.0 3 The plaintiff had joined
the Final Employer after leaving the Initial Employer.4" The
UMW Plan increased the plaintiffs pension benefits to reflect the
wage payments under the agreement containing the release,0 5 but
also informed him that he would no longer be entitled to lifetime
401. The Courts in each of these Circuits almost never considered whether
the Releasing Fiduciary has any fiduciary obligations to the individual from
whom it sought the release of a claim to an entitlement to ERISA plan

benefits.
402. 842 F.2d 734, 736 (4th Cir 1988).

403. Id. at 735-36.
404. Id.
405 This was based on the arbitrator's award of back pay, which was part of
the settlement. Id. at 735.
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medical benefits from the UMW Plan because the solvent Initial
Employer would be treated as his final employer as a result of the
settlement and would therefore be liable for the lifetime medical
benefits.4
The court found that the Initial Employer was not liable for
the plaintiffs lifetime medical benefits because he had released
this company from all claims resulting from his employment in the
wrongful termination settlement agreement. °7 The court stated
that the plaintiff may not have known, when he executed the
release, that he would deprive himself of the lifetime medical
benefits that the Initial Employer would otherwise be obligated to
provide."° The court, however, pointed to a settlement provision in
which the plaintiff expressly assumed the risk that his loss "might
be greater than then known or anticipated." Moreover, the court
noted that the plaintiff had been advised by UMW counsel during
the settlement negotiations. 10
The Former Employer was thus acting as the Releasing
Fiduciary for both the employer's plan and the UMW Plan when it
requested the release, since the plaintiff purportedly released his
rights to benefits under both those plans.4

11

The Proposed

Fiduciary Release Rules would prevent any deprivation of these
earned employee benefits by voiding the release.
There was no showing that the plaintiff knew that, by signing
the release, he may have been waiving his right to lifetime health
benefits from both the UMW Plan, which was then providing those
benefits, and his Initial Employer's plan, which would arguably
become liable for post-release benefits.4 12 The fact that UMW
counsel advised the plaintiff did not show that the plaintiff knew
this deprivation could result from the settlement when he
executed the release. 43 In fact, the Court explicitly conceded that
the plaintiff may not have known when he executed the release
that he would thereby deprive himself of the lifetime medical
benefits that the Former Employer would otherwise have been
obligated to provide him.14 The plaintiff thus, had not been shown
to have the requisite understanding when he executed the release.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 736.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 735-36. The plaintiffs civil action against the UMW Plan for the
medical benefits would continue under the court's decision. Id. at 736. If the

Plan ultimately prevailed it would have obtained an unexpected windfall.
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. The Court relied on a settlement provision in which the participant
expressly assumed the risk that his loss "might be greater than then known or

anticipated."

The John MarshallLaw Review

[38:773

The plaintiff was not shown to have received fair and
reasonable consideration. The court referred to the substantial
consideration paid to the plaintiff under the agreement." 5 The
court, however, did not consider whether the consideration was
adequate in view of both the purportedly foregone lifetime medical
benefits and the wages and other current compensation he had
been deprived of by the wrongful termination."'
Similar questions arose when two district courts applied
contractual principles to determine the effectiveness of releases
pertaining to claims to the entitlement of pension benefits based
on the payments under agreements settling Title VII actions for
wrongful terminations.417 Both concerned the same issue, whether
the individuals were entitled to service credits418 for the period of
the time for which they received settlement payments. None of
the agreements explicitly described the payment as being in whole
or in part as back pay or the precise number of hours for which
payments were made."1 9 In each case, there was no showing that
the individuals fully understood that the lack of such
characterization would prevent them from receiving the
substantial pension benefits that ERISA would have required to be
associated with the compensation they were purportedly denied.42
In one class action settlement, the lack of understanding and the
lack of fair and reasonable consideration seemed apparent from
the difference between the $3 million settlement payment and the
$40 million in pension benefits associated with those same
payments.42'
415.
416.
417.
U.S.

Id.
Id.
See Anderson v. W. Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 1993
Dist. LEXIS 12437 (E.D. Cal. June 23, 1993), at *14-15; Wilson v.

Nabisco, No. 01-CV-415, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12265, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 2,
2002).
418. Service credits determine rates of benefit accruals and the extent to
which benefits are non-forfeitable.
419. The focus would probably have been on the significance of 29 C.F.R.
§ 2530.200b-2(a)(3), which defines an "hour of service" in relevant part to
include: "each hour for which back pay, irrespective of mitigation of damages,
is either awarded or agreed to by the employer."

420. This characterization issue arose without a release of ERISA claims in
Patrick v. Westinghouse, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16667 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 1990)

and Francis v. Rodman Local Union 201 Pension Fund, 367 F.3d 937 (D.C.
Cir. 2004). In both cases lump sum settlements of discrimination litigation did
not result in additional pension accruals. However, in Patrick the plan

appears to have been drafted in a manner that would have prevented any
pension credit accruals for the period in which back pay was granted, although

the plaintiff asserted he had been led to believe the contrary.

Thus, it is

appropriate to apply the Proposed Fiduciary Release Rules to a party relying

on an agreement which implicitly affect employee benefit entitlements even if
ERISA claims are not explicitly released.
421. Anderson, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12437, at *9, *20.
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These releases violated each of the Proposed Fiduciary
Release Rules, and thus ERISA would void them. The plaintiffs
lacked understanding of the released claims to pension benefits
and the released parties. The plaintiffs failed to receive fair
consideration for those rights. Finally, the agreements failed to
release the pension plans or the fiduciaries. The pension plan
fiduciaries would then have the right and obligation as ERISA
fiduciaries to determine the extent to which the plaintiffs were
entitled to service credits in concert with the payments made on
the pension plan. This was in fact the result reached by the
parties at oral argument in Wilson v. Nabisco.42
B. The Second and Sixth Circuits'Totality-of-Circumstances
Analysis of Whether an Individual Made a Knowing and Voluntary
Waiver of the Individual'sEntitlement to ERISA Benefits
In Laniok, the Second Circuit denied summary judgment to a
pension plan that claimed an individual released his right to
participate in the plan (i.e., a pre-accrual release) even though the
plan conceded that he did not know the terms of the plan when he
began his employment and executed the release.423 Under the
Proposed Fiduciary Release Rules, the participant's lack of
knowledge of the pension plan terms would have voided the
release, regardless of the plaintiffs education, his role in
negotiating the release, the clarity of the release, or his legal
representation.
Moreover, the unreasonableness of the
consideration appeared to be almost obvious in Laniok because of
the tremendous disparity between the plaintiffs substantial
accrued benefits and his insubstantial wage compensation.4"
The court stated that, "[tihe essential question is a pragmatic
one: whether, in the totality of the circumstances, the individual's
waiver of his right can be characterized as 'knowing and
voluntary."' 5 The court set forth the following factors that may be

422. 82 Fed. Appx. 282 (3d Cir. 2003) (unpublished opinion). It may be
argued that the plan would not agree to such reconsideration unless there is a
good chance that the pension plan will reach a different result than their
initial denial of the service credits. On the other hand plans often move to
dismiss claims on the basis the plaintiff has not exhausted internal reviews

and after such dismissals deny those same claims.
423. 935 F.2d at 1363-69.
424. Id. at 1362-64. The plaintiff went to work at Brainerd Company as a
machinist beginning at an hourly wage of $8.00/hour after retiring, i.e.,
approximately $1,250/month or $15,000/year. Id. He had retired from a
similar job paying $8.20/hour. Id. The release appeared to have no provision
relating his wages to the waived pension plan benefits. Id. He left Brainerd
after ten years when, if the release were not effective, he would have been
entitled to $750/month annuity or a lump sum of $70,500. Id. Thus, he

appears to have received no significant part of this benefit in increased wages.
425. Id. at 1368.
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used to analyze the circumstances, which it had used to analyze
the effectiveness of ADEA waivers in Bormann v. AT & T
Communications:426
1) the plaintiffs education and business experience, 2) the amount
of time the plaintiff had possession of or access to the agreement
before signing it, 3) the role of plaintiff in deciding the terms of the
agreement, 4) the clarity of the agreement, 5) whether the plaintiff
was represented by or consulted with an attorney [as well as
whether an employer encouraged the employee to consult an
attorney and whether the employee had a fair opportunity to do so],
and 6) whether the consideration given in exchange for the waiver
exceeds employee benefits to which the employee was already
entitled by contract or law. 421
The court made an ERISA waiver easier to uphold than an
ADEA waiver by adding to the fifth ADEA factor "whether an
employer encourages or discourages an employee to consult an
attorney, and whether the employee had a fair opportunity to do
"
This makes it less likely that the employee will fully
so. 428
understand an ERISA benefits release than an ADEA release.
Thus, the court thereby violated standard fiduciary principles that
impose greater fair dealing requirements on fiduciaries than nonfiduciaries.429
The participant is presumed to have acquired the knowledge
he would have obtained if advised by an attorney with presumed
ERISA expertise. As discussed in District 29, United Mine
Workers, even an attorney who could be expected to understand
the plan terms may not provide a participant with such
This presumption disregards the fiduciary's
understanding."0
common law obligation to assure that its beneficiary, who is asked
to consent to a trust transaction, fully understands his legal rights
and the material facts of the transactions, in particular, the
benefit claims that he is being asked to release." 1
Basing the standards for the effectiveness of releases of
claims for benefits from an ERISA plan on those applicable to Title
VII and ADEA claims has two major flaws. First, no fiduciary
standards govern those who seek releases of such claims.
426. 875 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1989).
427. Id. at 403 (original added bracketed material).
428. Id.
429. Fiduciaries, unlike non-fiduciaries, are generally required to deal fairly
with their beneficiaries, i.e., assure that they fully understand any
transactions the fiduciary encourages them to enter and the beneficiary
receive fair consideration. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 216 (1959)
(Consent of Beneficiary); id. § 217 (Discharge of Liability by Release or
Contract).
430. 842 F.2d at 736-37.
431. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 216(2) (Consent of
Beneficiary); id. § 217 (Discharge of Liability by Release or Contract).
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Employers generally have no fiduciary responsibilities to their
employees.4"2 Fiduciary principles thus have no applicability in
determining the effectiveness of a release of Title VII or ADEA
claims. By contrast, seeking releases of entitlements to claims to
ERISA benefits is a fiduciary act and thus governed by ERISA's
fiduciary provisions.
Second, damages for the failure to pay an individual his or
her ERISA plan benefits are easy to determine; they are the value
of the unpaid benefits. By contrast, there is often no accepted set
of damages for Title VII or ADEA violations." Thus, it is much
harder to assess the adequacy of the consideration received in a
Title VII or ADEA case than for an ERISA benefit claim."
In DePace v. Matsushita Electric Corp. of America, a district
court in the Second Circuit emphasized that the ultimate test of
the effectiveness of a waiver was not the Laniok factors, but
whether a release was "in fact knowing and voluntary." 5 The
court declined to dismiss a claim that an employer had
fraudulently induced executives to accept severance benefits and
resign by providing them with excessive pension benefit
estimates."
The relief sought was not the pension benefits to
which the executives were not entitled, but rather equitable relief
under ERISA section 502(a)(3), such as reformation of the pension
plan, reinstatement, or the pay they would have received if they
had not resigned." 7
The court found that the fraudulent
inducement rendered the releases of all ERISA claims against the
employer ineffective, even though the Laniok factors, including
clarity and the presence of additional consideration, seem to have
each been satisfied."' The releases would also not have been
432. See e.g., Stewart v. Jackson & Nash, 976 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1992).
433. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(D). Effective ADEA waivers require the
presence of some consideration rather than adequate consideration.
434. Similarly, 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) (1997) provides that employees may
not release their rights under the FMLA-this is a much more limited

prohibition than that of ERISA §410, 29 U.S.C. § 1110. Thus, one circuit has
concluded that Title VII release principles are inapplicable to either preaccrual or post-accrual claims to FMLA rights. See Taylor v. Progress Energy,
Inc., 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 14650 (4th Cir. July 20, 2005). But cf. Faris v.
Williams, Wp C-I, Inc., 332 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2003)
435. 257 F. Supp. 2d 543, 556 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).

436. Id. at 546-47, 574.
437. Id. at 565-66.
438. Id. at 557. The same court also subsequently denied a summary
judgment motion from the same defendants. See DePace v. Matsushita Elec.
Corp. of America, No. 02-CV-4312 (ERK)(VVP), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13316,
at *42-51 (E.D.N.Y. July 16, 2004). It literally repeated its initial analysis of
the release, but added that even if the defendants had shown they had not
engaged in fraudulent inducement because the defendants shared the
plaintiffs' ignorance of the plaintiffs' pension rights, then the release would

have been ineffective because of mutual mistake. Id. Again, there was no
discussion of the fiduciary duties of the employer requesting a release.
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effective under the Proposed Fiduciary Rules because the
individuals did not fully understand the relevant facts about their
pension plan benefits, which were material facts upon which the
release was premised." 9
In Krackow v. Dr. Jack Kern Profit SharingPlan,"' a district
court in the Second Circuit distinguished two waivers of the right
to participate in a profit-sharing plan. " ' The first was executed by
a dentist at the outset of his employment, even though he had no
idea of the benefits to which he was entitled."2 The second was
executed by the dentist in the midst of employment, when he
waived in advance three years of contributions-the amounts were
specified and credited against a debt the dentist owed his
The court correctly found the first waiver ineffective
employer.'
and the second effective by reviewing the plaintiffs degree of
understanding of the released rights.4
There were also two relatively straightforward applications
by district courts of the Second Circuit's focus on the pragmatic
question of whether releases were "knowing and voluntary."445
In Hogan v. Petitpren, Inc., a district court in the Sixth
Circuit used the Second Circuit's totality-of-circumstances analysis
to decide that a release prevented a claim that a payment in
settlement of age discrimination litigation was to be included in
the participant's compensation in order to compute his pension
plan benefits."' The issue arose because after the agreement was

439.
440.
441.
442.

Id.
No. 00 CV 2550, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20524 (E.D.N.Y. May 29, 2002).
Id. at *7.
Id. at *2.

443. Id. The plan was not a 401(k) plan, which would have permitted
participants to elect at least once a year whether to participate in the pension
plan. Consequently the dentist would have lost the ability to treat any future
plan contributions as pre-tax contributions. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(k)-l(a)(5).
444. However, the court's statement that an employer's actions to persuade
an employee to waive participation in an employee plan do not constitute

fiduciary acts of plan administration is at odds with the customary
understanding that it is a fundamental plan administration responsibility to
describe to employees the implications of participating or not participating in

ERISA plans, such as 401(k) pension plans or medical insurance plans. Id. at
*15-16.
445. The explicit omission of a term mandating medical coverage and a
request that an individual be paid on form 1099 did not constitute a knowing

and voluntary release of an individual's right to participate in an employer's
medical benefits plan. See Baraschi v. SILVERWEAR, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 11263

(MBM), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24515, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2002). A
release of ERISA benefit rights, which was presented for immediate execution

at the office of the employer's counsel to which a fired senior executive was
directed to go to execute an agreement to sell back employer stock and collect
on notes his employer owed him, was not effective. Gorman v. Earmark, Inc.,
968 F. Supp. 58 (D. Conn. 1997).

446. Hogan v. Petitpren, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 612, 615 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
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executed, the IRS announced a change in the tax treatment of
payments for emotional distress caused by discrimination: they
became taxable." 7 If the plaintiff had known this, he could have
requested that those payments be described as compensation
payments and obtained additional pension benefits.'
The court,
at the plaintiffs request, used the totality-of-circumstances
analysis presented by Adams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 8 in which the
effectiveness of a release of an ADEA claim was reviewed and the
focus was on the facts at the time of the execution of the release,"
as would be required by the Proposed Fiduciary Release Rules." 1
It appears that in any event the participant was not entitled to the
claimed inclusion of the payments under the plan terms.452
In West v. AK Steel Corporation Retirement Accumulation
Pension Plan,' a district court in the Sixth Circuit denied
summary judgment to a defendant relying on a release. The Court
held there had been no showing that the plaintiffs knew about the
claims that the cash balance plan violated ERISA."3 Moreover, the
release which referred to all employment-related claims did not
explicitly refer to pension benefits, the retirement plan or ERISA.
The court found there had not been a showing of a knowing and
voluntary relinquishment by applying the totality of circumstances
455
analysis set forth in Walker v. Asea Brown Boveri, Inc.
The Second Circuit also remanded for further consideration
two other participation waivers and directed the lower courts to
apply the same careful scrutiny of the totality-of-circumstances
test that it had found applicable to pension plan waivers to nonpension plans. First, in Sharkey v. UltramarEnergy, 6 it denied
summary judgment in favor of an employer who had claimed that
a release executed by a rehired employee on his first resignation in

447. Id. at 613.
448. See id.
449. 67 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 1995).
450. Id. at 583 (citing Bormann, 875 F.2d at 403).
451. See supra note 43.
452. This is similar to the results in Fair, 905 F.2d at 1114, and Licciardi,
990 F.2d at 979.
453. No. 1:02-CV-0001, 2005 WL 1745491 (S.D. Ohio July 25, 2005).
454. Such claims could have not been apparent by looking at the face of the

plan or its summary plan description.
455. 214 F.R.D. 58, 65 (D. Conn. Feb. 25, 2003). This case cited the Laniok

analysis. By contrast, the Fifth Circuit, in Miller v. GM Corp., No. 87-1493,

1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 5601 (6th Cir. 1988), appeared to apply contract
analysis when it found that the plaintiffs "fairly and knowingly" released their

GM severance plan rights when they agreed to become employees of EDS. The
contract appeared to be clear and unambiguous. Id.
456. See generally Sharkey v. Ultramar, 70 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 1995).
However, in an unpublished decision, the Second Circuit upheld releases of
unknown claims for accrued pension benefits without careful scrutiny. See
Yablon, 93 Fed. Appx. at 55.
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exchange for severance benefits precluded the employee from
obtaining a second set of severance benefits based on his prior
employment.457 The second severance plan was not in existence
when he first resigned and executed a release of all claims arising
from his employment.4" The court emphasized that the "release
does not clearly and unambiguously waive benefits under plans
adopted after he was rehired by the company, ' and directed the
lower court to review the totality-of-circumstances of the execution
of the waiver."0 In Yak v. Bank Brussels Lambert, the court also
reversed the dismissal of a claim for employee benefits by an
individual who at the onset of employment had signed an
agreement stating that she was an independent contractor and
was therefore not entitled to any employee benefits.4 " The lower
court was directed to review the plaintiffs actual employment
status and the totality-of-circumstances of the execution of the
Neither result would change under the Proposed
waiver."'
Fiduciary Release Rules, although different review standards
would have been applied to determine whether to void the releases
on remand.
C. The FirstCircuit'sTotality-of-CircumstancesAnalysis of
Whether an Individual Made a Knowing and Voluntary
Relinquishment of the Individual'sEntitlement to ERISA Benefits
In Rodriguez-Abreu v. Chase Manhattan Bank, the First
Circuit concluded that an individual who had selected severance
plan benefits rather than long-term disability ("LTD") benefits had
made a knowing and voluntary relinquishment of the disability
benefits." A question about the significance of certain ambiguous

457. 70 F.3d at 229-30.
458. Id. at 229. The court supported its holding that there was no reason to
give severance benefits less scrutiny than pension benefits with a reference to

Brown v. Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., No. 89 Civ. 7309, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13299 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 1991).

This illustrates the tendency to conflate

releases of Title VII claims and ERISA claims. The issue in Brown was not
the effectiveness of an ERISA waiver of severance benefits, but rather the
effectiveness of a Title VII waiver release provided in exchange for severance

benefits. Id. at *2-4.
459. Sharkey, 70 F.3d at 230-31.

460. Id. at 231.
461. 252 F.3d 127, 128-29 (2d Cir. 2001).
462. Id. at 131. As in Lynn, after the release was voided, the plaintiff was
found ineligible for the only employee benefits she pursued on remand. Yak v.
Bank Brussels Lambert, No. 99 Civ. 12090, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18091, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2002).
463. Rodriguez-Abreu, 986 F.2d at 580. The First Circuit referred to the

Fifth Circuit's holding in In re Heci Exploration Co., 862 F.2d 513, 523 (5th
Cir. 1988), that an effective "waiver of ERISA benefits must be an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." RodriguezAbreu, 986 F.2d at 587. Significantly, the Heci court had applied neither
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release language was resolved by a review of the circumstances of
the execution, including the fact that the plaintiff asked, and was
told he could not obtain both the severance benefits and the longterm disability benefits."s There was no explicit review of the
fairness of the agreement; although the fact that plaintiff was a
manager who reviewed the severance offer with his accountant
suggests that the agreement was fair and that he fully understood
his legal rights.'
Thus, the Proposed Fiduciary Release Rules
would have generated the same result.
In Feret v. First Union Corp., a district court in the Third
Circuit similarly decided that a release prevented claims for
severance benefits by individuals who had executed agreements
settling litigation for wrongful termination in which they released
all ERISA claims against the employer.'
In Smart v. Gillette Co. LTD DisabilityPlan, the First Circuit
concluded that an individual who accepted severance plan
benefits, which did not include LTD benefits, had made a knowing
and voluntary relinquishment of the LTD benefits. 7 In this case,
the plaintiff claimed she became entitled to LTD benefits after the
severance, even though she was not otherwise entitled to LTD
benefits.'
In fact, LTD benefits were only excluded from the list
of post-severance benefits in the final draft of the individually
negotiated severance agreement. 9
Thus, the court correctly
concluded that it was not confronted with a release of a claim to
entitlements to benefits under the terms of an ERISA plan.47 °
Nevertheless, the court considered and rejected the plaintiffs
argument that there was no effective release of her claim.47' The
court slightly modified the six Laniok totality-of-circumstances

contract nor fiduciary analysis, but rather determined that it was arbitrary
and capricious for the claims reviewer to find that the participant had
satisfied the plan requirements for a release of a claim of entitlement to

benefits under a pension plan by an implicit oral waiver. 862 F.2d at 525. In
particular, the plan required such a release to be explicit and in writing. Id.
464. Rodriguez-Abreu, 986 F.2d at 582 n.2.

465. Id. at 588.
466. No. Civ. 97-6759, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 570 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 1999).

The court cited Rodriguez-Abreu and rejected the plaintiffs' claims that (a)

they had received no consideration because other people executing other

releases received

the same consideration, and (b) there had been a

misrepresentation about the individuals who had also been offered releases.
Id. at *24-25. It does not appear that a different result would have been
reached under the Proposed Fiduciary Release Rules.
467. 70 F.3d 173 (1st Cir. 1995).
468. Id. at 178-80.
469. Id. at 177-78.
470. A similar decision was reached in the same manner about post-

employment LTD benefits in Piehl v. Metropolitan Life Insurance and
Raytheon LTD Plan, 2005 WL 627586 (D. Or.).
471. Smart, 70 F.3d at 183.
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criteria to determine "whether a party actually knew she was
relinquishing a benefit, and whether she acted voluntarily in doing
"
SO. 472

The court referred to the nature of the consideration for the

release rather than to its mere existence.478 The court disregarded
the plaintiffs claim that the release was ineffective on the basis
she did not "understand what ERISA was" because the plaintiff
knew that she was not being made eligible for benefits under the
LTD plan.4 74 The participant would have also been found to have
fully understood her legal rights under the Proposed Fiduciary
Release Rules.475
Two California district court decisions illustrate the
continued need for a correct contract analysis of releases. In Zhu v.
The Fujitsu Group 401(k) Plan476 a California district court held
that a release which excluded vested pension benefit rights did not
prevent a plaintiff from claiming that a vesting schedule reduction
was inapplicable to him.477 The plaintiff had signed a severance
agreement containing a release of all claims against his employer
and its employer benefit plans and their fiduciaries. However, the
agreement provided that the plaintiff remained entitled to his
vested plan benefits, whose amount was unspecified. The court
found he had not agreed to accept the plan interpretation of his
accrued benefits and he had not given up the right to obtain those
benefits, which the employer had tried to eliminate by reducing
the participant's vesting schedule in violation of ERISA section
203(c)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(c)(1)(B).
By contrast, in Bennett v. CNA Insurance COs. ,478 which cites
Smart, the court upheld a release of a claim to LTD benefits for a
pre-termination injury even though the release did not cover the

472. Id. at 182.
473. Id. at 179.
474. Id. at 182 n.5.
475. In Lund v. Citizens Financial Group, Inc., a district court in the First
Circuit applied similar analysis to a company President who similarly claimed

entitlements from a benefit program in which he had no right to continue to
participate on the basis that an individually negotiated severance agreement

which had a list of continuing benefits that did not reference the program was
not an effective release of his participation rights in such a program. No. Civ.

97-183-M, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22590, at *46-47 (D.N.H. Sept. 30, 1999).
No benefits were being released, and in any case the totality-of-circumstances

showed the exclusion even if characterized as a release was effective. Id. at
*57. In Lund, the benefit program was an unfunded deferred compensation

arrangement and thus not subject to the ERISA fiduciary rules. Id. at *3 n.3.
See also ERISA § 401(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(1).

476. 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5134 (N.D. Cal). This was pure contract analysis,
no totality of circumstances were considered.
477. This was a class action case in which the plan tried to eliminate the
initial plaintiff on the basis of release.
478. 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107 (N.D. Cal.)
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'
claim, the LTD plan, or its fiduciaries. 79
The plaintiff released all
employment related claims as part of a settlement of a dispute
about alleged sexual harassment/discrimination. The court found
that the LTD plan and its fiduciaries were "agents of the
employer" and "entities owned by the employer," and thus released
parties. In fact, employee benefits plans and their fiduciaries are
distinct from the employer and may not be their agents,' thus
they were never released.
Bennett also illustrates how the totality of circumstances
analysis may fail to consider whether the individual understood
the release or received fair consideration. The court relied on the
following factors from that analysis to show that the release was
knowing and voluntary: the individual's business sophistication,
representation by counsel, role in drafting the agreement and time
she had to review the agreement.4'
The court noted the
substantial consideration for the entire settlement agreement but
did not ask if the plan had shown that a reasonable amount was
allocable to the LTD release rather than the release of the other
claims.
By contrast, neither the First Circuit nor the Second Circuit
applied the totality of circumstances analysis, sua sponte, when
participants claimed that releases were not effective solely on the
assertion that they had been obtained under duress.482 In Deren v.
DigitalEquipment Corp. the First Circuit upheld a dismissal after
finding that the participants had effectively released their claims
to benefits under a severance plan when they accepted smaller
benefits than they may have been entitled to under the plan after
the employer withdrew its original offers.' The court found that
by filing the civil action more than three and half years after they
received the payments the participants had thereby forfeited the
right (to have the contract voided for the economic duress to which
the plaintiffs claimed they had been subjected to when they were

479. Smart by contrast involved a claim of post-termination LTD coverage,
i.e., an alleged pre-accrual release.
480. Plan fiduciaries may not act as agents of the employer. ERISA
§ 404(a)(1). Moreover, ERISA treats plans as distinct entities rather than as
entities owned by the employer. See generally ERISA § 502(d). See also
Leonelli v. Pennwalt Corp., 887 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1989); Crocco v. Xerox
Corp., 137 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1998) (employer which is not welfare plan
administrator or trustee may not be held liable for benefits under the plan).

See also infra note 543.
481. The court made no further attempt to show that these factors showed
that the plaintiff understood she was giving up her LTD claims.
482. See Samms v. Quanax Corp., No. 95-27356, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS
27356 (6th Cir. Oct. 17, 1996) and Halvorson v. Boy Scouts of America, No. 995021, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 9648 (6tth Cir. Mar. 3, 2000). Those plaintiffs
were found to have waived their ability to attack releases because they had
not returned any part of the consideration received for the ERISA releases.
483. 61 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1995).
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losing their jobs and executed the release).' Similarly, in Harless
v. RIA, a plaintiff in the Second Circuit who claimed he had signed
an agreement to settle a dispute about LTD benefits under
economic distress for $150,000 was similarly not permitted to go
forward with his claim that he was entitled to greater benefits
because of his failure to repudiate the voidable contract
promptly.'
D. The First,Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Circuits'Adequate
ConsiderationRequirement for an Effective Release of an
Individual'sEntitlement to ERISA Benefits in a Settlement of a
Bona Fide Dispute
The Fifth Circuit, in Chaplin v. NationsCredit, held that
executives who settled a bona fide dispute about eligibility for
severance benefits had effectively released their claims for such
The court found that the plan had the burden of
benefits.'
showing that a participant received "adequate consideration" in
exchange for the release. 7
The court correctly stated that if the participants were
"already legally entitled to receive severance benefits under the
plan, then the smaller severance package they received in
exchange for the releases" could not be "adequate consideration.'
Presumably if the participants were entitled to no additional
benefits, any consideration would be adequate. However, after
describing the underlying issues as not having an unambiguous
resolution, 9 the court stated:

484. Id. at 3. The plaintiff in Hogan v. Eastern Enterprises also claimed
duress in executing a release as part of an enhanced early retirement
agreement. 165 F. Supp. 2d at 60. However, the court referenced Deren and
also applied the totality-of-circumstances test because the plaintiff attacked
the release on a variety of grounds. Id. at 61-63. The case does not appear to
have involved a release of claims to entitlement to benefits under the terms of
an ERISA plan because the plaintiff received all the benefits to which he was
entitled when the release was executed. Id. Rather he claimed he had a right

to post-release benefit enhancements, which the court considered and rejected.
Id.
485. 1 F. Supp. 2d 235, 242-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).

See also Sarver, Jr. v.

Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc., in which an individual, who may have
lacked capacity when he executed a purported release of a claim for

unspecified ERISA benefits, was also found to have failed to repudiate
promptly after regaining his incapacity. No. 96-1283 R, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12184, at *4-5 (E.D. La. Aug. 23, 1996).
486. 307 F.3d 368, 373-74 (5th Cir. 2002).
487. Id. at 374.
488. Id.
489. The two issues were whether the individuals had been designated as
participants pursuant to the plan terms, and if so designated, whether they
satisfied the other benefit prerequisites before the plan had been allegedly
terminated. Id.
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Perhaps plaintiffs would have proven their eligibility for the plan if
they had not signed the releases and instead had taken their
underlying ERISA claims to trial; but perhaps not. That is a story
whose ending we shall never know, because plaintiffs signed the
releases. By doing so, they surrendered their disputed right to a
largerpayment for a certain right to a smaller payment, which is to
say, they received adequate considerationfor the releases.490
Under this reasoning any payment would have been adequate
consideration. The Proposed Fiduciary Release Rules, however,
require that the amount and strength of the claim be valued to
determine if the consideration for the release was fair and
reasonable.
In Morais v. Central Beverage Corp. Union Employees'
Supplemental Retirement Plan, the First Circuit concluded that an
individual was bound by a release of his disability pension benefit
rights because (1) the $5,000 he had received was reasonable
consideration for the release of those rights; (2) the individual fully
understood what was being released when he executed an
agreement resolving a dispute about the reduction of the
participant's benefits by a workers' compensation award under the
plan terms; and (3) the individual had no basis for his claim for
additional benefits.491
The participant began receiving a disability pension in
In 1995, the plan learned he had received workers'
1993.'
compensation benefits and informed him that his future pension
benefits would thus be reduced. 49 3 The participant filed a union
grievance and, with the union's assistance, negotiated the
settlement agreement. 49 Twenty months later, he filed a benefit
claim with the plan that his disability pension benefit should have
been only reduced for the month in which he received the workers'
compensation lump sum award.495
The Morais court concluded that $5,000 was a reasonable
estimate for the lump sum value of the participant's plan
The court did this after reviewing and rejecting the
benefits. '
Moreover, it
plaintiffs interpretation of the pension plan. 97
rejected the participant's assertions about the circumstances of the

490. Id. (emphais added)
491. 167 F.3d 709 (1st Cir. 1999). The court thus upheld a fair settlement of
a bona fide dispute about the specific ERISA plan entitlements at issue under
the Proposed Fiduciary Release Rules. In such a case there was no question
about the coverage of the release.
492. Id. at 711.
493. Id.
494. Id.
495. Id.
496. Id. at 714.
497. Id. Thus, the court's holding would not have changed if it had voided
the release.
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execution of the release agreement because releases of claims for
benefits under ERISA plans are governed by the principle that
"contracts containing unambiguous language must be construed
according to their plain and natural meaning. " ' In particular, a
contract description of the circumstances of execution takes
precedence unless the plaintiff shows he was incapacitated when
he executed the contract, which he had not done."'
In Unum Life Insurance Co. of America v. Cappello, a Rhode
Island district court in the First Circuit used the totality of
circumstances analysis to conclude that a release of an individual's
wrongful termination claims, including ERISA-based claims'
against her employer and its plan fiduciaries in exchange for
ninety-six weeks of severance benefits, did not effectively release
her right to LTD benefits from the employer's Unum plan."
The court found that the agreement's language did not clearly
release Unum.'
The reference to releasing plan fiduciaries did
not unambiguously refer to Unum, and the employer continued to
deduct LTD premiums after the execution of the agreement.'
However, more importantly, neither party contemplated releasing
the plaintiffs LTD benefits.'
In reviewing the nature of the
consideration for the release, the court looked at its adequacy.'
The court agreed that the consideration received under the
agreement was substantial," but did not find that Unum had
shown that the consideration was sufficient to cover both the
termination claims and the LTD disability benefits."7 The release
would have also been void under the Proposed Fiduciary Release
Rules because the individual did not fully understand the released
rights and did not receive fair consideration for such release.
In West v. AK Steel CorporationRetirement Accumulation
Pension Plan'° a Sixth Circuit district court required a showing of
more than fair consideration for a defendant to obtain summary
judgment based on a release. The court asked if there had been a
498. Id. at 712.
499. Id. at 713.
500. The release contained an explicit exception for workers' compensation

claims but not for LTD claims.
501. 278 F. Supp. 2d 228, 236 (D.R.I. 2003).

502. Id. at 234-36.
503. Id. at 234-35.
504. Id. at 234-36. The Proposed Fiduciary Releases impose an even greater
burden for an effective release. The plaintiff must have understood not only
that certain benefit claims were being released but the extent of the released
benefits.
505.
506.
other
claim
507.

Id. at 235-36.
Id. The consideration was $140,000 and nearly twice that offered to
employees who lacked her twenty-four years of experience and a strong
of a wrongful termination.
Id. at 236.

508. 2005 WL 1745491
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showing that the plaintiff had received an amount in excess of the
plaintiffs claim. Thus, the court assumed the validity of the
plaintiffs claim rather than assessing its strength to determine its
value. This requirement arose because the court it held that
releases of federal claims are not permitted if "overreaching or
The court was
exploitation is inherent in the situation."'
concerned about this possibility because the releases had been
executed in concert with a reduction in force.51°
In Davis v. Bowman Apple Products," ' a Virginia district
court in the Fourth Circuit relied on the totality-of-circumstances
analysis presented in Morais512 to invalidate a release of a
participant's breach of fiduciary claim for pension benefits.5 1 The
release had been executed when he received what had been
represented as his total plan benefits. " There was no showing
that the plaintiff had been made aware, when he executed the
release that he was thereby purportedly giving up his claim for
benefits worth $40,000 in exchange for $12,000.'15 The basis for
the plaintiffs claim was that he was entitled to have been treated
as working on the final day he came to work and therefore entitled
to 100% rather then thirty percent vesting of his pension
benefits. 1 '
XI.

THE ANALYSIS COURTS HAVE APPLIED TO DETERMINE IF

GENERAL RELEASES EFFECTIVELY RELEASE CLAIMS TO UNKNOWN
OR UNCONTESTED ENTITLEMENTS TO

ERISA

BENEFITS

[T]he language... clearly and specifically released "all claims
and/ordemands of whatever kind or nature."

509. This condition was not derived from any cases considering ERISA
claims but one upholding an ADA waiver, Mararri v. WCI Steel, 30 F.3d 1180
(6th Cir. 1997). This case rested upon one upholding an ADEA waiver,
Runyan v. National Cash Register Corp., 787 F.2d 1039 (6th Cir. 1986), which
in turn was derived from the dissent to the decision voiding FLSA releases in
Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697 (1945).
510. 2005 WL 1745491, at *3.
511. No. 5:00CV00033, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6204 (W.D. Va. Mar. 29,
2002).
512. 167 F.3d at 709.
513 The breach that was complained of was not the failure to pay the
individual his earned benefits but rather the failure to make fair disclosure
about the material terms of the release. Under the Proposed Fiduciary Rules,
such a fair dealing breach voids the release.
514. Davis, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6204, at *28.
515. Id. at *28-29.
516. Id. at *2-4. The fiduciaries nevertheless prevailed because the statute
of limitations period to file the breach of fiduciary claim had expired. The
court also found that the distinct statute of limitation for an ordinary benefits
claim to the plan under ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B),
had expired. Id.
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The release was signed in November 1985. Because Wright did not
assert his ERISA claim until this lawsuit was filed in December
1988, it was impossible for either SWB or Wright to know of this
claim when the release was signed. Although we agree the language
of the release is sufficiently clear to release the pending
discrimination claims we hold it is insufficient to release future
claims againstSWB about which neitherparty knew.' 7
In short, a general release of "any and all" claims applies to all
possible causes of action, unless a statute specifically and expressly
requires a release to mention the statute for the release to bar a
cause of action under the statute.
ERISA contains no such
requirements. The releases therefore cover plaintiffs' claims for
ERISA benefits.518
Specific releases explicitly describe both the claim for
employee benefits that is being released and the party that is
being released, such as the plan, which may differ from the
employer for a trusteed or insured plan. General releases, which
lack one or both of these references, raise two distinct issues,
under both the Proposed Fiduciary Release Rules and any
reasonable contractual analysis. "' These issues are sometimes
conflated.
The first is the coverage prerequisite for an effective release.
Does the release cover both the claim at issue and the party
claiming to be released?
As discussed, supra, the courts
sometimes disregard this issue and assume that there is no
difference between an ERISA plan, its fiduciaries and the
plaintiffs employer and its agents.
The second issue is the full understanding prerequisite for an
effective release. The Proposed Fiduciary Release Rules ask
whether the plaintiff fully understood the release. As discussed,
supra, the courts often do not seek full understanding; rather they
seek "knowing relinquishments" or "requisite knowledge." Unlike
coverage, this knowledge may not be shown by reviewing the
agreement in isolation because a general release by definition does
not specify the released claim, the released party or both. This
reality is not changed by boilerplate provisions that the
participant (a) understood the agreement containing the release;
(b) unknown claims are covered, and (b) was advised and given the

517. Wright v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 925 F.2d 1288, 1293 (10th Cir.
1991) (emphasis added and citations omitted).
518. Chaplin, 307 F.3d at 373-74 (emphasis added).
519. We are assuming, arguendo, for purposes of this section that ERISA
sections 206(d) and 410, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1056(d) and 1110, do not void any
releases of claims for entitlements of ERISA benefits.
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opportunity to seek legal or other professional counsel.52 Courts
have found that the requisite knowledge is present for a general
release by reviewing the circumstances of the execution52' or the
plaintiffs concessions.522 Two Fifth Circuit cases illustrate the
difference between the two issues about the effectiveness of
general releases.
In Chaplin v. Nationscredit,the Fifth Circuit concluded that
executives who settled a bona fide dispute about eligibility for
severance benefits had effectively released their claims for such
benefits in a general claims release.522 The issue involved the
release's coverage.2
The participants conceded they understood
they had released the claims to benefits at issue."n The court
rightly rejected the participants' assertion that an effective release
of ERISA52 6 benefit rights must include an explicit reference to
"ERISA."
By contrast, in Carrabba v. Randalls Food Markets, the
Fifth Circuit focused on a lack of understanding rather than
coverage and affirmed a decision that the individuals had not
effectively released their claims to benefits from a pension plan525

520. This is consistent with the claims regulations which do not permit
general denials of claims for entitlements to benefits under ERISA plans but
instead require references to specific plan provisions. The consequence of such
deficiency is identical to the ineffectiveness of a release-the participant is
given court access.
521. See, e.g., Leavitt, 921 F.2d at 160, 162-63 (finding effective a general
release of all claims against the employer appeared to have been used in an
agreement settling a bona fide dispute about the participant's eligibility for
severance benefits, but the participant's understanding of the release rights
was shown by the facts surrounding the execution of the agreement).
Compare Barbera v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. Long-Term
Disability Plan, No. 04-1598 (DWF/SRN), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21862
(finding a general release of "unknown claims" did not include LTD claims
when the plaintiff did not know of the plan).
522. See, e.g., Hogan v. Pettipren Employees Profit-Sharing Plan, 92 F.
Supp. 2d 612 (E.D. Mich.). A release of "any and all claims" against an
employer, its agents and representatives" applied to a pension claim after the
plaintiffs attorneys conceded that the agreement was intended to be "allencompassing." But cf. Dist. 29, United Mine Workers v. New River Co., 842
F.2d 734, 737 (4th Cir. 1988) in which the court conceded that the plaintiffs
may not have understood the ERISA benefit claims that were being released
but upheld the release based on its terms.
523. 307 F.3d at 373-74.
524. Id. at 370-71.
525. Id. at 372.
526. Id. at 373. Compare rejections of similar assertions in Smart, 70 F.3d
at 173, and Martino-Catt,317 F. Supp. 2d at 914.
527. 145 F. Supp. 2d 763 (N.D. Tex. 2000), affd, 252 F.3d 721 (5th Cir.
2001).
528. No question was raised about why the plan was not mentioned as a
separate released party but only the employer was named as a defendant. The
plan had been operated as though it did not need to comply with the ERISA
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terminated two years before they executed a general release in a
severance agreement that provided that the employee released his
employer "from all claims, liabilities, demands and causes of
action, known or unknown, fixed or contingent, which [they might]
have or claim to have against [defendant] as a result of [their]
employment and this termination. "5' The court found that there
was no evidence that either the individuals or their employer had
any idea that the release pertained to the claims under the
terminated pension plan." ° Thus, the defendants had not met
their burden to show that the employees had knowingly
relinquished or abandoned a known right."l
The court contrasted Carrabba with another Fifth Circuit
case in which a similar general release was found to encompass
ERISA claims because the plaintiff referred to the ERISA claims
within the period he was given to revoke the release, yet did not
revoke the release. 2 Similarly, the Tenth Circuit held that a
general release of "all claims," which was part of an agreement
settling a bona fide dispute about race discrimination, did not
suffice to establish the requisite knowledge for an effective release
of a future disability benefit claim under a totality-ofcircumstances analysis applicable to releases of Title VII
discrimination claims.=
In Auslander v. Abraham Helfand, a district court in the
Fourth Circuit held that a release of all claims "whether known,
unknown, or unforeseen.., arising out of any event, transaction,
or matter that occurred before the date of this Settlement
Agreement," did not apply to an unasserted claim for accrued
pension benefits. ' The court held that the general release which
was part of a settlement of litigation with respect to allegations of
embezzlement by the participant against his former employer
applied only to the plaintiffs accrued claims, i.e., those which he
then had the right to bring a civil action. 5
requirement for a separate trust because it was wrongfully treated as a tophat plan, which would have been subject to the exemption of ERISA sections
4(b) and 401(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1003(b), 1101(a). Carrabba, 145 F. Supp. 2d at

768.
529. Id. at 771 (alteration in original).

530. Id. at 771-72.
531. Id. at 771. See also Smart, 70 F.3d at 181-82 and Barbera v. Minn.
Mining & Mfg. Long-Term Disability Plan, No. 04-1598 (DWF/SRN), 2004 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 21862, at *1 (D. Minn. Oct. 26, 2004).
532. Wittorffv. Shell Oil Co., 37 F.3d 1151, 1154 (5th Cir. 1994).
533. Wright, 925 F.2d at 1293. See also Antoniu v. Thiokol Corp. LTD Plan
(Plan No. 503), in which a general release was found inapplicable to LTD

benefits which were not considered at the time of the execution of the release
and were terminated eight months after the execution. 849 F. Supp. 1531,
1535 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
534. 988 F. Supp. 576, 578-81 (D. Md. 1997).

535. Id. at 581-82.
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The Fourth Circuit, however, prevents a participant from
beginning a civil action for benefits from an ERISA plan until the
participant has exhausted the plan's claims review procedures,
i.e., the plan has denied the participant's initial claim and the
appeal of the denial. In short, the participant is denied court
access until the participant's claim has been reviewed by a party
with a fiduciary duty to follow the plan terms that are consistent
with ERISA."6 There had been no showing of such claims filing.
Thus, the release did not cover his potential claim to accrued
benefits from a pension plan.
Similarly in an unpublished
decision, Hudson v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., the Tenth Circuit
found inapplicable a general release to a future claim for disability
benefits."?
The court in Lund v. Citizens Financial Group, Inc.,
responded to this argument by stating that "the question is
whether the claim is one 'whose facts were well enough known for
the maker of the release to frame a general description of it and
request an explicit reservation. ' This was inapplicable to Lund
because a dispute with respect to the eligibility to the benefits at
issue was settled with an explicit list of the benefits to which the
parties agreed the participant was entitled."s This argument is
also inapplicable if, when the release was executed, the claim was
unknown as in Wright'" or Carrabba."
The argument is
inappropriate if the claim had not been asserted, whether or not
known, as in Auslander, because the argument presumes plan
fiduciaries will only comply with their future ERISA duties to
determine an individual's benefits correctly if explicitly reminded
of such duties. This is contrary to the basic ERISA requirement
that plan fiduciaries are responsible for knowing and following
ERISA plan terms."3
In Cange v. Stotler & Co., a non-ERISA release case, the
Seventh Circuit found that prospective waivers of other federal
statutory protections tend to encourage violations of law and are
thus generally void.' It may be and has been argued that waivers

536. See supra note 49 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
exhaustion requirement to initiate an action for an ERISA benefits claim.
537. No. 94-6392, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 25957, at *6 (10th Cir. Sept. 13,

1995).
538. 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22590, at *46.
539. Id. at *41-42.
540. 925 F.2d at 1293
541. 145 F. Supp. 2d 763 (N.D. Tex. 2000), affd, 252 F.3d 721 (5th Cir. 2001)

542. 988 F. Supp. at 577. The Auslander plaintiff probably knew that he
had accrued benefits under his employer's profit-sharing plan, although he

had not asserted a claim to such benefits on or before the time he executed the
general release.
543. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
544. 826 F.2d 581, 594-95 (7th Cir. 1987).
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of unasserted claims for ERISA benefit entitlements would
similarly encourage the plan fiduciaries to violate their duty to
participant or
determine correctly the benefits to which the
5
plan.
ERISA
the
under
to
entitled
is
beneficiary
The fiduciary obligation of the Releasing Fiduciary may not
have been apparent in Lund because the deferred compensation
plan at issue was restricted to a select group of management
employees; thus the ERISA's fiduciary rules did not apply in the
Lund case." 6
A New York district court in Yablon, however, dismissed' a
plaintiffs claim for accrued pension benefits when it disregarded
the basic principles for reviewing the effectiveness of a general
release that was part of form severance agreement that he
received and executed on the day his employment was terminated.
The plaintiff was held to know the significance of the release
because the agreement was only two pages long, he acknowledged
"understanding the agreement" and being "encouraged to consult
an attorney" and the release referred to a release of "any claims
for employee benefits. " " A pension plan and its fiduciaries were
held to be released and the individual understood these parties
were released when the released parties were described as "the
employer, its officers, agents in their individual and representative
capacities."55 ° Finally, no basis was given by the court for the
545. See e.g., Reighard v. Limbach Co., 158 F. Supp. 2d 730, 733 (E.D. Va.
2001) (finding the right to claim life insurance benefits was not waived
prospectively).
546. ERISA § 401(a)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(1). For a discussion of the
analysis of claims for benefit claim entitlements under such top-hat plans, see
Kemmerer v. ICIAmericas Inc., 70 F.3d 281 (3d Cir. 1995).
547. Yablon, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10528, at *1, affd, 93 Fed. Appx. 329 (2d
Cir. 2004) (unpublished opinion).
548. All presumptions are thus made in favor of the plaintiff.
549. Id. at *16-18. However, as in Carrabba,the assets of one pension plan
not mentioned in the agreement had been distributed more than eight months
before the execution of the agreement. The other plan (the "absorbed plan")
had been merged into a new plan that was exempt from the release. Despite
the court finding that the release relieved the merged plan of any obligation to
make any post-release payments to the plaintiff, the absorbed plan distributed
funds to the individual from the merged plan after the release was executed.
Thus, the administrators of the new plan, who, like the plaintiff, were aware
of the release treated the release as not affecting the plaintiffs right to claim
benefits from the merged plan.
550. Id. at *18-19. Plan fiduciaries must act solely in the interests of plan
participants and beneficiaries; thus they may not perform such duties as
employer representatives. See ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1);
NLRB v. AMAX Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329-31 (1982); Pegram, 530 U.S. at
223-25. The cited case does not support the assertion that the term
.representative" was intended to or did include representatives of the plaintiffemployee or representatives of the distinct pension plans. Nor did the cited
case support the application of res judicata to the fiduciary releases, if
arguendo effective, to thereby release the two unmentioned pension plans
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plaintiff to suspect that an ADEA release agreement purportedly
increasing his compensation and benefits 55 was also reducing his
accrued pension benefits.
XII.CONCLUSION

ERISA section 2, entitled
Declaration of Policy," provides:

"Congressional Findings

and

(b) It is hereby declared to be the policy of this Act to protect.., the
interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their
beneficiaries..,
by
establishing
standards
of conduct,
responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit
plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions and
ready access to the Federal courts.
One of the key components of ERISA's protection of employee
benefits is the provision of ready access to the federal courts by
ERISA participants and beneficiaries who wish to challenge
alleged deprivations of those benefits. In particular, releases of
claims for ERISA benefit entitlements are void ab initio unless
they satisfy very stringent conditions. On the other hand, voiding
a release does not entitle an individual to any ERISA benefits, but
only to the opportunity to have a full and fair judicial review of the
claim to an entitlement to ERISA plan benefits.
ERISA section 410, 29 U.S.C. § 1110 voids all releases of
claims to entitlement to ERISA plan benefits. That section
prohibits fiduciaries from being relieved of their fiduciary duties,
including the most vital of them: the duty to pay participants and
beneficiaries all the employee plan benefits to which those
individuals are entitled.
ERISA section 206(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d), prohibits pension
plans from being released from their obligation to pay participants
and beneficiaries the pension benefits to which they are entitled
and which have accrued prior to executing the release. Thus,
settlements of disputes about accrued pension benefits, like
settlements of overtime pay disputes, require judicial approval to
become binding.5 2
If, arguendo, any releases of claims to entitlements to ERISA
which were distinct entities. Thus, the plan and its fiduciaries had failed to
show that the plaintiff fully understood what or who he was releasing.
551. The agreement was presented as providing the plaintiff with additional
consideration because effective ADEA releases must provide consideration. 29
U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(D). The court made no attempt to determine whether any

part of the consideration was attributable to the release of claims to accrued
pension benefits, let alone whether such part was fair consideration for the
released pension claims.
552. ERISA unlike the FLSA has no provision, such as 29 U.S.C. § 216(c),
giving the Department of Labor or any other non-court entity, the authority to

make these releases effective.
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plan benefits are permitted then ERISA sections 3(21)(A) and 404,
29 U.S.C. §§ 1002 and 1104, void such releases unless the person
who wishes to rely on the release may show that the release was
obtained in compliance with the following fair dealing
requirements, the Proposed Fiduciary Release Rules: (1) the
individual voluntarily entered an agreement which covers the
claim, and the plan or plan fiduciaries; (2) the individual fully
understood, when executing the agreement, what the plan
fiduciary should have known or did know about the rights being
purportedly released; and (3) the individual received fair and
reasonable consideration for the release. These elements of fair
dealing are always present in fair settlements of bona fide
disputes about an individual's entitlement to ERISA plan benefits.
Boilerplate provisions, by which a participant acknowledges
having understood the agreement, having the opportunity to
consult legal counsel, and being encouraged to do so, are not
enough to establish a valid release of an entitlement to the
employee benefits. Nor will validity result from the mere addition
of general release language by which participants or beneficiaries
purport to release unknown, uncontested, or all claims pertaining
to employment, employee benefit plans, ERISA rights, or even the
plan name itself. These provisions do not suffice to show that the
participant or beneficiary fully understood the specific claims
being released.
Thus, ERISA prevents such releases from
depriving participants or beneficiaries of their earned plan
benefits unless, arguendo, ERISA permits such releases, and such
understanding may be established by circumstances other then
the terms of the release.
Finally, releases in severance agreements may never deprive
participants and beneficiaries of their accrued pension benefit
entitlements. If, arguendo, permitted releases pertaining to
welfare benefits or to the pension treatment of payments under
such agreements are void unless the individual fully understood
the rights purportedly released and was compensated fairly for
them. By contrast, neither fiduciary safeguards nor antiassignment prohibitions apply to releases of ordinary contract
claims and claims for Title VII or ADEA damages. Employees
thus may effectively waive unasserted and unknown contractual
and Title VII claims arising from their employment when they
execute a severance agreement containing a release of all such
claims."'
553. See generally Oubre v. Entergy Operations Inc., 522 U.S. 422 (1998)

(holding the plaintiffs failure to tender back consideration prior to filing
ADEA claim did not cause an ADEA release, which violated the statutory
requirements to become valid); Parisis G. Filippatos & Sean Farhang, The
Rights of Employees Subjected to Reductions in Force:A CriticalEvaluation, 6
EMPL. RTs. & EMPLOY. POLY J. 263, 298-317 (2002).

